

Top Negotiators address Chişinău workshop

Natalia Gherman is Moldova's deputy foreign minister and chief negotiator with the EU. CESS spoke to her in Chişinău during the second in a series of UNDP workshops on EU negotiations organised by CESS and its partners. Ms Gherman had just returned from a visit to The Hague and Berlin where she spoke to her colleagues about the visa liberalisation regime, one of the main priorities for Moldova in its relations with the EU.

"The objective of Moldova is to eventually join the EU. We would have liked to see a perspective of EU membership given to us in a pre-ambule of the Association Agreement. This was done in the past for the Western Balkan countries. It would have served as additional encouragement for the reforms that Moldova needs to undertake. Moldova has been denied this perspective, and I think this is a mistake." Ms Gherman told us. She went on to say:

"By entering into Association Agreement negotiations, we subsequently reform our structures and institutions involved in the process. In this phase, it is important that we build capacity, which we want to consolidate for the process of implementation of Association. A lesson we have learned from others and which has been stressed by Ms Obradović as well, is that it is not a race. We might take a bit more time to train our people and build capacity, involving all stakeholders. This would ensure a solid foundation for the proper implementation of the agreement."

"We are following what is going on in the EU, and we see that there is a strong resistance to further enlargement. But Moldova has no alternative. We have chosen this path of internal reform of our structures in line with the *acquis communautaire* and European standards. We want to be ready if the occasion arises and the EU decides to allow new countries into the family."

Ms Gherman concluded by saying:

"Moldova is a European country. It is not a neighbour of Europe, but a neighbour of the EU. We are Europe. There is no alternative for Moldova. For us European integration is a natural choice."



Natalia Gherman

Lessons Learned in Croatia

The CESS team of instructors at the Chişinău workshop consisted of Paul Meerts of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Arcadie Barbarosie of the Institute for Public Policy in Moldova, Sami Faltas, Erik Sportel and the former deputy chief negotiator of Croatia, Tamara Obradović-Mazal.



Tamara Obradović-Mazal

The trainees were delighted by Ms Obradović's practical and candid descriptions of the difficulties and pitfalls of her country's negotiations with the EU. While Croatia's accession process is considered a success story, the former top negotiator spoke frankly about the mistakes she and her colleagues had made.

CESS: "Was the process of association and accession difficult?"

"Yes, definitely. It has never been easy, but after the fifth wave of enlargement, the member states introduced all kinds of novelties that made things more difficult for accession candidates. Instead of opening and closing chapters in one go, the EU now checked all details step by step."

CESS: "Do candidates have room for manoeuvre, or must they simply do as the EU demands?"

Obradović: "Yes, there is some room for negotiation. At our request, the Union agreed to focus on areas that were of particular importance to Croatia, such as wine, agricultural production, real estate and industrial policy. I have tasted exquisite Moldovan wines, and it seems to me that they should make wine a major topic. Like us, they need to be very substantive and careful. State aid is always a difficult topic. We underestimated it, and suffered the consequences."

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Chişinău Training Workshop

CESS: “Are the required reforms merely a price that one pays, or are they useful in themselves?”

Obradović: “I would say both. Unless society is involved, consulted and informed, the process will remain secretive. Some reforms need to be made anyway, such as intellectual property rights and consumer protection. So the people see Brussels pushing our government to carry out necessary reforms. The pressure coming from Brussels can be a good thing.”

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued a call for tenders for training workshops for senior Moldovan negotiators. The assignment, sponsored by Sweden, was won by a consortium consisting of CESS, the European Integration Strategy Association (EISA, Germany) and the Institute for Public Policy (IPP, Moldova). The series of workshops is meant to build capacity of the Moldovan public authorities involved in negotiations with the EU. The first two workshops were held on 19-22 July and 21-24 September. The remaining two workshops will be held on 18-21 October and 16-19 November. The central theme of the October workshop will be economic policies. The last workshop will be deal with agriculture and rural development.

A Gentle Heart and a Firm Hand

When the top negotiators met in the workshop, Tamara Obradović addressed Natalia Gherman as follows:

“Madame Deputy Foreign Minister. I know how you feel. I was once in your shoes. It’s a big job you have. I wish you every success, a gentle heart, but a very firm hand.”

It soon became clear what Ms Obradović meant by a firm hand. She related the difficulties she encountered getting her colleagues from various Croatian ministries to meet the targets they had agreed to, and admitted that she often had to play the proverbial ‘bad cop’ at the side of her minister, whose role was usually that of the ‘good cop.’

On the subject of legal harmonisation, she described the problems the Croatian government faced when a draft law that had been designed to meet EU requirements and had been approved by the Commission was subsequently amended in parliament, so that it no longer satisfied the European Commission.

The workshop clearly demonstrated Moldova’s determination to pursue its European vocation.

Georgia on the Brink of Constitutional Change

Current political debate in Georgia is focussing on a government proposal to amend the constitution. The proposed changes will redistribute the power between the president, the prime minister and parliament. Supporters of the amendment say it will prevent a possible concentration of power in the hands of a single person. However critics suspect that the proposed shifting of competencies between the president and the prime minister are meant to enable President Saakashvili to switch to the post of prime minister and thus hold on to power after his second and last term ends in January 2013.

Mr Saakashvili denounced this criticism, claiming that if he had intended to secure his position in power he would have called for a referendum seeking the voters’ consent to run for a third term as president or to transfer all powers to the prime minister. He did not speculate on the possible reaction of Georgia’s Western partners to such a move.



Dutch and Georgian MPs discuss parliamentary inquiries

A ‘Putin Scenario’?

Speaking to *Le Monde* in June, Mr Saakashvili had clearly hinted at the possibility of becoming prime minister at the end of his second presidential term. A public opinion poll showed that one-third of the respondents did not like this idea.

In the meantime, opposition is growing against the intended constitutional amendments. The Labour Party wants to include a provision that would prevent an incumbent president from running for key government positions for five years after his last term as president. Several other opposition parties have responded positively to the Labour Party’s idea. The weak point in the opposition parties’ resistance to the proposed amendments is that after the elections of 2008 they decided not to take their place in parliament. They have therefore robbed themselves of the opportunity to participate in the decision-making on constitutional changes.

The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe composed of independent experts on constitutional law, visited Tbilisi in September to discuss the amendment package. They said a constitutional provision as proposed by the opposition was possible, but they would not make the recommendation themselves.

CESS is implementing the **Georgia Parliamentary Programme**, a three year Netherlands-sponsored programme that aims to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the security sector. The project started in November 2008 and will run till October 2011. The main target groups are MPs and their staff dealing with security issues, as well as representatives from relevant ministries like the Ministry of Defence, and civil society. It consists of a series of seminars and training courses as well as the publication of an expert report. The upcoming event, to be held in Batoumi in October, is a training course entitled “*Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. Skills, Tools and Techniques.*” In December we will return for the second training course in a series of four.

Promoting Good Governance in the Security Sector of Turkey

Turkey wants democratic change to continue. This was confirmed once again by the yes vote of 12 September on a constitutional reform package. Politicians may disagree about some of the reforms, but nearly everyone agrees that there is no turning back on the road to full and mature democracy. Now Turkey faces the challenge of carrying out the reforms approved. CESS is offering its assistance by means of a new three-year programme of seminars. Its main objective is to enhance the civilian capacity for good governance in the security sector. Another important aim is to contribute to the establishment of a culture of accountability in Turkey.

A Lack of Civilians

Turkey has large and highly professional armed forces, which also play a leading role in formulating defence and security policy, under the political responsibility of the prime minister. There are too few civilians working in the making and execution of security policy. Besides, current and potential practitioners are perhaps not sufficiently aware of the needs and possibilities for close collaboration amongst government agencies, between uniformed and civilian officials, and between government, journalists and civil society. In a nutshell, Turkey needs to expand and improve civilian capacity for the making, execution and oversight of security policy.

The outcome of the referendum suggests that most Turks want to replace or improve their current constitution, which bears the imprint of the military *coup d'état* of 1980. Step by step, the army is being placed under civilian control and subjected to democratic oversight. In this issue of *Security Matters*, Nil Şatana of Bilkent University argues that Turkey needs to foster a culture of accountability in its security sector. Today it is not enough for security officials to do their work professionally and efficiently. Internationally affirmed norms require them to also work transparently, to account for their actions and to respect human rights and civil liberties. The best signs of a mature democracy are a culture of accountability and a strong parliament and civil



Atatürk's Mausoleum in Ankara

society who boldly monitor everyone who wields public power. Revealing, explaining and justifying what it does and what it spends should become a routine obligation for the executive and holding the government to account should be the responsibility of parliament. That is the two-way street of democratic governance.

Building Capacity

Good governance is especially difficult to achieve in the security sector. There are various reasons for this, such as uncertainty, secrecy, complexity and the use of force. But for similar reasons, it is vitally important for the security sector to be well governed. Hence good governance is most difficult to achieve where it is most needed.

The programme **Promoting Good Governance in the Security Sector of Turkey, sponsored by the Matra programme of the Netherlands government**, will run from 1 March 2010 – 28 February 2013. Its participants include deputies and officials of state organs that oversee the executive branch, academics, professionals working in parliament and representatives of the media and civil society organisations that critically monitor the work of the government

The first public events in this programme are a high level seminar on **Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector** on 12 October in Ankara, followed by an interactive seminar on the same topic from 13-15 October.

Later this year, on 13 December 2010, we will organise a paper workshop on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector on 14 December a High Level Seminar on **Financial Control** and on 15-17 December an Interactive Seminar on the same topic. All these events are in Ankara.

Our programme will address these problems by helping to develop civilian capacity for good governance in the security sector. The programme is being carried out, in cooperation with Bilkent University and the Istanbul Policy Center.

The main aim of the first seminar, to be held from 12 to 15 October, is to examine the present state of parliamentary and civil society oversight of the security sector in Turkey. Which changes in legislative oversight over the security sector are to be expected now that the Turkish people voted in favour of the constitutional reform package? And what does this mean for the oversight role of civil society and the

media? Which further reforms are needed in this regard? At the seminar we will debate the role of parliament, civil society and the media. In future seminars we will deal with financial control, rule of law and civil direction.

Training for a 'Mission Impossible'?

In 2007, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD published a Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) that explained how the Western donors should support SSR. This OECD doctrine was also adopted by the European Union. At the request of OECD DAC, CESS and other institutes developed a training module and began teaching SSR workshops and offering training for trainers in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as for EU officials in Brussels. With RACVIAC in Croatia, CESS developed and taught a series of SSR courses, including a training for trainers, for practitioners in South East Europe.

The SSR courses that CESS developed and taught at RACVIAC were supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main purpose of the **introductory course on SSR** was to bring together representatives from relevant South East European ministries and parliaments and NGOs with a view to introducing and debating SSR. This first course took place at the RACVIAC premises on 16-20 November 2009.

The **advanced training course** was conducted on 22-25 March 2010. Here we discussed SSR in an international context. Like the introductory course the trainees came from ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and parliaments from South East Europe.

CESS followed up its SSR activities at RACVIAC with a **training of trainers** course for a selected group of trainees. This event took place on 16-18 June 2010. We welcomed a few alumni from previous SSR courses at RACVIAC and we invited former trainees and partners from Starlink countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. During the event the trainees practiced their training skills with the rest of the group and learned how to design training course and how to write simulation games.

The OECD DAC approach to SSR is based on four guiding principles. Security System Reform is supposed to make the security system of the country concerned more effective, that is to say better capable of delivering security and justice services to the population. However, it must ensure that this is done in a way that is transparent, accountable and respectful of the rule of law. OECD DAC is adamant that if capacity building does not go together with integrity, the effort should not be called SSR. The problem is, of course, that donors, beneficiaries and various stakeholders do not necessarily see eye to eye about these objectives. Donors tend to be more interested in promoting integrity, whereas the governments receiving SSR support tend to be more interested in modernisation and capacity building.

Local Ownership and Donor Conditions

The next pair of guiding principles are local ownership and sustainability, two golden rules of development co-operation that have been integrated into SSR doctrine. If an SSR programme is not driven and led by local stakeholders, it will not be well suited to the needs of the country concerned. Of course, it will also not continue after donor support has come to an end. So local ownership and sustainability go together, like capacity and integrity. Here the problem is that the OECD DAC approach is a donor strategy. The Western donors have committed themselves to supporting SSR in this manner and under these conditions, one of which is local ownership. This conveys two conflicting messages to the recipients of such aid. One, you must take charge of the whole reform effort. Two, your reform effort must conform to our doctrine. Otherwise, we will not be able to help you.

There is another ambitious element in the OECD DAC approach to Security System Reform. It requires all government agencies, as well as non-governmental organisations involved in SSR support, to work together closely. This is essential, if the effort is to promote and improve the human security of each man, woman and child in the country concerned. Of course, as this is a donor doctrine, this Whole of Government approach formally speaking only applies to government agencies and NGOs working for the donors. However, it is hard to see how SSR support as envisaged by OECD DAC is to work without a similar concerted effort on the part of local stakeholders. Unfortunately, interagency co-operation is very difficult to achieve anywhere in the world. Twenty years ago, policy-makers working in the field of development and their colleagues in the area of security did not speak to each other, much less work hand in hand. Since then, they have begun to accept the need for co-ordination, at least in Western countries. However, it remains difficult to overcome rivalry, turf battles, differences of interest and misunderstandings, even in the best governed countries. In developing democracies, the obstacles to achieving a Whole of Government approach are much larger.

A Training Course on SSR for EU Officials was held at the European Commission on 31 May-1 June 2010. The instructors were Sami Faltas and Merijn Hartog. The workshop was hosted by the Commission's Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex). Among the participants were also officials from the DG Development, EuropeAid and the Secretariat of the Council of the EU.

These problems do not make SSR support a 'mission impossible.' However, there is no denying that the OECD DAC approach to SSR is very ambitious and in some ways paradoxical. Increasingly, as we teach SSR, we feel compelled to point out the difficulties and paradoxes of Western SSR doctrine in order to help our trainees to deal with them.

Towards the Civilianisation of Turkish Politics

CESS commissioned a research report, to be published soon, on the civilian direction of the military in Turkey. The author, Nil Şatana of Bilkent University, summarises some findings in this piece she wrote for Security Matters

On the 30th anniversary of the *coup d'état* of 12 September 1980, a referendum approved several amendments to the 1982 Constitution prepared by the coup makers. While many criticised these amendments and the referendum, observers in Turkey and abroad have acknowledged this process as another phase in civilianisation of Turkish politics. Research at Bilkent University suggests that demilitarisation of Turkish politics has only been the first step in democratisation. Civilianisation is the ultimate goal. Here I will touch briefly on two important topics, the level of civilian direction of the military by the Turkish Prime Ministry and the extent of oversight in defence policy-making by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

There is an organic connection between the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in Turkey. The Ministry of National Defence cooperates with the CGS, who is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The Constitution and Law No. 1324 indicate that the CGS has equal status with the Minister of National Defence, but in practice, the CGS has more direct access to the Prime Minister. Currently, every Thursday, the CGS meets the Prime Minister and goes on to visit the President informally. While the National Security Council was once an important source of the military's political power, after the 2001 and 2003 EU harmonisation amendments, the Council was civilianised and lost much of its clout. The President chairs the Council; however, in practice it is responsible to the Prime Minister. Consequently, the Prime Ministry appears as the most important civilian institution in Turkish civil-military relations. The EU progress reports on Turkey criticise the outspoken nature of the military, leading the General Staff to announce that it would cancel weekly meetings with the media starting from 2010. As the military gradually retreats from the political arena, the Prime Ministry increasingly dominates it.

According to the Constitution, the office of the Commander in Chief is represented 'in the spiritual entity of the Turkish Grand National Assembly'. This vague definition of the relationship between the General Staff and parliament has been detrimental to civil-military relations. It is taken as an endorsement of the military's guardianship role, which limits parliamentary oversight. The Constitution gives the Assembly the authority to check the preparation and implementation of security policy. A number of tools are available for parliamentary oversight, such as questions, parliamentary inquiries, general debates and motions of censure. The Constitution allows parliamentary committees to function as a democratic platform. However, there is an urgent need for more transparency and public debate. Governmental initiative to encourage parliamentary debate is crucial. In the case of the Defence Committee, the lack of

criticism and scrutiny of defence policy-making stems more from personal attitudes of MPs than from legal shortcomings or military pressure. Moreover, regulations, laws and constitutional articles often contradict each other. For instance, the Court of Accounts has not been able to audit military expenditures due to contradicting laws.

The constitutional and practical changes in civilian control and parliamentary oversight indicate that the military's involvement in politics has diminished since 2001. The real power of the Turkish military is rooted in the belief that civilian politicians have 'dumped' all responsibility for defence issues on the military. Politicians have at times dismissed the military altogether and at other times withdrawn in fear of a military coup. The struggle for political survival and clientelism stifled democratisation. In the absence of a strong engagement by local stakeholders, EU accession, supported by the Turkish military, has become a major drive for social and political transformation.

Today, Turkish society refuses to accept military trusteeship. Civilians in politics are expected to control defence policy-making. Civilianisation requires a healthy public dialogue and professional discussion within the security community, which makes the contribution of CESS all the more important. Once we, the civilians, learn to debate security issues, we can convince the EU that our transformation is genuine and enduring.



Nil Şatana

People

Regular readers will remember that one of our most important considerations when recruiting interns is the contribution candidates can make to our coffee break discussions. **Philippus Zandstra** and **Rishi Raithatha** fully met our expectations in this and other respects. It was a pleasure having them on board, and we wish them every success in the interesting careers they are pursuing.

Philippus had attended a class taught by Sami Faltas at Groningen University's Department of International Relations and International Organisation. On graduating, he asked Sami's advice about interesting internships, and Sami recommended him to our internship czar Merijn Hartog. Philippus worked at CESS from November 2009 to March 2010. He describes his time at CESS as "a pretty turbulent period." His work consisted of research, PR and especially helping to organise seminars and courses in Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. "I learned a lot about SSR and the situation in these countries. Whether being driven around in a Lada through Tbilisi or facing endless plains of snow in Moldova, these were all experiences I will never forget."



During our daily coffee breaks, Philippus regaled us with stories about *The Wire*, crust'n, Arnold Schwarzenegger, iPhones and music. As a free-lance journalist working for various media, he is a walking encyclopaedia on popular music of all kinds. He is now holding down two jobs, doing PR for a record company and teaching international economics to journalism students.

From September 2009 to August 2010, **Rishi Raithatha** read an MA in International Relations and International Organisation at the University of Groningen. Originally from London, Rishi happened to cycle past the CESS office and curiosity led him to work as an intern at CESS from mid-March to early July 2010. During his tenure, Rishi participated in an Advanced SSR training course in Croatia and assisted Erik Sportel with the Georgia Parliamentary Programme publication and seminars. In addition, Rishi was tasked with attempting to get a foot in the doorway of SSR projects in Burundi.

"When I arrived at CESS, my knowledge on Security Sector Reform (SSR) was somewhat sparse at best. But I was willing to learn and further understand the importance of security in development and democratic governance. Within two weeks of having commenced my internship, CESS had already managed to have a significant impact on me; I found my then-thesis plan less exciting and decided to write about transitional justice in Burundi, under the framework of SSR."

The highlights of his internship were the two trips he made to Croatia and Georgia respectively, which would be inconceivable in a "normal" internship. "CESS offered the unparalleled opportunity of being able to participate in and organise internationally-held seminars and workshops. And though I only assisted in organising one event – the Parliamentary Seminar in Georgia in June – I was able to engage in some insightful research on the accountability of the military in Turkey."



"My memories of CESS stem from the fact that I enjoyed working as part of a small, close-knit team in which my views were welcomed. I appreciated the varied nature of the work and the range of different tasks – not least washing up, an essential obligation of any staff member. My only regret was that I failed to impart the rules of cricket to Merijn and Erik."

Parliaments Can Learn from Each Other

By Henk de Haan

When I get the opportunity to speak at the seminars that CESS organises in developing democracies, this gives me great pleasure. As a Dutch parliamentarian, I sat on the defence committee and chaired the committee for foreign affairs. This made me sensitive to the weaknesses and strengths of parliament in overseeing security policy. This is a challenge everywhere, but some parliaments are more alert, more assertive and more effective than others.

The first function of parliament is to determine the budget and oversee how the executive branch of government is spending public money. In a democracy, the government cannot spend a penny or a cent with parliament's prior approval, and experience shows that this is one of the areas in which young democracies most urgently need to strengthen parliamentary control. If there are laws that prevent parliament from exercising the power of the purse, then they need to be changed. But there are other important fields.

One of these is the procurement of military equipment. Over the years, the Dutch parliament has strengthened its grip on the purchasing of defence equipment, not so much by passing new laws, but by improving rules and procedures, so that it has all relevant information before deciding on major acquisitions. I would like to call this learning by doing.

Another example is the deployment of troops overseas. Here we learned many lessons from the disastrous failure of the Netherlands to protect the enclave of Srebrenica in Bosnia. Our parliament in The Hague concluded that it was partly responsible for this failure and put in place several rules and procedures to prevent such mistakes from recurring. These have improved and intensified the involvement of the Netherlands parliament in peace support operations.

By attending CESS seminars all over Europe, I have learned that everywhere and all the time it is a challenge to ensure that parliament oversees defence policy effectively. We can deal with this challenge better if we learn from each other.



Henk de Haan, board member of CESS

Publications

Merijn Hartog, editor, *Security Sector Reform in Central Asia: Exploring Needs and Possibilities*. Groningen, CESS, 2010. Greenwood Paper 25.

Sami Faltas, "Can Security and Development Policy Go Hand in Hand? The Challenges of Security Sector Reform." *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación*, Summer 2010.

Erik Sportel, "Moldavië laverend tussen Oost en West: Europese aspiraties in Ruslands nabije buitenland." Uitgegeven door Educatief Centrum Hotel De Wereld, Wageningen, 1-2010.

Commentary

Revolution In Kyrgyzstan: Causes And Consequences

By Stanislav Chernyavskiy

The revolution in Kyrgyzstan did not come as a surprise. Discontent had been growing for years. In early April, some 80 people lost their lives, 1500 were wounded, and offices, shops and homes were looted and burnt. This marked the end of Colour Revolutions, in which mostly non-violent protests led elected presidents to stand down. What caused the revolution, who is profiting from it, and what is likely to happen now?

Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power in the Tulip Revolution of 2005 promising economic growth, political reform and an end to corruption. In the event, political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the Bakiyev clan, which went on to plunder the country's meagre resources. A million people left the country, ethnic strife continued, corruption and organised crime flowered, dependence on foreign aid remained high and the standard of living fell.

The April revolution was sparked by a protest against rising prices of electricity and heating. Government buildings and companies associated with the friends and family of Mr Bakiyev were stormed by angry young men, often drunk. Most of the leaders in the new Otunbayeva government had held high offices in the Bakiyev administration. As in 2005, the backers of the revolution were clans whose interests clashed with those of the ruling group. To a large extent, the politics of Kyrgyzstan is driven by clan rivalry.

Where will Kyrgyzstan go now? The changes that the Otunbayeva government is seeking look like a restructuring of clan relations. The familiar pattern of systematic nepotism and corruption seems destined to continue. Elections are scheduled for 10 October. On 27 June, a referendum approved constitutional amendments enhancing the power of parliament and reducing that of the president. What this will mean in practice remains to be seen.

Turmoil and uncertainty in Kyrgyzstan have not remained unnoticed abroad. The presidents of the USA, Russia, and

Kazakhstan studied and discussed developments in this small country with some alarm.

After the revolution, Russia quickly approved a large aid package for Kyrgyzstan. It stressed that strife in Kyrgyzstan was a domestic affair. However, President Medvedev said the collapse of the country's political system had been provoked by the failure of the Bakiyev administration and its refusal to seriously consider the population's interests.

Western claims that Russia was behind the April revolution hold no water, but it is true that Russia had problems with President Bakiyev's administration. These included the inappropriate use of large Russian loans, illegitimate exports of oil products supplied by Russia at below-market prices, inconsistent behaviour regarding the Manas air base, and the illegal trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan.

The same could happen to Rosa Otunbayeva's government. Kyrgyzstan's new rulers would do well to learn from the shortcomings of their predecessors. Internationally, Kyrgyzstan has much to gain from a strategic alliance with Russia. They share a rich past, and Russia has proven a friend in need. And with respect to American military facilities in Kyrgyzstan, Russia is not blind to their usefulness for the joint struggle against international terrorism. Of course, close friendship with Russia should not mean bad relations with the West. Indeed constructive co-operation between the regional security organization CSTO and NATO will strengthen regional stability.



Stanislav Chernyavskiy,
MGIMO University, Moscow.

Colophon

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Editors: Sami Faltas and Erik Sportel. Contributors to this issue: Stanislav Chernyavskiy, Sami Faltas, Henk de Haan, Merijn Hartog, Rishi Raithatha, Nil Şatana, Erik Sportel and Philippus Zandstra.