PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERSPECTIONS
IN THE EU AND TURKEY

*Stumbling blocks on the road to accession*

Peter M.E. Volten, editor

2009
Ever since its inception some fourteen years ago, the Centre for European Security Studies in Groningen has focussed on the transformation of the security sector in the post–Cold War setting. Our chief concern has been to support and promote democratic governance. Even in defence and security, which is often confidential and specialised, governments must account for their actions and their use of public resources. In the words of our much-regretted colleague David Greenwood, who passed away on 11 May 2009, the essence of governmental responsibility is for the executive branch to “reveal, explain and justify” its policies and actions to Parliament and the public at large.

During the Netherlands EU presidency of 2004, we launched a programme to assist Turkey in its process of accession to the European Union. The Netherlands government generously supported this programme, but is not responsible for its content. CESS is convinced that Turkish membership would benefit both Turkey and the union. Anchored in NATO and the EU, Turkey will be better able to make a geopolitical contribution in a vitally important region of the world. Conversely, if the EU is able to incorporate Turkey as a secular state and the second largest democracy with a preponderantly Muslim population, this would be a strong affirmation of the pluralistic values of the EU, both internationally and within each member state. The acceptance of shared values would also have a stabilising impact on domestic issues in the West.

For these reasons, CESS organised a task force, which reported on the need for “further alignment” of Turkish and Western practices in civil-military relations. Much has been done, but we are not there yet. We identified areas in which we believe Turkey needs to carry forward its democratic reforms. At the same time, we tried to explain what we think the EU means by European standards and practices in civil-military relations. Candidate members like Turkey are expected to align themselves with these standards and practices, but no one knows exactly what they are. My own approach has concentrated on what I called “security through cooperation”, i.e. doing things together so that we get accustomed to working together. That also seems the best way to remove misunderstandings and misconceptions on both sides.

In June 2008, CESS organised, together with the Turkey Institute, an informal international roundtable on misperceptions standing in the way of Turkish accession to the EU. Many Turkish experts participated in this meeting, held at Oegstgeest in the Netherlands. They will meet again in Istanbul, in October 2009. The papers for the 2008 conference are presented in this book, which is to be launched in Istanbul.
Clearly much remains to be done. The EU is impatient about the pace of reforms in Turkey, which nevertheless are remarkable. Turkey feels that the EU is treating it unfairly, holding it to different standards than Bulgaria, Romania and other countries that recently joined the union. Both positions have some merit. The purpose of this book is to identify political obstacles to Turkish membership of the EU in a constructive manner and to clear the path for realistic but meaningful progress.

Dr Willem F. van Eekelen,
Chairman of the board of the Centre for European Security Studies
CONTENTS

Part A Introduction
I Reflections on Perceptions and Misperceptions in Turkey and the European Union. Three Inconclusive Dialogues? 9
Peter M.E. Volten

Part B Clashing political and strategic cultures
II Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary or Carved in Stone 27
Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

III EU–Turkey Clashing Political and Strategic Cultures as Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession? 47
Graeme P. Herd

Part C Socio-economic differences as an obstacle for integrating Turkey in the EU
IV Turkey’s Economy: Is Accession Necessary? 71
Sübidey Togan

V The Economics Do Not Bite, but Do Not Support Turkish Accession to the EU 91
Arjan Lejour

Part D Populism in the EU and Turkey as a threat to the negotiation process
VI Turkish Populism and Anti-EU Rhetoric 109
Hakan Yılmaz

VII Europe’s Revolt of Populism and the Turkish Question 131
René Cuperus

Part E Discontent and Distrust
VIII The Declining “Soft Power” of the EU Regarding Turkey, and Its Consequences 157
Sahin Alpay

IX Turkey’s EU Accession and the European Identity 179
Jaap W. de Zwaan

Part F Consequences of accession and non-accession for the global position of the EU
X The Long-Term Future of Turkish–EU Relations 191
Jaap de Wilde
PART A

INTRODUCTION
I. Reflections on Perceptions and Misperceptions in Turkey and the European Union. Three Inconclusive Dialogues?

Peter M.E. Volten (Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen)

In 1963, Turkey and the European Union (EU) agreed on an Association Treaty. Turkey did not apply for EU membership until 1987 and this formal application was recognised at the EU summit in Helsinki as late as 1999. Political reforms in Turkey started in earnest after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, indicating a sincere interest in membership. As a result of these steps, the EU decided in 2004 to start negotiations; these began in 2005. Fairly soon thereafter, however, developments on both sides stalled and relations between the two deteriorated.

No one ever expected Turkey’s accession to the European Union to be plain sailing or easy. The political obstacles have been and are still proving formidable; today, even the periodically expressed enthusiasm on both sides of the Bosporus is waning, making the outcome of this major endeavour uncertain. Much of the debate on the many problems is shallow and self-serving, lacking a careful and dispassionate look at the obstacles in Turkey and in the EU, as well as those between Turkey and the EU. No doubt, these three simultaneous debates and attempted dialogues are a tall order. Neither side has control of all three, or is capable of steering them in one direction, but their interrelationship is undeniable.

In order to address a number of the political obstacles in this process, the Centre for European Security Studies and the Turkey Institute, both based in the Netherlands, invited scholars and other experts from the two sides to a meeting in the summer of 2008. The idea was not to put the most immediate, concrete and well-known issues on the table; rather the aim was to look for the broader context in which these have occurred and to discover the underlying concerns, in particular the often unspoken fear or distrust related to the disagreements. Special attention was to be given to the perceptions of one another’s society, polity and identity. Although perceptions may not correspond with reality and, therefore, stand in the way as misperceptions, both perceptions and misperceptions have left their marks on the actual policies and continue to influence Turkish and EU approaches.

The wide range of (mis)perceptions of a great many actors across a broad span of subjects forced the organisers to select a number of cases, almost at random. Each of the selected fields were analysed from an EU and a Turkish perspective. They were organised around the following topics: Discontent and distrust; Clashing political and strategic cultures; Socio-economic differences as an obstacle for integrating Turkey in the EU; Populism in the EU and Turkey as a threat to the negotiating process; and Consequences of accession and non-
accession for the global position of the EU. The contributions are presented in the chapters that follow the present reflections; they serve as input and background, as did the lively debates on the written contributions during the two-day seminar.

The result is not a summary of the seminar, and the following chapters stand on their own. I will neither refer to the individual chapters nor explicitly attribute comments to any one of the participants. That would not do justice to the richness of the introductions, comments and discussions. Moreover, as with the selection from the broad subject matter, these reflections can only offer an impression rather than presenting clear-cut conclusions from the many observations and nuances regarding perceptions in the EU and Turkey. Finally, this account inevitably has a personal twist, coloured by the West-European and Dutch background of the author, as well as by his training in International Relations. As to the latter, I take into account the existing “reality” of both Realist and Constructivist approaches to the political debates at hand. The distinct views of the political actors on EU–Turkish relations and their associated preferred directions reflect both the different theoretical IR constructs, as well as the evolving cultures in practice. The extent to which a Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian culture is adhered to in the EU or Turkey, is important for unravelling the (mis)perceptions as well as for making a distinction between the complex (three) discourses. Any distortion, however, remains the author’s responsibility.

Flawed Perceptions amidst Shared Perceptions

What you see or perceive depends on where you stand. Or, perceptions are very much influenced by the initial starting point in the threefold debate: in Turkey, in the EU or at the negotiating table in Brussels. Each position implies particular biases and critical, though one-sided, views. From the Turkish standpoint, the argument may quickly be mired in a morass of accusations pointing to, for example, unreasonable requirements and “double standards” on the part of the EU, the French closure of (even more) Chapters of the acquis communautaire, and the use of a dubious instrument of democratic decision-making, namely the referendum, all leading, consciously or otherwise, to an understandable drop in support for membership among the Turkish elites and population. Furthermore, electoral campaigns in democratic systems amplify existing biases and disagreements.

If one starts from an EU perspective, the reiteration of the points made in successive Progress Reports presented by the Commission suggests certain indecision, if not stubbornness, on the part of Ankara, underlining for some critics a lack of realism in Turkey as to its bargaining position. Finally, if we address the EU–Turkish negotiations and debate first, we may come up against disagreements and negative perceptions on, say, Cyprus or the traditional role of the Turkish military in the Republic. The process of negotiation itself also has its traumatising effects; on
the one hand, there is a kind of cynicism in Turkey, on the other, an enlargement fatigue is apparent in the EU. Opponents and advocates of similar simplified, even flawed perceptions can be found in all three debates: in Turkey, in the EU and between the two. The points made are not completely without truth, but sticking to them doggedly, with no willingness to compromise, leads to “negotiations without a dialogue”, as one participant put it. Moreover, the style of arguing differs among the participants. The culture of negotiation is different in Turkey and in the EU and this also opens the door to misunderstandings. Not surprisingly, a political stalemate has occurred and at present it threatens the whole undertaking. We have come to a point when tired or disillusioned political elites are pursuing the goals of integration half-heartedly rather than with determination. They are working under increasingly populist pressures or facing oppositional parties that are fiercely opposed to Turkish membership. But it is not merely these negative effects that make the process more difficult; there is also an apparent lack of positive goal-setting. Without positive arguments, not to mention results, momentum slows, and is at risk of stalling altogether. And there seem to be less positive arguments because too few players are willing to make them with a firm enough commitment. Only true conviction and commitment are likely to resonate in Turkey and in the EU and to stand a chance of re-establishing a sense of direction and momentum. Politicians who are willing to show such a commitment are badly needed on both sides.

This is not to say that there are no areas of shared views and positive perceptions. In fact, political leaders and governments should not merely look backwards, pointing at recent disappointments and stumbling blocks on the road to accession. Turkey and the EU member states may instead look to the future and compare their two positions in the emerging European and international order after the end of the Cold War and in the light of ongoing globalisation. The current economic-financial global crisis highlights once again the political interdependence in world affairs. No single power can redress these unsettling developments on its own, either economically or politically. Moreover, Turkey and the EU are neighbours and do face comparable, if not common, challenges in our unprecedented multi-polar world order. Some argue that the multi-polar world order will again take a Westphalian turn in which four or five poles reinstate the urge to balance power and interests rather than striving for global governance. To whatever degree that might happen, and whatever roles the USA, Russia, China, India and the Middle East — in whatever combination or alliance — might play on the world stage, the EU will have to define its place and identity in this new context. Will the EU be able to maintain its status as an economic superpower, and thus remain a politically restrained, regional and “civil” power? Or will it extend its political clout, backed up with a (more) robust European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) including a strengthened military capability, to project power beyond its borders? Given Turkey’s status as a NATO member and its geographic position vis-à-vis the EU, Brussels simply cannot ignore Turkey’s participation in its regional security
complex, EU member or not, especially since the return of France to the military structure of NATO. This fact alone opens up new ways of doing business in security matters both for the (trans-Atlantic) West and the EU. The energy corridor which Turkey provides towards the EU and the West merely underlines the interwoven security interests. Finally, the role and responsibility of the EU in the volatile neighbourhoods of the Caucasus and the Middle East, and the transnational threats stemming from those regions’ involvement in terrorism, trafficking and the like, form another clear link with Turkey, whether or not it joins the EU.

The identity of the EU and its strategic culture are difficult to define. Member states differ significantly in this respect. The strategic culture of France and the UK — former colonial powers with a tradition of military power as part of their foreign policy — is hardly comparable with that of Germany or the Nordic countries. Yet, a European Security Strategy (ESS), the “Solana document”, has been designed and was published in 2003. It reflects a common security concept, albeit a dual one. On the one hand, the ESS stresses the political (non-military) aspects of security including social and economic stability and the quality of life of individuals and groups rather than the external security of member states. On the other hand, the security concept of the EU acknowledges the need to strengthen the military capabilities. A dedicated European army of 60,000 may be wishful thinking and the battle groups may not be fully operational yet; nonetheless, there is a trend towards building a distinct European contribution to defence and security and their institutionalisation in Brussels. The EU military missions are increasingly seen as non-dependent on others and, if member states act in concert with NATO, as in Afghanistan, the EU contribution will be further recognised in its own right.

All the same, the security culture of the EU is principally committed to political-strategic rather than military-strategic considerations. It proclaims the wish to delegitimise power politics and considers peace rather than war as the natural component of state policies; ESDP is an element of foreign policy and a subordinate one at that. Moreover, the EU still prefers to exert influence based on its “soft power” — its attraction for others as a political and socio-economic system. Its nature is characterised by diplomacy and negotiation; Brussels is not known for the use of military means and seeks to avoid securitisation of political issues. The EU is said to promote “effective multilateralism” founded on governance and cooperation, pushing the traditional notions of security and Realist antagonism into the background, if possible. A Kantian culture has been established. Many will not consider this as some sort of “grand strategy” and, indeed, the security culture has not been translated into a concrete design or plan. But an intuitively seized strategic direction agreed on by all is perhaps more important than a spelled-out marching order by some (great) powers. In that sense, a growing awareness of the EU’s global challenges and responsibilities, such as the defining “battle of the West” in Afghanistan, may help to sort out how this intuitive approach becomes the EU’s realist position.
In all these respects one may conclude that Turkey could be an asset for the EU in finding a political global role. Its geopolitical position and military capabilities must be weighed in the EU’s approach to Turkey’s membership. The French and British tradition in foreign policy and the role of their military could serve as a bridge to accommodate a Turkish contribution to the “civil” nature of soft power and add to the — perhaps inevitable — emergence of the Union as a global, political power. However, there are many different views and even contradictory positions on this issue. One contradiction is the French stance on Turkish membership, if France really wants a stronger Europe — the desired *Europe-puissance* — in the world; another is the view in London and Washington DC, that Turkish membership might weaken the EU resolve and the capacity to use it outside the context of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

For the Turkish part, the development of a stronger Europe would be possible, even desirable, through its membership of the EU. The Turks make no secret of their geopolitical and military weight in their dealings with the EU. Their basic attitude is a Realist one, although this may be somewhat outdated in light of the Cold War styled structure of their armed forces. Nonetheless, Turkey shows a departure from a Hobbesian world view and is embracing the Lockean perspective of regional cooperation in its volatile neighbourhood. It also contemplates Security Sector Reform (SSR) and participates in Peace Support Operations in a multinational context. If the “real world out there”, as the Realists like to say, forces the EU towards a less Kantian approach and a more Hobbesian world outlook, the same realities seem to push Turkey from a Hobbesian inclination towards a more cooperative effort in security complexes, regional and Union-wide. EU membership would undoubtedly further this trend and even a “privileged partnership” would be a positive vehicle to that end. Of paramount importance, however, is the willingness on both sides to adhere to this perspective rather than immediately putting forward a series of unilateral demands for “tomorrow”. This is not helpful. A meeting of Kantian and Hobbesian cultures takes time. Strategic cultures can change, but only slowly. It is important to become oriented towards the direction of change and to refrain from (unrealistic) requirements aimed at immediate and tangible results.

While different options do exist for Turkey’s future alignment, they do not ultimately offer a serious alternative to working out a deal with the EU and, in general, the West. In this respect, the domestic dynamics in Turkish politics play a vital role in Turkey’s choice and future role. Will this be a harmonious relationship, or will there be a continuous power struggle over the question of EU membership? Alternative options that emerge from the domestic debate include neutrality; a Eurasian orientation with Russia and possibly China; an Atlantic orientation; a Middle East political option; and a “civilianisation alternative” dealing with Islam societies, an option probed by the Welfare Party during its time in power. All these suggestions are contested and problematic. Neutrality is hard to define nowadays; the Eurasian alternative could lure Turkey towards the seduction of authoritarian rule; the Middle East alternative is fuzzy and risky, given the hugely divergent
courses followed by the different states in the region; and the civilianisation alternative runs counter to every notion of the secularised Turkish republic. So, there are alternatives on paper, but not in reality. Moreover, any choice other than a relationship with Europe would reverse a two-century endeavour to turn toward modernisation in a European sense, and an outspoken wish to belong to Europe rather than to a Russian or Asian culture. In many ways, it is surprising that such options are still aired. Turkish history refutes these alternatives, even though the European option is not fully embraced by everybody. EU membership is circumscribed by reservations, but this is in no small measure because of a fundamental lack of knowledge about what membership entails.

In brief, the geopolitical and strategic issues offer common ground for the EU and Turkey. The perspective of a common future should not be flawed by short-term gains and opportunistic, often electorally motivated acts. On the contrary, perceptions could converge as to the usefulness of integration and the role that the EU and Turkey want to play in the emerging world order. Both can look at this geopolitical and strategic issue as a win–win opportunity. The two sides will weigh their interests in their own right, but they must also strike a balance of interests in key areas.

Yet, the issue of “who is offering the most to whom” emerges, even in the foreign and security area where relative agreement exists. Geopolitical considerations have a nationalistic ring in Turkey, while in Europe they are wrapped in an unhealthy degree of indifference. “We do it our way, that is the better way” is not, however, a good enough answer to this strategic question which is crucial for the future of both sides. There is common ground to be found and the perceptions of the two parties can be brought closer together than the currently dominant Realist versus Constructivist views on security will allow. It would serve neither side to portray the other as ‘demandeur’ in the field of foreign policy and security. An “us” versus “them” attitude is already a considerable burden in so many other issue areas.

**Who is the ‘Demandeur’?**

National pride and the ingrained image of the heroic history and achievements of the Republic — not to mention the glorious past of the Ottoman Empire — are fundamental to Turkey. The revolution brought about by Atatürk and his followers was impressive indeed, and is carefully guarded. The road to modernity, development and democratic rule was forcefully taken from 1923 onwards. Turkey was determined to embark on the Western path. In pursuing these goals, Turkey perceived itself as a self-made country which should not rely too heavily on foreign assistance. Western Europe, in particular, was viewed with great suspicion, as a continent that — consciously or not — was likely to belittle Turkey's aspirations and
even to push it back towards Asia. For a long time, Ankara showed little or no interest in a formal alignment with the emerging European community.

When Greece sought membership in the 1970s, Turkey did not want to be left out; it followed suit, but its rapprochement was not driven by a genuine desire to become a member. The deep-rooted and general reluctance lasted until 1987 when Turkey applied for membership, but even then, and during the following decade, the political elites and parties remained hesitant about presenting themselves as staunch supporters of EU membership. Whilst in power, they were inclined to stress the positive aspects, but once in opposition, their enthusiasm dwindled before an electorate that did not fully embrace a prospect which implied, among other things, the risk of losing its cherished national identity and sovereignty. By the same token, economic development was seen as fundamentally a national responsibility until Prime Minister Özal liberalised and opened up the economy in the 1980s — a move, as it turned out, that carried some risk of leading to vulnerability and dependence in the increasingly globalised world. After all, who could really expect the European “Christian club” to be sincere in welcoming Turkey as a member and integrating a Muslim community within itself? Suspicion was rife.

An ambivalent attitude towards Europe and the EU has never completely disappeared; even the determination of the AKP since 2002 to gain membership was met with mistrust as to the party’s real intentions and its apparent willingness to surrender national sovereignty, Turkishness or the unitary state. This perception may be wrong, but secularists, liberals, intellectuals and a great many middle-class people are still inclined to rely on the military as the guardian of Turkish accomplishments rather than to trust a Muslim party in power. This illustrates the complicated situation which is further aggravated by political demands from the EU that are seen as condescending. A proud Turkish audience might instinctively be asking itself: “who is the ‘demandeur’?” Even so, the nation is at a crossroads; if it is not already fully engaged in this soul-searching, it should be.

In the economic area, the answer seems to be pretty straightforward. Turkey is a relatively poor country with a huge agricultural sector accounting for about 30% of its total labour force and producing around 11% of gross value added in the economy, roughly comparable with Romania. The prospect of taking a share in the subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU is no doubt attractive. This is not restricted to agriculture. By and large, there is an imbalance in economic interests and benefits between Turkey and the EU. From an EU perspective, the benefits of Turkish membership would be marginal. In contrast, Turkey could expect to gain quite handsomely, provided that it is willing and able to reform its political and economic institutions. Again, it is the internal dynamics of Turkish politics, such as genuine transparency and democratic rule, that are crucial for overall development and rapprochement between Turkey and the EU.

Economic issues are relatively easy to tackle. Figures can be calculated and the differences can be made clear without much dispute. Generally, economic agreements can be worked out over time and implemented according to the pace of
integration. That is one of the lessons of earlier enlargements. Negotiations on hard figures involve rational choices and a readiness to give-and-take. What is more difficult is the recognition of the symbolic meaning of a *de facto* imbalance of costs and benefits. For the Turkish elite, EU membership is seen as shorthand for safety, stability and recognition of the country and this symbolic significance is often overlooked. It is at this point that we enter the realm of non-material and more sensitive matters on which it is much harder to compromise.

Whatever rational considerations lie at the basis of Turkish membership, on the one hand, and enlargement of the EU, on the other, a judgement on the appropriateness of enlargement is value-laden or ideationally founded. Turkish perceptions suggest that it is appropriate for the EU to welcome such an important and rapidly developing state as a step forward and as a measure to strengthen the EU. Turkey should not be seen as a *demandeur* but as an asset, particularly in the field of foreign and security policy of the Union. For example, Turkey adds value to the European messages towards other global powers, the Middle East and, last but not least, to the Muslim world. Enlargement would, moreover, be fully consistent with the Union’s own belief in democratic values, the rule of law and the enlargement of a European “democratic zone of peace”. These are valid and strong arguments which the EU would do well to take seriously, if it is not to lose its legitimacy.

At the same time, the sense of appropriate enlargement entails other elements, particularly those pertaining to the history of an aspiring state, its willingness to comply with the demands of the EU and its eagerness to become a member. It is often suggested that countries like Romania and Bulgaria were not — and are still not — ready for full membership; yet, they have been in the EU since 2007. However, these two states and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were in a different position as regards the three elements mentioned. The enlargements in 2004 and 2007 were considered appropriate in spite of the fact that the countries were not quite ready, seen from a rational analysis of costs and benefits. The history of four decades of suffering under Soviet and communist rule prompted a sense of sympathy when the Berlin Wall came down and these countries could finally choose their destiny in freedom. The German *Ost-Politik* and German re-unification implied a pro-active policy of bringing them “back” into Europe and assisting them in the process of transformation. Moreover, in virtually all CEE countries, the willingness to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the requirements of the *acquis communautaire* were beyond doubt and clearly demonstrated. Finally, all CEE states displayed a unified, nationally supported strategy to join the EU — and NATO, for that matter — as soon as possible. These elements were crucial in considering appropriateness of membership a criterion that prevailed over the calculation of costs and benefits and actual readiness as to the *acquis*.

As a country in transition — admittedly a long transition — Turkey does not enjoy that same sense of appropriateness on the part of the EU. It is also in a very
different position to countries like Romania and Bulgaria that had connections with the Central European and the Baltic states; nor is there any equivalent to the idea of those CEE countries turning back to Europe. Besides the observed notion of enlargement fatigue in the EU, Turkey suffers from a lack of commitment in the minds of many Europeans, a phenomenon which also applies in some ways to the Western Balkan countries. As one participant, an ardent supporter of Turkey’s accession, noted: “Unfortunately, Turkey lacks strong advocates or friends in the EU”.

This is not to defend or justify the reluctance displayed in Europe. But it is an observation which should be taken seriously, even if it seen as unfair or as a sign of applying “double standards”. Two contradictory developments in the EU may also add to the lukewarm approach to Turkey. On the one hand, the comfortable position or success of the EU in terms of its wealth, its soft power, etc., and the fact that Turkey already belongs to the Western security organisation, mean that there is little need for further, rapid enlargement. On the other hand, the lack of success revealed by the crisis provoked by the French and Dutch votes against the draft European constitution and the subsequent slowing of the Lisbon process, have fuelled opposition to enlargement as another complication of the already besieged decision-making structure of the EU-27. The latter development undoubtedly strengthened the hands of those who have reservations about Turkish membership because of its sheer size.

The French official position in this respect is more than a mere perception. Nicolas Sarkozy was explicit on the issue well before the 2007 elections which made him President. As he recently reaffirmed: “I have always been opposed to this [Turkish] entrance and I remain opposed”. Other member states, or some of their parties and political elites, may be of the same mind, but, in light of the French position, they do not need to express themselves so clearly. The notion of a Turkish “privileged partnership”, the only option as far as the French are concerned, has been circulated more widely, even explicitly shared by Sweden, for example. In some member states, the political parties and leaders may not express themselves against Turkish accession — they might even be in favour of it, as in the UK or in the ranks of the SPD in Germany — but their views are countered by growing political scepticism and outright opposition from society at large.

Western Europe seems to be suffering a political identity crisis. The traditional parties are confronted with eroding popular support and a dramatic surge of anti-foreign sentiments. This represents fertile soil for populism, which is no longer a (perceived) prerogative of the right wing parties, but is increasingly making inroads in the anti-liberal and left protectionist factions as well. A re-nationalisation of preferences underlines the aversion against being ruled by the EU institutions and Brussels. The historical meaning of Western integration and the significance of democratic peace no longer have the same appeal to rally around the “idea of Europe”. On the contrary, globalisation and EU infringements of national identities foster resentment and fear. Moreover, immigration and multi-ethnic societies are
seen as threats to a trusted way of life, undermining a cosmopolitan attitude and strengthening national chauvinism. Both outside pressures and domestic fears are creating a new political-cultural conflict which plays into the hands of populist leaders, who stress Euroscepticism and cultural xenophobia. This all takes place on the national stage: attempts to restore stable political-societal and inter-ethnic relations in the Western democracies are dependent on developments in the individual member states and are unlikely to be successfully steered from the EU and its institutions. Brussels may assist in this endeavour, but it cannot rescue the European cause through rather abstract references to successes as regards regained freedom, material advancements, advantageous arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty, or enlargement and the “positive conditionality” provided by the Copenhagen criteria. Such pronouncements will fall on deaf ears and national populists will carry the day.

Ironically, Turkey is not centre-stage in this complex political-cultural debate. The French and Dutch ‘no’ votes reflected Euroscepticism as well as ethnic-driven and Muslim fears, but not necessarily a sentiment directed against Turkey and Turkish Muslims. In a sense, it was Turkey’s bad luck that the negotiations on accession coincided with the political crisis. Political elites were not able to quell the popular rising against the perceived tutelage of Brussels, much less to stem opposition against further enlargement highlighted by the prospect of the entry of a huge country, possibly to be followed by another big aspirant, Ukraine. Turkey did not enjoy the same advantages as Romania and Bulgaria and the other “big bang” enlargement countries in terms of timing, or connections; nor did it benefit from the same positive perception of making an appropriate move in extending human rights, rule of law and democratic peace, regardless of rational cost–benefit calculations.

Moreover, the public perception within Europe is not moved by developments within new or aspiring countries. In fact, levels of information and knowledge among the public concerning the CEE countries then, and Turkey now, are extremely limited. Whether we are talking about the positive, perhaps revolutionary reforms undertaken by Turkey in the early 21st century, or the negative features of the fight between Islamic and secular forces, the role of the military, and the clash between the AKP and those who sought to close down that party, the mood of the Western public is unlikely to be affected. True, there is an informed group of persons among the politicians, academics and journalists who favour membership, in whatever form, but this has not led to an informed, national debate. In the battle between political arguments and opinion polls, the signs are not good. The inclination of politicians to lean towards public opinion, exemplified by the French UMP, and the negative input of populists, are disastrous for the chances of a genuine debate on the merits of Turkish membership. In short, Europe’s success is part of the problem, but those who want to build on that success and to overcome divisions and political-cultural clashes vis-à-vis Turkey, both among the member states and with Turkey itself, face an uphill struggle at home and in Brussels.
The EU is a hybrid organisation of many levels of decision-making and, if only for that reason, European identity is difficult to define. The outcome of “governance” is uncertain and unpredictable. The present tension between the political order and society at large only increases uncertainty in the process of enlargement. This is unwelcome news for the Turkish negotiators and for the political elites and society at large in Turkey. The process of negotiation will be long — a fact that deserves an honest and public admission on both sides — but the EU’s position should not simply be perceived as unfair and rife with double standards. While there are some subjective, national reasons for acting slowly or negatively, there are also some objective hurdles which the EU, for all its goodwill, finds difficult to overcome.

Some of these might not be overcome without the help of Turkey itself. It would be very useful, for example, if Turkey were to acknowledge and take into account the shortcomings of the complex European organisation. The EU portrays itself as an actor gifted with “soft power” and talks of “positive conditionality”, notwithstanding its economic “hard power” and firmly established acquis. Turkey must show the capacity and determination to confront the EU with unambiguous efforts to implement a consistent strategy widely supported at home. If this process is to succeed in due time, a Hobbesian, zero-sum approach should be discarded. A Kantian, cosmopolitan culture seems out of political reach for Turkey, at least for the time being. Therefore, solutions must be sought in a Lockeian sphere of negotiations, to find cooperation under circumstances of conflict on both sides. Whether or not it is a demandeur in the overall process, Turkey could (some would say, should) do its utmost to unite itself behind an unequivocal strategy in an attempt to achieve its objectives vis-à-vis a divided Europe.

Building a Turkish Consensus

Nationalism can be an asset in nation-building. However, it proved to be a disaster in international politics when it was used to stress exceptionalism and to exclude the “Other”. That was the experience on the war-torn continent of Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. The “idea of Europe”, born after the devastating Second World War, was intended to remove this threat to security once and for all, at least in the Western part of the continent. Enlargement of the EU allowed the new members to quell nationalistic feelings and to tame sovereignty. They learned to deal with “pooled” sovereignty, as Jacques Delors called the moderation of national interests at the time. There is no reason why nationalism as such cannot be seen as an asset in building and strengthening a unitary state. But nationalism as a singular characteristic, and the quest for national sovereignty, appear both a curse and an anachronism in our age of global interdependence and ongoing integration in Europe. They hamper a constructivist approach to building a common identity and
political culture. All countries in the EU should address this issue, but the relatively high degree of national pride and esteem felt in Turkey vis-à-vis “the West” should be carefully handled, in particular by the political elites.

Atatürk wanted to build a unitary, indivisible Turkish nation and the political elites have faithfully followed his visionary path ever since. The revolutionary change to establish a modern, secular state, however, was a top-down undertaking, a model of a state nation rather than a representation of a nation state rooted in demos and relying on democratic impulses. State–society preferences were determined in Ankara rather than in response to society. This was perceived as the most realistic way to bring about the changes envisaged. These changes were intended for the Turkish people, but not entrusted to the hands of the people; the political process had to be guarded carefully.

In Turkey, political parties were not allowed to diverge too much from the prescribed design. They closely followed each other. There was a fear of parties becoming too powerful or using their power for particularistic purposes. One such case occurred during the 1950s when an alternative to the Kemalist party came into being and when the Democrat Party under Menderes was seen by 1960 as abandoning the Kemalist, secularist principles, and using religion to get votes. Suspicion was further heightened when he installed a committee to investigate the Republican Party’s activities. Menderes’ call on the military to restore order during the student revolt failed and actually backfired. The military coup in 1960 restored order and was supported by a great many representatives of the elite. Other coups followed in the same vein. Polarisation, Marxist threats, and Islamic (majority) parties were perceived as a danger to the national and secular order. The point here is not the military intervention per se, but the political instability and division which bedevilled Turkey during its emancipation process towards a multi-party system. Parties split up, disappeared and were outlawed, sometimes in a harsh manner. The same groups of people regularly reappeared on the political scene under a different name — Erbakan’s three successive Muslim parties being a case in point.

Party organisations were often not only short-lived, they also followed a short-term perspective driven by popular and opportunistic motives. There were repeated incidents of switching positions on issues, depending on whether the party was in power and felt responsible or in opposition and acting on the perception of the prevailing public mood. There was little consistency in national policy-making, and this applied also to the rapprochement towards Europe. The more radical left and right were more consistent in their opposition to opening up Turkey internationally, including a Europeanisation of foreign policy objectives. Their approach contributed to resistance to the emerging pro-European tendencies within coalition governments that were already under fire from within. They were of no help in building consensus.

In contrast, AKP under the leadership of Erdogan won a majority in 2002 and an even larger one in 2007, before adding to its success by winning the
Presidency in 2008. AKP has thus brought some stability and greater consistency to foreign policy. Nonetheless, the party and its leadership still face an opposition inspired by doubts and suspicion regarding too much Westernisation. Despite two centuries of looking West, Turkey is still haunted by traditional domestic convictions and interpretations of Western culture, as well as Islamic and Eastern inclinations. This complexity and ambivalence in combination with the long-standing commitment to Westernisation are conducive to misperceptions and doubts about sincerity. The absence of consensus breeds misunderstanding in Europe.

State preservation and state-centrism assuming, at first, an elitist-Ottoman and, later, a national-republican ideology, have been married to a particular reading of Western philosophy. Rationalism was embraced without the nuances of its German versions and coupled to a materialist-positivist “scientific” approach to the “real world”. Sustained by the Young Turks in the early 20th century and in the new Republic, this view included secularism — religion was seen as an obstacle to modernity and not as rational or scientific — and nationalism — an indispensable building-block for strength and unity — as mere ideology rather than as practical ingredients of a realpolitik. Individual views, therefore, must be subdued and democratic decision-making has to be made contingent on national solidarity and state-preservation furthering the Turkish identity. One of the contributions which follows calls this a “rationalist democracy” versus a “liberal democracy”.

Although contemporary Turkey has moved and is still moving towards a moderate version of such an ideological position, and although it has significantly liberalised its view on material issues away from strict military to socio-economic considerations, current debates still reflect this kind of “either/or” approach, representing a nation struggling with politically confronting dichotomies on the way to a modern, liberal-democratic order. These (still) include secularism versus Islam and statehood versus nationhood, the state–society dichotomy. By the same token, the rational democracy of the (Republican) elites impinges on the emerging liberal-democracy. Nonetheless, that the electorate’s voice is being heard is apparent given the re-election of the AKP in 2007 and the rebuff of the (prudent) warnings of the military. The disenchantment with the Islamic party pronounced by the (Republican) opposition and secular civil society found little popular response.

In the literature on democratic rule, it is considered crucial that a party or coalition survives and wins three elections in a row as a sign of maturity. For Turkey, this has yet to happen. It is a fair assumption that much will depend on the extent to which Erdogan and his cabinet are able to consolidate the existing reforms, if not expand and strengthen them, and on how far the electorate recognises this course as “the right thing”. Confusion still exists as to a genuine choice for modernisation along West-European/EU lines versus the ingrained adherence to national sovereignty. It does not seem that the present government is relaxing the Turkish position on this score, at least from the perspective of Brussels. Sooner or later a consensus must be built around the concepts of interdependence, compromise and pooled sovereignty, the hallmark of the success of the European
experiment. This is not an old-fashioned echo from the past, but a defining principle of European integration to date.

The political transition of Turkey must also tackle the question of decision-making within the party and in the cabinet, versus the present phenomenon of individual leadership by Erdogan. Institutionalisation of the rules for policy-making is another sign of maturity. The reshuffling of the cabinet in May 2009 bodes well: forceful ministers have been moved to crucial position and new ministers are apparently not known as “yes men” in Erdogan’s entourage. The local elections of early 2009 in which AKP lost some ground might have been a reason for this development. It is important to note that the leaders of AKP apparently learn from their mistakes. The message of the electorate might have been interpreted as a warning against overly assertive state behaviour neglecting signals from the Turkish society. The move of AKP seems important in building up a party that is capable of pursuing a sustained policy course which is determined in concert with its members rather than rubber-stamped by them. The Republican CHP and other opposition parties should be invited to follow suit rather than simply opposing whatever is proposed by the government. Disagreement is at the heart of politics, but the Turkish elites are hopefully capable of finding their way towards a consociational democracy where societal cleavages can be bridged through a sustained dialogue. In this respect, there is of course the issue of dealing with minorities and how to allow them a say in democratic decision-making. Whether they come from left or right, Christian, pious or radical Muslims, or ethnically different groups, a mature democracy has — up to a certain point — to recognise and accommodate “dissenting” views. Western Europe is struggling to find that “certain point” in the discussion on multiculturalism versus integration. Turkey’s official stance is that there are no other citizens than Turks, but that seems in the long run an untenable position in a modern, democratic society.

A final remark concerns the special position of a policy elite assuming a role as if it were a political party in the decision-making process in Turkey: the military. The waves of democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s have clearly affected the position of this policy elite. In fact, the military was pushed out of political power and became what they are intended to be: uniformed servants of the state who, admittedly, have a special and dedicated role to play in the security of state and society. There can be no doubt about the need to maintain a professional army in the sense of Huntington’s work on civil–military relations. Political parties should continue to respect the profession of the military. But that is not the same as calling on the military to preserve the political regime and supporting or even applauding a coup d’état. Political parties and parliament are required to control the government according to democratically established patterns. It is in that sense that the EU asks Turkey to “further align” its civil–military relations to West-European practices; not an alignment to one single practice in a particular country, but to a commonly shared understanding of “getting it right”. There is no blueprint and Turkey will develop its own culturally and historically
dependent relations between the polity and its uniformed servants. For this to happen, it is not only the military that must come to grips with a new role, but first and foremost the political parties, both secular and non-secular.

As with so many other issues, this will require patience and a willingness to take the time necessary for the changes. The reforms undertaken by AKP requiring a civilian Secretary-General of the National Security Council, or the improved accountability and transparency of the defence budget, for example, are important steps. There is more to do, such as the strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Defence and parliamentary control and oversight. Looking at the overall developments in civil–military relations, there is, however, reason for optimism.

Since the coup of 1980 when military rule was installed, intervention has been limited to forcing a government out of office (1997) or to orchestrating the closure of an Islamic party (Welfare Party, 1999) by means of the constitutional court. This might be bad enough for a democracy, but the use of military power in Turkey has changed, from applying force, to a “postmodern coup” as the “process of 28 February” 1999 is called in Turkey. During the reign of AKP, threats were issued in 2007 when Güll presented himself as a candidate for the presidency, and again in 2008 when the constitutional court voted on the possible closure of the AKP. But Güll was elected and the court just — by one vote — refrained from closing the party that occupies about 70% of the seats in parliament. Of course, closing down a majority party and excluding some 70 of its leaders from running for office, would have been a disaster in Turkish relations with the EU. But it did not happen, and Turkish democracy was not seriously damaged.

One can only speculate about the role of the military in these recent events that reflect a secularist fear that the ruling party has a hidden agenda. But current developments suggest a normalisation and even an improvement in the military approach and in civil–military relations in general. There seems to be an understanding of the restraints and limitations of political power on the part of the military. No military coup has ever had a long-term effect in the military’s favour, and they are forced to work with an Islamist majority. Suspicion as to a trend towards a radical, political Islam had to be reined in — unless one ranks the political issue of the head-scarf as an existential threat to the secularist state. Of course, developments at the local level and in society are of a different order. Pressure from believers on their neighbours to behave in particular ways, or from mayors on restaurant and pub owners not to serve alcoholic beverages and the like, is another matter. But the time to order societal preferences from above seems to belong to the past. The rebuttal of the military/republican interference with the election of Güll by a massive re-election of AKP candidates is a reality of the present. Moreover, Turkey is a very young country; according to the 2000 census, nearly 60 per cent of the population are between 6 and 30 years of age. The modernisation and emancipation of Turkish society are more likely to continue than to fall prey to regressive tendencies.
The current military leadership shows a modest inclination to understand the current trends in politics and society. The Chief of the General Staff, General Başbuğ, has recently redefined the military notion of relations with the civilian masters and also shown a more open approach to the “peoples of Turkey”. It seems that the military leaders have learned that the old approach no longer fits their ambitions. They have to strike a deal with the government and understand that they have to formally communicate with the Prime Minister and the cabinet. They also realise that failures in the past and current scandals like the Ergenekon affair implying military involvement have a negative impact on their prestige in society at large. Whether or not the plans ascribed to the Ergenekon affair to undermine and unsettle the government are proven, the fact that two former generals are prime suspects in the indictment is not conducive to the military’s standing in society.

In brief, the military/republican guardians of the constitution and the secular system have gradually changed their position from a harsh, uncompromising stance towards a more conciliatory, negotiable viewpoint. Time will tell whether this is really the case and to what extent the divide between AKP and these guardians will be bridged. Building a democratic style consensus with a give-and-take attitude is crucial not only to Turkey’s future, but also for getting the EU perception “right”. As one interlocutor put it jokingly: “Would you accept Belgium as a new member of the EU if it was seeking membership now?” A united Turkey should convince the doubting member states that it is appropriate to make it a full member, perhaps via an intermediate arrangement, as long as the final result is the same. Both sides should be realistic about the timing and should not expect integration to happen tomorrow. A decade would not be unrealistic, given the experience of other rounds of enlargement. But Turkey must take the initiative to bring a happy ending to this three dimensional love–hate relationship: within Turkey, within the EU and, especially, between Turkey and the EU. It is our profound desire that the following chapters will contribute to that end.
PART B
CLASHING POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CULTURES
II. Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary or Carved in Stone

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu (Department of International Relations, Bilkent University)

In the words of Colin S. Gray, “culture comprises the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience”. Security culture (or strategic culture) “can change, over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated”. If culture is defined as a genetic phenomenon, it leads decision makers to racial-cultural stereotyping misperceptions. Culture is not immutable or insular. Cultures interpenetrate and take new forms, albeit slowly. As the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, America’s leading scholar-senator said, “the central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself”. On the other hand, however, culture is “deep rooted and does not express merely the passing fancy of the moment”. The question, therefore, is not whether a particular national security culture is changeable or not. The question is about the direction, quality, and degree of change.

Peter J. Katzenstein and his colleagues take culture and identity as important determinants of national security policy. They argue that states define their security interests by responding to cultural factors. Culture is about identities and loyalties. Interactions of cultures construct and define identities. Identities in an international system provide each state not only with a certain understanding of the “self”, but also with an understanding of other states, their interests, roles and motives. Differently put, definitions of identity depend on a distinction between “self” and “other”, implying definitions of threat and security interest. State conduct is determined by state identities which are inter-subjectively constructed in relation

---

1 Some of the arguments in this paper are partly drawn from my previous publications on the same topic, especially my article “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 198–216.
to other states’ identities. As purely structural analysis takes state identities as undifferentiated, it leaves a hiatus in our understanding of foreign policy decision making and diplomatic strategic conduct. This gap can be filled by cultural analysis. Similarly, the EU–Turkey relationship is not primarily a technical issue dependent on material factors. It is also a political, social and ideational matter that requires a cultural undertaking.

Turkey has long developed a deep-rooted security culture which has been shaped by the accumulation of historical experiences and interpenetration of diverse kinds of discourses. As is the case for any country, Turkey’s foreign and security policy objectives and its diplomatic-strategic operations are carried out in a cultural context. Turkey’s responses to security challenges from within and without are affected by its security culture as much as by material structural factors such as power configurations in the international system. To decode the complexities of its international behaviour, we need to pay attention to the parameters and evolution of its cultural environment. Some aspects of Turkey’s security culture have been consistent across historical periods. In some respects, however, it has evolved over consecutive periods into the new millennium.

The purpose of this article is to seek answers to the following questions: what has changed and what has persisted in Turkey’s security culture? What is the direction and meaning of change? Is Turkey’s approach to security policy evolving towards cosmopolitanism, multilateralism, and policies inspired by cooperation and interdependence; or, on the contrary, is Turkey inclined to consider security from a power-political perspective emphasising the military dimension? Finally, what is the role of structural and of ideational factors in the formation of its security culture?

**The Realpolitik Security Culture**

The long conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe was not only a clash of hostile creeds but also a conflict of interest. At first sight, the struggle was between two hostile religious, cultural and political systems. According to Raymond Aron, the European international system, together with the Ottoman state, was a “heterogeneous” one. The ideological conflict, sometimes taking the form of armed struggle, and sometimes that of proselytism and subversion, continued through modern times, when the Ottoman Turks extended their order into Central Europe and when their state was finally destroyed by the constant assaults of the European powers, and by rising nationalism. Ottoman imperialism, however, cannot be

---


defined simply as Islamic expansionism.\textsuperscript{10} It was a highly pragmatic policy affected by political realism.

The Ottoman state’s continuous relations with European powers made the concept of balance of power an indispensable element of its diplomatic-strategic actions. The Ottomans and the Habsburgs were engaged in a long struggle for supremacy. Support for France and the Protestant states including the English, the Dutch, the Protestant princes of Germany and other anti-Habsburg parties, such as the Jews of Spain, were elements of the Ottoman policy which aimed to balance the dominance of the Emperor and the Pope in Europe.\textsuperscript{11} Arguably, this policy, by encouraging political decentralisation in Europe, contributed to the advent of the Westphalian system.

The Ottoman policy until the end of the seventeenth century can be defined as “offensive realpolitik". Its objective was maximisation of power by gaining territory, population and wealth through power politics and war. The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 marked a decisive turning point in the military balance between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. After that date the Ottoman statecraft utilised balance of power diplomacy, not to expand its influence and control in the West, but to slow down the pace of its own retreat towards the East. This policy, which can be defined as “defensive realpolitik", was facilitated by European diplomacy, which feared the creation of a dangerous power vacuum in the East that might result from an abrupt collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Although the Ottomans had been losing wars and territory to the Christian powers since 1699, the 1877–1878 Russo–Ottoman war over emerging Balkan nationalism, which Russia wanted to patronise, became another significant development in the formation of Turkish security culture. That war accelerated the military decline and territorial retrenchment which had begun with the Habsburg victories in the second half of the seventeenth century. From then until 1952, when the Republic joined NATO, Turkey lived in relative military and diplomatic isolation which meant being subjected to Great Power bargains over its territory. The fears of abandonment and of loss of territory were a major aspect of Turkish security culture in the Empire and the same fears were inherited by the Republic, strengthened even further by the Treaty of Sévres, which provided for the partition of the


remaining Ottoman territories among the European Powers after the First World War.

The French Revolution was the forerunner of another disaster. Its ideological impact on the imperial order was devastating. According to Arnold Toynbee, the modern history of the Balkans and Anatolia is marked by a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of nationalities. A product of Western civilisation, it was introduced into the social structure of a cosmopolitan empire where non-territorial and economically interdependent ethnic communities coexisted. Consequently, the emergence of nation-states in these parts of the world required massive relocation of peoples and increasingly extreme use of force became common practice between different ethnic communities. This phenomenon, which Toynbee calls “The Western Question”, continues to affect mutual threat perceptions among the nations of the former Ottoman Empire. The political development of the Turks and Greeks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and of relations between them, were enormously affected by the implications of this Balkan version of nationalism. This, in fact, constitutes the background of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes today.

**Identity Problematique**

Given the rigours of transition from the Empire to the Republic, and the security culture which was predicated upon the ruling elite who witnessed the demise of the Empire, continuing distrust with the West was perhaps inevitable. Turkey did not feel at ease until it joined NATO in 1952. In general, the Cold War froze previous security concerns. But Turkey’s distrust toward Europe was the result not only of its bitter experience with the European powers during the centuries of imperial decline but also, and probably more significantly, of the fact that Turkish and European identities have been constructed through an inter-subjective process which can be defined in terms of a “self and other” dichotomy. Turkey’s identity formation can be traced back to relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s long Westernisation process on the one hand, and its limited but insurmountable Islamic and Eastern characteristics on the other, have resulted in a complicated and ambivalent identity.

Through wars, alliances, and economic policies, the Ottomans became significantly involved in the continent’s international affairs. Their state was formally included in the European state system after the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris in 1856: “That simple formality codified a century and a half of precedent,

---

embedded in an even longer process”. But the Ottoman state was never fully accepted as an integral part of the European system. European statesmen and political theorists consciously or unconsciously assumed that the European balance of power was a culturally homogeneous system and that the Ottoman state, representing a different culture, could at best be “an irregular and peripheral member of the European framework”.

The negative inter-subjectivities in the formation of Turkish and European identities have been the major reason for Turkey’s marginalisation in Europe. “The Turk” has been the main theme in the representation of “otherness”. “It has been the threat from the East which has produced attempts at European unification, both as a defensive response and as a rationalisation for aggressive policies of expansion and the consolidation of Christian, ‘civilised’ Europe against its Other”. The remnants of this viewpoint can still be found among the European peoples. Similarly, despite the centuries-old Westernisation process and Atatürk’s reforms, public opinion as well as the foreign and security policy elite in Turkey at times demonstrate a lingering lack of confidence towards Europe and view it as an unfriendly, if not entirely hostile, entity. Neither the contemporary cleavage between Islam and the West, nor the residual distrust between Turkey and Europe, however, has affected Turkey’s commitment to Westernisation which has always been a determinant of Turkish foreign policy. For this purpose, membership in European institutions has always been a foreign policy objective of Turkey.

**Ottoman Modernisation: Realpolitik or Ideology**

In the second half of the eighteenth century the Ottomans recognised the European military superiority and the urgent necessity of reforming their military and public administration. They considered change as a requirement for saving the state. The three generations of the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth century, the leaders of the Tanzimat, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, shared a consistent policy of


15 Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe’s Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), 10–18. One serious consequence of Turkey’s exclusion was felt in the conduct of warfare. See Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (London: Routledge, 1987), 279–280 and 316: “Many of the restraints usually associated with war in the eighteenth century… were less in evidence in the campaigns against the Turks”.


“state preservation”,¹⁸ which gradually became a state ideology and continued to affect the mind-set of the republican elites of consecutive generations.

The Westernisation policy had two interrelated objectives. One of them consisted of measures to revitalise the state by modernising the armed forces and the administration. Ottoman rulers “judged that the only effective way of holding one’s own against the West is to fight the West with Western weapons in the broadest sense of the word — a sense in which it covers Western ideas and institutions as well as Western makes of guns and bombs”.¹⁹ The spread of the modernisation process to areas other than the military was inevitable. The modern army needed new-technology weapon systems and officers trained in Westernised military schools, and a transition “from a pre-modern army dependent on Janissaries and timariot cavalry to a professional military based on conscription”.²⁰

The administrative reform, therefore, consisted of a high degree of centralisation with a view to more efficient control over the taxation and resources of the provinces to finance the military reform.

The modernisation policy had another realpolitik aspect. The Ottoman rulers were well aware of the close connection between domestic reform and foreign policy. They developed a habit of using the policy of reform to deal with the European inclination to intervene in the internal affairs of the Empire. At times, they used it in order to attract foreign support. For example, the promulgation of the constitutional monarchy in 1876 is interpreted as a means of gaining Western European support against Russia. Sometimes, however, in demonstrating their commitment to reforms, they expected to avert European interference. This was particularly the case with measures taken to improve the legal status and other conditions of their Christian subjects. Moreover, the European powers themselves had considerable interest in the modernisation of the Ottoman state and society because they believed that reforms would delay its collapse and ensure the Great Powers’ strategic and economic interests in the region.²¹

The Ottoman experience has left a complex imprint on the mindset of the contemporary political elite in Turkey. In the context of Turkey–EU relations, we often hear political declarations emphasising that Turkey should improve its human rights performance not to please Europeans, but for its own sake. Furthermore, Turkish politicians, bureaucrats, media, and academics tend to adopt an intolerant attitude towards foreign human rights interventions despite the fact that Turkey is signatory of most of the human rights conventions as well as a negotiating candidate of the EU.

---

¹⁸ Şerif Mardin, Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 182.
The other principal objective of the modernisation policy was the Ottoman Empire’s integration with European international society. Behind this, there was probably the *realpolitik* concern of averting the possibility of abandonment and of being the prey of a general European plot to partition the imperial territories. Whatever the security concerns were, the policy of modernisation led to the imperial elite’s opening up to European ideas and values. This process gained momentum with the establishment of the Republic and the subsequent reform programme.

**Secularism and Nationalism**

Intellectual and political movements in the years of modernisation were heavily influenced by a uni-dimensional reading of Western philosophy. The first windows on modernity were opened in the eighteenth century by the ambassadorial reports of the Ottoman envoys and by a number of European converts who served the Porte as soldiers. Officers such as Comte de Bonneval (1675–1747), Baron François de Tott (1730–1793) and many others contributed to the adoption by the Ottomans of European military techniques and the reorganisation of the army. All these Europeans were products of the French Enlightenment, who believed that all spheres of life, including the military, should be subjected to the domination of reason. The Ottoman military reformers took their cue from the innovations introduced by the French Enlightenment and the simplistic social-political implications of a crude rationalism that ignored Kant, the Scottish Enlightenment, and British conservatism. This uni-dimensional understanding of rationalism became a dominant intellectual movement, permeating the military education, and the civilian administrative and political cadres.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, this intellectual movement was merged with an equally simplistic materialist and positivist philosophy. The Young Turks’ mindset was shaped predominantly by these materialist-positivist ideas. Materialism was viewed “as the driving force behind the material progress of the West”. Anti-religious sentiments became widespread among the Young Turks. Some progressive periodicals condemned Islam as the cause of backwardness, and they even “ridiculed many Muslim practices”. Another source of inspiration was German militarism. The influence of German military instructors such as von der Goltz-Pasha, who were invited by the Hamidian regime, was considerable.

---

24 M. Şükrü Hanoğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 185.
25 Ibid.
Their \textit{Weltanschaung} was formed by nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism.\footnote{Handan Nezir Akmeşe, \textit{The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I} (London: Tauris, 2005), 21–22.} Von der Goltz-Pasha’s book, \textit{The Nation in Arms}, was translated into Turkish in 1885 and used as a textbook in the War College (\textit{Harbiye}).\footnote{Ibid., 69.} Von der Goltz-Pasha and Ottoman officers, in their works, explained the cause of Japan’s victory against Russia in 1905 by the close relationship between the military and the nation in Japan. They also expressed their admiration for Japan on many occasions.\footnote{Ibid., 31.} As a result of the Young Turk revolution, the military gained enormous prestige. The militarisation of society and polities became a common modernising principle of nation-building in many of the Ottoman successor states, including the Republic of Turkey.\footnote{M. Ş. Hanioğlu, \textit{A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire}, 201.}

Under the Young Turks, the early Ottoman \textit{realpolitik} began to move away from its pragmatic roots and gradually acquired a radical ideological overtone. “Secularism and nationalism [were] among the distinctive characteristics of Young Turk ideology”.\footnote{Erik J. Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History} (London: Tauris, 1993), 189.} Both were inherited by the republican regime as the “indispensable” elements of building a new national identity, society, and state. Positivism was regarded as a necessary means to overcome religious fanaticism. According to Atatürk, “the truest guide in life is science”. He asserted: “bear in mind that Turkey cannot be a country of apostles, saints, clergy and fanatics”.\footnote{Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk’s Speeches and Declarations), Vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1959), 215.}

Moreover, the positivist approach to social affairs had to be emphasised as a tool to restructure the society for the purpose of the preservation of the state. Even today, for many officials and politicians, the limits of individual freedom are to be determined according to “scientific principles”, which means that individual liberties must not cripple the will and sovereignty of the state; and the secular (\textit{laïc})\footnote{Cihat Akçakayalioğlu, \textit{Atatürk: Komutan, Inkılapçı ve Devlet Adamı Yöneriyle (Atatürk: Commander, Revolutionary and Statesman)} (Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, 1988), 629–630.} modernising republican project, as understood in the 1930s, should be promoted because it is “scientific”. Dr. Sami Selçuk the former President of the Court of Cassation, criticises Turkish secularism (\textit{laicisme})’s doctrinal aspect. He argues that it “starts from a concern for rationality… and aims to develop a rational individual. In the realisation of this aim, it regards religion as the principal obstacle” to modern society and politics.\footnote{Sami Selçuk, \textit{Longing for Democracy} (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2000), 56–57.}

Even for many of those who support democratisation, democracy is a necessary means for preserving and promoting the state. It should not damage national solidarity. It should not be an arena of conflicting interests. Democracy should provide a framework for “reasonable debate” to find “rational solutions” to
social, political and economic problems for the survival of the state and for strengthening national solidarity. Metin Heper, referring to Sartori, calls this version of democracy “rationalist democracy” as opposed to “liberal democracy”. However, he observes in modern Turkey an ongoing transition from the former to the latter.34

Despite its pretentions, the Republic did not represent a total break from the intellectual and political environment of the nineteenth century. Atatürk and his friends were educated in the modernised Hamidian schools and indoctrinated by the ideas of the Young Turks. They were the extension of a generation which prepared Turkey for the twentieth century. They inherited the late Ottoman external and internal threat perceptions. Defence of laicism and national unity made their way into their threat evaluations. Debating laicism or cultural-ethnic pluralism was viewed as a threat to internal security. Nevertheless, at the same time, Atatürk and his comrades alienated themselves from the Young Turk tradition in some important ways. First of all, they were realists. They disliked irredentism. They limited nationalism to the confines of the Republic, namely to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace where the majority of the population was Turkish-speaking. They repudiated revisionist doctrines such as Pan-Islamism or Pan-Turkism. Second, they displayed a marked preference for Western culture while they insisted on independence and territorial integrity. Although they criticised the expansionist tendencies of European Powers, the West as such occupied a privileged place in their minds as a unique source of inspiration. Their ultimate goal was to carry the nation to “contemporary civilisation” and to integrate it within the Western community of nations. For Atatürk, “contemporary civilisation” was a dynamic concept that represented continual progress. It is thus hard to reconcile the anti-Westernism and anti-globalism of contemporary “Kemalists” with Atatürk’s conception of “contemporary civilisation”.

Alignment with NATO

Turkey’s alignment with NATO cannot be explained solely by the Soviet threat after the Second World War. It was motivated by a complex interplay of structural and ideational factors. Exogenous realities related to Turkey’s national security culture as well as its identity problematicque both played a role in bringing about Ankara’s choice of alliance.35 It was not the Soviet threat or demands per se which caused Turkey to seek NATO membership. It is clear that the Soviets’ assertiveness and territorial claims after the Second World War amounted to a threat in objective terms. What is equally significant is that Soviet demands had begun to fade before Ankara’s admission to the Atlantic Alliance. However, the geographic proximity of

the Soviet Union, its offensive capabilities including air power, and its assertiveness, when combined with Western complacency towards Turkey, revived the fear of abandonment which was ingrained in Turkey’s strategic culture. This sense of strategic vulnerability was at the core of Ankara’s threat perception after the war: Soviet demands only exacerbated the feeling. Neutrality or non-alignment would not be an acceptable option for Ankara, because it would imply self-isolation.

Of the alternatives, a Middle East collective defence arrangement would bring Turkey’s precarious Middle Eastern identity to the forefront, although it could provide a security guarantee from Britain, and even the United States. While a realistic case can be made for the impact of international constraints (Soviet power and assertiveness, and the fear of isolation) on the formation of Turkey’s security policy, Ankara’s decisiveness in joining a specific alliance — NATO — derived mostly from a profound belief in Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems. Rejecting the Soviet and non-aligned options, as well as the Middle Eastern option, did not result primarily from structural international factors, but rather from a combination of the factors peculiar to Turkish identity and the characteristics of the bipolar system. Options other than NATO would imply for Turkey the abandonment of its Western orientation; NATO membership, on the other hand, would consolidate its Western orientation by establishing a long-term institutional and functional link with the West. As Bernard Lewis puts it: “The Turkish alignment with the West is not limited to strategic and diplomatic considerations. It is the outward expression of a profound internal change extending over a century and a half of Turkish history and sustained attempt to endow the Turkish people with these freedoms, economic, political and intellectual, which represent the best that our Western societies have to offer”. 36

NATO membership has had a certain transformative effect on Turkey’s security culture. Most high-ranking military officers have either visited or served in various NATO headquarters and in the United States. Such experiences abroad have given them an international outlook. Regular discussions on national defence issues in international fora are likely to have moderated their conception of state sovereignty. Although their priorities are defence-oriented in dealing with their foreign colleagues, their commitment to maintaining their country’s ties with the West prevents them from overlooking Western views on political matters, including Turkey’s problems with democratisation.

Given the particularities of Turkey’s security culture and its geo-political setting, its approach to NATO has at times been dominated by a purely national and regional outlook. For example, being aware of Russian sensitivities during the Cold War, Turkey acted with circumspection, combining deterrence through NATO with reassurance towards Moscow. Within the framework of this policy, Turkey accepted the alliance’s nuclear weapons modernisation programmes under the condition that the range of the short-range systems deployed in the country was not to be

extended. Moreover, Turkish radio stations refrained from broadcasting to Central Asia and the Caucasus. This overly cautious policy was inherited from the nineteenth century and was made operational again in the Cold War irrespective of NATO’s security guarantee.

**Moderation of Realpolitik**

The post-Cold War conditions have broadened Turkey’s horizons and, at the same time, moderated its *realpolitik* culture. Beyond the international systemic change, President Turgut Özal’s new liberal vision in the 1980s and early 1990s has had a long-lasting transformative impact on Turkey’s security culture. He made significant efforts to integrate Turkey with the world economy, to alter the state-controlled, protectionist economic structure of the country and to promote entrepreneurial interest. He also emphasised international economic interdependence. The increasing importance of economic considerations in external affairs strengthened the role of business circles and managerial elites in foreign policy making and introduced a significant element of transnationalism into the outlook of the traditional foreign and security policy elite. Economic reforms also affected the defence industry by promoting business relations between the private and public sectors, contributing to the moderation of the military’s state-centric conception of internal and international affairs.37 One striking example of this change of mind is the recent decision to sell the armed forces-owned Oyak Bank to a Dutch firm.

Since the end of the Cold War and the reduction of the Soviet threat NATO has made efforts to develop new strategies in order to meet a much more diverse set of risks and challenges. Turkey has remained strongly committed to the alliance and has enthusiastically contributed to its efforts to adapt to the changing strategic context. After the Cold War, Turkey began to pay particular attention to regional cooperative security and multilateralism. Its interest in cooperative security extended from participation in peace operations to the initiation of regional arrangements such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation scheme. It contributes to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes, including military and naval exercises in the Black Sea. Turkish General Staff assumed the responsibility of establishing a PfP Training Centre and a Centre of Excellence for Defence against Terrorism in Ankara. Turkey also took the initiative of creating a Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR).

Furthermore, Turkey has actively participated, and continues to participate, in peace operations in the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, East Timor, and Congo (Turkey sent a police unit to the Congo). Peace operations are usually manpower-intensive and require diverse skills and special military training

---

for units and individual soldiers. Training programmes and actual experience in the field improve not only the troops’ and officers’ skills in using proportional force in combat, but also their abilities in public relations.\(^\text{38}\) For the purpose of facilitating adaptation and contributing to peace operations, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) created new institutions. Peace missions were assigned to the Third Corps and the Twenty-Eight Mechanised Brigade, and the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and each of the three services (land, navy, and air) established “Peacekeeping Departments”.

Peace operations have played a major role in the transformation of the Turkish military in line with emerging security conceptualisations suggesting human and societal dimensions of security.\(^\text{39}\) Turkey’s participation in these operations has considerably enhanced its soft power image in the neighbouring regions, and has helped dispel concerns about Turkey as a “rising regional hegemon”.\(^\text{40}\) Turkey’s growing interest in peace operations is explained in two principal ways.\(^\text{41}\) One of Turkey’s major motivations is to improve its experience and know-how in dealing with new types of security challenges, emanating from the neighbouring regions. Globalisation has increased security-interdependence and intra-state ethnic conflicts tend to spread across countries and regions. Contributing to conflict-management and good governance in neighbouring countries through the deployment of peace units is expected to increase the sense of security at home.

The second explanation involves ideational factors. In the Cold War, Turkey’s security identity was recognised as “Western” as a result of its NATO membership and close strategic partnership with the West against the common Soviet threat. This situation completely changed after the Cold War. In the absence of an existential threat, Turkey’s non-Western cultural and political peculiarities came to the fore, rendering its security identity increasingly uncertain. Peace operations provided Turkey with a valuable opportunity to construct a new type of security partnership with the Western allies through close cooperation in conflict-ridden areas and by sharing the same Western values and norms. They gave Turkey chance to demonstrate that it is adapting its security understanding to the new norms, emphasising the relationships between democratisation, human rights and security.

\(^{38}\) Interview with General Atilla Ateş, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, *Military Technology* 24, no. 6 (2000): 78-79.


\(^{40}\) Uğur Güngör *The Analysis of Turkey’s Approach to Peace Operations*, 250.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 133–147 and 156–179.
Civil–Military Relations

While the Turkish military has successfully adapted to civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) and the idea of good governance in external peace operations, the civil–military relationship has been one of the most intractable problems inside their own country’s process of democratisation. Since Turkey’s transition to a multiparty system in the mid-1940s, democratic consolidation has been disrupted on various occasions by the heavy influence of the armed forces on public affairs. The armed forces took over the government three times in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and they forced it to resign in 1997. Moreover, since 1950, there have arguably been a number of attempts by certain groups of officers to topple the legitimate governments. These have been unsuccessful, thanks to the vigilance or unwillingness of other officers from the higher echelons of the armed forces. One such abortive plot in 2003 was recently made public by a weekly magazine, Nokta, and received wide and detailed media coverage.42

The military, historically pro-Western, considers itself the guardian of the state, established and maintained according to Atatürk’s republican and secularist principles. In other words, the task of the armed forces has been not only to protect the political and territorial integrity of the state but also its secular character against its internal enemies. This mission continues to be an integral part of Turkey’s security culture, notwithstanding certain developments which have served to moderate the interventionist mission of the military.

The military is increasingly careful not to involve itself in politics in too obvious a manner. The armed forces seem to have developed a *modus vivendi* with governments.43 There are several reasons for this trend. First, in the contemporary era, democracy cannot be separated from modernisation, which implies civilian primacy. As the agent of modernisation, the military has been increasingly mindful of this historical development since the end of the Second World War. Second, the military is aware that its involvement in politics undermines the professionalism of its officer core. Political statements by the Chief of Staff and the Force Commanders spark heated critical debates in the media. Many columnists and academics severely criticise such statements as unjustifiable interference with public affairs. Beside the public debate, Turkish academics are researching and publishing articles on civil–military relations in scholarly journals: never before has this issue received such wide publicity as a problem of democratisation. Lastly, there is growing pressure for further democratisation from the public opinion.

Despite ups and downs, Turkey has made considerable progress in building new and democratic civil–military relations. From 2002 to 2005, in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria of the EU, the parliament revised the Constitution several times and adopted new legislation curbing the authority of the military. In

42 Nokta (29 March–4 April 2007), 1–57.
June 2006, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül acknowledged that the armed forces had made valuable contributions to Turkey’s European Union (EU) objectives and reforms. He said, “the reforms would be much more difficult without the support of the military. They understand where Turkey’s interest lies. They have a long-term strategic vision... The change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy became possible thanks to their active contributions. We have been in continual contact with them”.

Although these reforms and demands for further democratisation have brought Turkey more into line with democratic norms and practices, occasional public declarations by military leaders in 2006 and 2007 demonstrated the continuing involvement of the armed forces in politics. On 27 April 2007 the military’s encroachment on the presidential election through an “electronic memorandum” was a blatant example of the continuing political role of the armed forces. That “memorandum”, however, proved ineffective, as demonstrated by the landslide electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in July 2007.

In May 2007 civil–military relations began to take a new turn. The military’s “hands-off” position became more visible. The new pattern of civil–military relations is marked by a close and effective collaboration between the civilian government and the military in the field of the Kurdish problem in general and the fight against the PKK in particular. Air and land forces have recently undertaken fifteen cross-border operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Before launching these operations, the government worked hard to prepare a favourable political and diplomatic environment in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Since then Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Chief of Staff General Büyükanıt have been getting together almost weekly in official and unofficial meetings to discuss and evaluate operations. One of the summit declarations in early June 2007 emphasised that the fight against terrorism would be carried out “on the basis of democracy and the principle of supremacy of law”. It also said that there was “full harmony and coordination” between the government and the armed forces. This collegial relationship between the civil government and the military created a window of opportunity for further democratisation, but it also emphasised the significance of the strategic interaction between politics and military operations. Furthermore, it brought to the forefront the inescapable political dimension of counter-terrorism and the Kurdish problem.

Two factors motivated this civil–military collaboration. Before and during the operations, the need to maintain national solidarity became an issue of high priority. The military wanted to avoid any steps that would split the nation. Secondly, and probably more significantly, a change of approach to the struggle against the PKK has occurred. The relative internationalisation of the PKK issue and the Kurdish problem on the one hand, and their convergence with the complex war in Iraq, on the other hand, aggregated a number of security challenges emanating both from

---

45 *Briefing* (18 June 2007), 6.
inside and outside the country. This development made the political and other non-military dimensions increasingly visible. Moreover, the revival of the PKK despite successful military operations in the 1990s reconfirmed the need to subordinate military operations to a new comprehensive understanding which integrates military and political efforts, including economic, diplomatic, social-psychological, and public relations measures.\(^46\) Such an approach requires a close collaboration between the military and the civilian government. Notwithstanding the ongoing civil–military cooperation, however, there is no reliable indication that the new understanding has yet resulted in a comprehensive strategy.

The TAF has an ongoing programme aimed at building up more efficient military formations with increased operational capabilities. This kind of reform, however, would require a new personnel policy aimed at creating a more professional army. Turkey has a hybrid system with professional officers, an increasing number of special force formations, technical NGOs and civilian employees, whose numbers are also increasing. These professionals are combined with soldiers enlisted through a traditional conscription system. Nevertheless, it seems that the TGS is in favour of a phased and slow transition to a fully professional army. They argue that the economic and demographic conditions of the country, as well as the multiplicity of threats and the country’s geostrategic location, do not allow a rapid abolition of the conscription system.\(^47\)

On 18 August 2008, the government released a draft national programme regarding EU accession which provides for significant additional reforms in Turkey’s civil–military relations.\(^48\) The new programme increases the power of the Court of Audit to control all military spending. The jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians and over military officials involved in civilian affairs will be restricted, whilst the jurisdiction of the civilian courts will be extended. Internal security services such as the gendarmerie will be put under complete civilian control.

**Conclusion**

In contrast to earlier republican scholarship which emphasised a radical break with the Ottoman centuries, recent Ottoman/Turkish historiography has begun to focus on change and continuity between the Empire and the Republic. From ongoing

\(^{46}\) For the emphasis put on the non-military aspects of security, see the Opening Address of the International Symposium by the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces General Yaşar Büyükanıt (İstanbul, 31 May 2007); and the Opening Address of the Academic Year 2007–2008 of the War College by the Turkish Land Forces Commander General İlker Başbuğ (Ankara, 24 September 2007).


\(^{48}\) *Today’s Zaman* (21 August 2008), 1 and 17.
research it is now possible to extrapolate a significant degree of continuity in Turkey’s security culture despite the radical republican reforms. Continuity is observable in a strong *realpolitik* tradition as well as in identity problems reflected in Westernisation and Western-oriented policies. In the Ottoman Empire, the security culture evolved from an offensive *realpolitik* to a defensive one. The latter continues to dominate foreign policy making in Turkey today. The process of modernisation had two interrelated aspects: reforms to modernise the state (and, in the Republic, society as well); and the state’s integration with the European state system. These policies led to the imperial elite’s (and later the republican elite’s) opening up to European ideas and values and eventually to a comprehensive policy of Westernisation which represented a breakthrough with the Atatürkist reforms. The West had a two-fold impact. On the one hand, it brought ideas of liberalism and open society; on the other hand, it promoted nationalism, power politics and authoritarianism. The second dimension, when combined with the state-centric tradition of the Ottoman Empire, left a more visible imprint on Turkey’s security culture.

Turkey’s security culture has been constructed and reconstructed under the impact of dichotomous trends such as offensive *realpolitik*/defensive *realpolitik*, tradition/modernity, cosmopolitanism/nationalism, national unity/pluralism, and secular republicanism/democracy. The evolution of this security culture in the Ottoman and republican periods is characterised by successive attempts to reconcile and adapt to these dichotomies. At times, this process brought about an ambivalent security identity, further complicating existing threat perceptions. At the same time, it complicated Europeans’ perceptions of Turkey. The ongoing and consistent inclination, however, has been to keep up with the standards of “contemporary civilisation”, as formulated by Atatürk.

These twin discourses have not faded away. Turkey continues to be challenged by their contemporaneity. Its ability to manage them is regularly tested. While its EU candidacy, NATO membership, its active performance in the PfP and its increasing participation in peace operations all suggest cosmopolitanism, multilateralism, interdependence, cooperative security, democratic civil control of the armed forces, and emphasis on societal and individual security, its regional environment, its lingering fears and enemies inherited from the nineteenth century, ethnic separatism, terrorism, and the unpredictable future of its relationship with Europe, all indicate security through power politics, nationalism, and the sustained primacy of the nation-state.

Despite the ongoing relevance of these dichotomies, Turkey’s predominantly *realpolitik* security culture has been moderated and regulated in the post-Cold War era. Its “soft power” has come to the fore in its activities in the Balkans, the Black Sea basin, and the Middle East. Nowadays, it is evident in its mediatory efforts between Syria and Israel. Its policy towards Iran is characterised by diplomatic engagement rather than containment. The non-military dimensions of the PKK and Kurdish issues have increasingly been emphasised by the military as
well as the government — although there is as yet no sign of a new viable strategy
to deal with these issues.

Turkey’s power-political tradition remains deeply embedded in its security
culture and comes to the surface from time to time. For example, in early 1997,
when the Greek Cypriot government announced its intention to deploy S-300
surface to air missiles on the island, Turkey threatened to launch air operations
against the Greek Cypriots. Another example was the Turkish deployment of
military units on the Syrian border in 1998 for the purpose of compelling Damascus
to expel Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, from Syria. In both cases, the
military threat paid off. Greek Cypriots refrained from deploying the S-300s and
Syria expelled Öcalan.49

Turkey’s civil–military relations have recently taken a remarkable turn
toward a more democratic pattern. This new development is different from the
previous legislative reforms which were adopted for the purpose of further
harmonisation with the EU. This time, the change is unfolding pragmatically and
independently of Turkey’s European ambitions. The new pattern is marked by close
and effective collaboration between the civilian government and the military,
especially in the Kurdish problem and the struggle against the PKK. Moreover, the
military refrains from criticising directly and publicly the JDP government on
secularism: it seems that they have handed their guardianship on this matter over to
the judiciary. The Constitutional Court recently heard a closure case against the
JDP, which was entered by the Chief Public Prosecutor. The Court decided not to
ban the JDP. Interestingly enough, the military judge, Hon. Serdar Özgüldür, was
among those members of the Court who voted against closure.

This is a new way of getting along with democratisation. Although the
military commanders continue to make declarations on public and political matters,
Turkey is moving towards a regime with more political initiative and less direct
military influence over politics, a pattern that we may call “conditional military
subordination”50 to the civilian democratic government. A consensus among the
political parties on establishing a more democratic balance between secularism and
Islam and between the Kurdish question and the unitary state would certainly
increase the possibility of more democratic control of the military and its complete
subordination to the civilian authority.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that the strategic cultures of
Turkey and the EU are very different from each other or that the possibility of
security cooperation between them is low. The dominant trend suggests
convergence rather than divergence. It is true that Turkey’s foreign and security
policy elite (civilian and/or military) continue to deal with security issues from an
exceptionalist standpoint, arguing that their country’s problems are different from

49 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International
50 J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: The
those of the EU members because Turkey is encircled by very dangerous areas and faces a continual risk of violence. This exceptionalism, however, is gradually fading as Turkey’s regional engagements increase and intensify. Turkey’s regionalism is now characterised by diplomacy, multilateralism, interdependence, peacekeeping, and energy security, opening new avenues for EU–Turkish foreign and security policy cooperation.

Turkey’s strategic culture still contains a power-political element, in spite of the “Kantian” aspects of its regional focus. Rather than being a point of divergence, however, this might constitute another point of convergence, increasing the possibility of cooperation. As Graeme P. Herd suggests in his chapter, there is not yet a unified strategic culture in the EU, but, since the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU has been working to develop a more robust strategic culture, increasing the military aspect of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Nevertheless, despite these areas of growing convergence, there still remains a significant point of divergence between the two strategic cultures: although a certain degree of democratisation has been achieved in civilian control of the military, Turkey still lags behind EU standards.

References


Şatana, Nil Seda. “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy.” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 357–388.

Toynbee, Arnold. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. London: Constable, 1922.


Other sources:

Interview with General Atilla Ateş, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Military Technology 24, no. 6 (2000): 78-79.


The Opening Address of International Symposium by the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces General Yaşar Büyükanıt (İstanbul, 31 May 2007).

The Opening Address of the Academic Year 2007-2008 of the War College by the Turkish Land Forces Commander General İlkер Başbuğ (Ankara, 24 September 2007).

Today’s Zaman (21 August 2008), 1 and 17.

Briefing (18 June 2007), 6.
III. EU–Turkey Clashing Political and Strategic Cultures as Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession?

Graeme P. Herd (Geneva Centre for Security Policy)

What is Strategic Culture?

Strategic culture is characterised as the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world-views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it. The underlying central assumption embedded within the concept is “the belief that traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and historical experience shape strategic behaviour and actual policy making”. In other words, strategic culture concerns itself with “behaviour relevant to the use of force for political purposes”. Duffield surveys more fully the utility of the concept, noting that strategic culture defines the basic foreign policy goals and objectives that are to be pursued (reflecting state interests and identity), shapes elite and public perceptions of the international environment, conditions the type of policy options that are seen to exist (in terms of their acceptability, legitimacy, and appropriateness), and influences the evaluation of these options and so shapes the foreign and security policy choice.

In the Cold War, national strategic culture was shaped by the classical understanding that security dealt with defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity through the use of military instruments. The concept was first debated in the Cold War with an analysis of how US and Soviet competing strategic cultures influenced nuclear rivalry and strategic thinking. The use of force — where, when and how elite decision-makers used it (civilian and military) — was central to the understanding of national strategic cultures. Snyder argued that Soviet strategic culture provided the context for understanding the intellectual, institutional and strategic–cultural determinants that bind Soviet decision-making in a crisis, and behavioural propensities that would motivate and constrain Soviet leaders. So the

equation of strategic culture with propensity to use force in defence was made and became a default understanding: states that had a strategic culture used military force and were strategic actors; states that were not willing to use military force did not have a strategic culture and could not be considered strategic actors.

If we stay with the narrower Cold War focus of the meaning of strategic culture then, while acknowledging that the EU in the post-Cold War period has created a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and within that an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which now includes Battle Groups able to perform peace-enforcement/war-fighting roles, and that it published a European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 which identifies strategic threats and responses, some have argued that the EU has not yet developed a sufficiently coherent or consistent approach to the use of force to allow for the creation of an EU strategic culture. Such an argument rests on the fact that the ESS does not make explicit reference to the “use of force” or “power”, but rather to “military activities”, “robust intervention” and “price to be paid”. It is also underpinned by the notion that ESDP is very much a creature of the member states, a second pillar sovereignty-sensitive inter-governmental construct, rather than under the control of the supranational EU Commission, Parliament and Courts. Realists argue that until the EU develops as a supranational federal state, rather than an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, it cannot forge a strategic culture — the sine qua non of strategic actor status.

Precisely because the EU does not currently have a strategic culture, it is still possible for it to develop one, and so become a strategic actor. It is already a global economic player, fostering an economic strategic culture of promoting free markets globally. Indeed, some argue that the EU has already reached a pivotal point and faces a difficult choice “whether to remain a primarily civilian actor in international politics or to transform itself through greater foreign and security policy integration”. But should the EU develop a strategic culture? While Naumann argues that the EU should develop military capabilities to match its ambition, Rynning, by contrast, strongly states that EU as a pluralist construct, a “successful European peace project”, should “leave strategic affairs to those who have the capacity to think and act strategically — such as the US or coalitions of willing European states.”

---


57 Tardy, Ibid., 552.

58 Christoph Heusgen, “Is there such a thing as a European Strategic Culture?,” *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* 2, no. 1 (2005): 29.


This paper argues that an EU strategic culture has already emerged, although this is unacknowledged by most scholars and analysts. The issue addressed by this paper, therefore, is the nature of an EU strategic culture, rather than whether or not it has one. The first section identifies and examines a series of past challenges and obstacles to the formation of an EU strategic culture. The second rethinks the concept to fit more appropriately the contemporary strategic context and uses this redefinition as the basis for the subsequent discussion. The third section assesses current and potential future drivers of a strategic culture, examining both the military aspects of ESDP and the EU’s wider strategic developments, not least the debates around the likely evolution of the ESS. A fourth seeks to conceptualise the relationship between an emergent EU strategic culture and that of Turkey. After noting some of the crude misperceptions on the part of the EU and Turkey with regard to the supposed incompatibility of strategic cultures, it argues that in a fundamental sense there is a growing convergence between the EU and Turkey in strategic cultures, orientations and identity. The conclusion provides an overview of trends and trajectories and highlights some paradoxes at the heart of the EU–Turkish strategic relationship.

1. Obstacles to the Formation of an EU Strategic Culture

A range of reasons are given as to why the EU has yet to develop a strategic culture and why it never will, some external to the EU, some internal and integral to its design. Powerful states in the international system oppose the strengthening of an alternative centre of global power, particularly one that has a robust strategic culture that challenges other such centres. For the US, the formation of an EU strategic culture allows the possibility of the EU becoming a counterbalance or counterweight to the US. As the US seeks to maintain the unipolar moment and avoid a multi-polar world, it therefore seeks to maintain strategic dominance within Europe. Interestingly, it is argued that the inclusion of Turkey within the EU would help to achieve that goal: “Turkish accession would not only lead to a weaker and more divided European Union but would in many ways leave us with an American Trojan horse in our midst.” The ability of the EU to get 27 member states to establish a coherent policy towards Russia in the form of a common energy strategy, is undercut by the national approach of member states who are willing to carry out bilateral deals with Russia. A “Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations”

---


undertaken by the newly created European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) argues that the EU lacks unity and as a consequence is unable to translate its comparative power into influence in its dealings with Russia. It is clearly also in Russian state interest to prevent a more coherent EU from evolving.

Looking internally at the nature of the EU, rather than constraints imposed by external states, it is clear that the EU is at best a hybrid entity. It is not a nation state and in political and cultural terms it does not behave like one. Its postmodern, complex, multilevel governance clashes with the modern necessity of executive authority to undertake military coercion. Centralised authority would have capacity without legitimacy; national institutions have legitimacy without capacity. Bailes argued that there are no distinct European models or set of European values in the organisation of defence to allow for convergence and the development of an EU strategic culture. This places an obstacle in the path of the EU’s potential to construct a strong strategic culture. As a result, and as Freedman notes, if the EU-27 does generate a military doctrine for ESDP it would be dysfunctional as it “would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an active conflict”.

There is a lack of consensus/agreement among member states about the means and ends of security policy, about “where, how, when and for what reasons the EU should engage in foreign policy”. This lack of consensus reflects the range of different national strategic cultures, divergent military doctrines and traditions within the EU. Howorth, for example, argues that there are six types of EU member state national security cultures — allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanist, professional power projection/conscript-based territorial defence, nuclear/non-nuclear military/civilian instruments, large/small states, weapons providers/consumers. The net effect of such divergence and difference is strategic incoherence. In the words of Meyer: “How else to explain Germany’s reluctance to send troops abroad, Poland’s difficulties with trusting European partners, Britain’s attachment to the US, France’s insistence on a global autonomous role?” In Finland, for example, the focus on homeland defence based on national conscription and self-determination is shaped by its historical experience of Great Power domination. The UK and France, by contrast, have an imperial/colonial tradition, and activist use of force, although the UK is considered Atlanticist in

66 Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?”.
67 Lawrence Freedman, “Can the EU Develop an Effective Military Doctrine?.” In Steven Everts et al., eds, A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004): 15.
orientation, France continental and European. This divergence only increases with enlargement.\(^\text{72}\)

It is not just that national strategic cultures are so different, but that they are resistant to change that challenges the formation of an EU strategic culture. Historical experience and how it is understood are particularly important elements of such practice. As Meyer\(^\text{73}\) explains: “Traumatic defeats, oppression, betrayal and exclusion, guilt as well as military triumphs plant themselves deep into collective memories as ‘lessons’ learned and ‘beliefs held’”. Hyde-Pryce\(^\text{74}\) argues that the strategic cultures of selected European states — Germany, France, UK and Poland — reflect a security environment of the latter half of the last century, rather than the strategic context of the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century. The weight and burden of history in the shape of the First and Second World Wars, the holocaust, the Cold War territorial defence focus and US/USSR subordinate “allies” status, where autonomous strategic ambition was discouraged, constitute important and powerful impediments to developing new national European security strategies in the new century, as well as to the formation of an EU strategic culture.

In addition, and to complicate matters further, some EU member national strategic cultures are themselves plagued by internal tensions, with no single dominant political and strategic culture evident. Germany, for example, refused to support the Iraq intervention not because of pacifist or anti-US strategic alliance, but because of the coexistence of two competing schools of thought within Germany’s strategic culture.\(^\text{75}\) In Sweden it is argued that an ideological gap exists between military elites that view military operations (rapid, high tech, deployable, employable) as the primary mission of the future, and a public opinion and large segment of the officer corps that focuses on the notion of a people’s army and concerns itself with territorial defence as the primary strategic mission.\(^\text{76}\) A last example is Denmark. Here, two forms of strategic culture coexist: cosmopolitanism (neutrality, conflict resolution through non-military means, support of international institutions) and defencism (military preparedness, NATO alliance). The compromise result is a strategic culture that stresses both deterrence policy and “new activism”.\(^\text{77}\)

\(^{72}\) Baun, “How Necessary is a Common Strategic Culture?,” 33.


It is generally recognised that strategic culture is under-explored in terms of theory and methodology.\textsuperscript{78} In the context of the debate over whether the EU has a strategic culture or not, this is all too evident. The EU is barred from strategic culture status because it is not a state. If it is granted the possibility of strategic culture, this status is rejected on the grounds it has not sufficiently demonstrated a willingness to privilege, stress adequately or actually use military force to gain its political objectives. Despite this injunction, there is no clear understanding of when a state possesses sufficient capability, force projection, or willingness to use force to qualify for strategic culture status. There is no consensus over the appropriate quantitative or qualitative metrics that can be applied to determine whether or not a strategic culture has emerged. In fact, there has been no effort evident in the literature to debate or even discuss what these metrics might be. Both these sets of arguments underscore the need to update strategic culture to the post-Cold War realities and new strategic context.

To tackle the first issue: the EU is not a state and therefore cannot have a strategic culture. The EU is not a state, but EU “competences are increasing, its power structure is deepening, its membership is widening and its mandate expanding” and it possesses “something of the character of the administrative-bureaucratic mode of state formation”\textsuperscript{79} However, the question is not the formal \textit{de jure} status of the EU — whether or not it has sufficient attributes of statehood to be considered capable of possessing a strategic culture. If strategic culture is concerned with the attitudes of elites, militaries and publics to such sources of strategic insecurity and their management, their ability to think and act strategically, then the extent to which these EU actors possess such attitudes and values and express such behaviour should be our focus.

The second objection is that the EU does not make sufficient reference to the use of force for it to have ‘emerged’ with a strategic culture. This understanding of strategic culture ignores a contemporary strategic context that is characterised by the rise of non-state and transnational actors and non-military/nuclear sources of strategic threat, which may require military but also non-military strategic responses. While policy-makers and practitioners acknowledge this reality, some in the academic and analyst community do not. Failed states and regional crises, environmental change, organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are all identified in the ESS as global challenges and sources of strategic threat, particularly where a nexus forms between them. The real question is the extent to which the EU uses a range of appropriate instruments — diplomatic, economic (development aid/assistance), political, normative/legal, as


\textsuperscript{79} Amelia Hadfield, “The EU and Strategic Culture: Virtual Identity Vs Uploaded Preferences,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary European Research} 1, no. 1 (2005): 68.
well as military force — to achieve a strategic political objective or to counter a range of contemporary strategic threats. Here military strategy and the role of the use of force should be viewed from within the EU’s overall set of strategic preferences. The answer to this question will help characterise the nature of an EU strategic culture (low intensity high context?) rather than settle the question as to whether it not it has one.  

3. EU Strategic Culture: Key Drivers

Strategic culture concerns the use of force in the management of threats. How has the EU’s understanding of threat management evolved, particularly attitudes towards the use of coercive force in support of this capability? Habitual behaviour is learned behaviour.  

How is the EU learning to behave strategically? There are two explanations that account for the EU’s acquisition of a strategic culture: first, the market-place of threats is the key dynamic in providing the EU with autonomy in defence and security matters and in forging an EU strategic culture; second, an EU strategic culture is driven forward by shared norms with regards to using force.

The EU can be seen to adopt a neo-realist market-led approach which leads to strategic convergence around a more robust strategic culture. There is a general consensus within the EU as to threat identification and management, strategic objectives and foreign policy principles; this is reflected in ESS 2003 and its emphasis on the rise of non-state transnational sources of instability.  

We can assess developments in EU strategic culture against the three strategic aims and goals it set for itself in ESS 2003: defence against threats (“in failed states military instruments may be needed to restore order”); strengthening of Europe’s security in the neighbourhood; and promotion of world order on the basis of effective multilateralism. ESS states: “we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”.  

Heisbourg and Howorth argued three years after the St. Malo summit that differences towards the use of military force were already narrowing, with greater acceptance prevalent among the member states of the Union as to its values and key threats to those values, and with operations involving military force gaining greater legitimacy. Since then the EU

---

80 The task of characterising an EU strategic culture is made more difficult by the absence of any commonly accepted typology of strategic culture as a reference point, further underlining the need to re-conceptualise the concept.

81 Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 8-9.

82 Baun, “How Necessary is a Common Strategic Culture?,” 34.


has further developed the military instruments and capabilities needed to match its strategic ambition (to manage the threats it identifies) and the political will to utilise the instruments to that end. By 2005 Cornish and Edwards\textsuperscript{86} noted that “the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere” had “developed markedly”. This development has continued through to the time of writing, in 2008.

The ESS was examined and debated under the French presidency of the EU and it is possible that an updated ESS will be formulated in which the when, where, why and how of coercive force will be more explicitly addressed. After the Georgia crisis of August 2008 such debates have focussed attention on the contemporary relevance of the first sentences of the ESS: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has give way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”. Whatever the text of the new ESS, it will most likely give a higher priority to further developing its “hard” security capability and will place a greater emphasis on coercive instruments to complement existing soft-power tools.

The common development, understanding and convergence of ESDP norms around an increasingly robust strategic culture which links the use of force within a more comprehensive tool-box of policy instruments with both civilian and military aspects of ESDP is another key driver. The EU's cumulative operational response to pressure of external threats and the internal generation of EU norms towards the use of force, provide for a growing narrative and security discourse that frames the EU as a strategic actor. (See Table 1 on page 56: EU Strategic Culture: Illustrative ESDP “Learning By Doing” Matrix.)

Duffield\textsuperscript{87} argues that in fact national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989. Firstly, attitudes towards threat perception can gradually change over time; this process can manifest itself through “paradigm competition” between older and younger generations, between older dominant and newer opposing strategic cultures. Secondly, institutionalised socialisation within foreign and security policy-making elites and military professionals also occurs at the EU level. An EU strategic culture rests on EU-generated “norms, procedures and institutions [which] form a policy community complete with policy resultant behaviour.”\textsuperscript{88} Here “norm entrepreneurs” and personnel changes can play a key role as individuals are able to generate, communicate and shepherd new ideas that shape policy. Norms come in two variants: “constitutive norms, which define actors’ identities and their situations; and regulative norms, which define normative and


\textsuperscript{87} Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behaviour.”

\textsuperscript{88} Hadfield, “The EU and Strategic Culture,” 68.
normal behaviour for actors." Most EU policy-makers would argue that the EU is developing a strategic culture over time, where individuals are aware of EU priorities and are familiar with ESDP objectives. This awareness is inculcated and institutionalised through the socialising effects of participation in ESDP operations (civilian and military) and training exercises, and service on EU structures and committees (EU Office of the High Representative, EU Political and Security Committee, EU Military Staff, etc.), as well as the creation of a European Defence Agency (EDA) which aims to overcome policy culture differences that have caused previous collaborative armaments projects to fail. It is also habituated through an increase in the amount of training offered at the EU-level. Indeed, a clearly stated goal of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is to spread EU strategic culture. As diplomatic and military course participants pass through the ESDC, an EU strategic culture will gradually develop as EU civilian and military security norms are incrementally and voluntarily transplanted to the national member-state level. The ESDC and the European Police College (CEPOL), which organises 80–100 courses, seminars and conferences per year, are just two of several training organisations under the EU umbrella. The EDA “could play a crucial role in institutionalising peer group pressure among the national military establishments”. Thirdly, external shocks to national cultural systems can trigger sudden strategic culture step-changes. Such shocks include “wars, depression and revolutions”, and the paradigm shifts that occurred with the sudden end of the Cold War or the trauma of 9/11. These sudden shocks focus attention and generate intense media-driven crisis learning: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Iraq crisis all served such a function for the EU. Together these learning pressures have supported a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms within the EU.

Here it is understood that the drivers and therefore the gate-keepers of an emergent EU strategic culture will be EU member states, the European Commission, and EU and national Parliamentary elites. These actors allocate government resources, shape foreign policy discourse — a “negotiated reality” — and set the parameters for foreign policy choices. EU publics also play a role and it is interesting to consider the relationship between the two. Institutional consensus can evolve in the face of new challenges; there may be conditions under which EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Strategic Guidelines/Framework</th>
<th>Threats – “against which to act”</th>
<th>Tools building – “capability to act”</th>
<th>Norms – “legitimacy for acting”</th>
<th>Key Operations – “acting”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)</td>
<td>Petersberg Tasks = humanitarian &amp; reconciliation, peacekeeping, crisis management, peacemaking</td>
<td>Crisis management tool box = diplomatic, military, economic = comprehensive approach</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention; multilateralism; UN and IL support; consensus; restraint</td>
<td>Strengthen EU’s military capability, in order to increase its security autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
<td>ESS I: European Neighbourhood Policy; Africa Peace Facility (support AU)</td>
<td>Terrorism, state failure, regional crises, organised crime, WMD proliferation, environment</td>
<td>Nation-building; counter-insurgency; preventative engagement</td>
<td>First ESDP mission EUPM; FYROM EUMISSIONS; PASCOR, DFC, Operation Artemis, OHQ Mont Valérien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
<td>First ESDP mission EUPM; FYROM EUMISSIONS; PASCOR, DFC, Operation Artemis, OHQ Mont Valérien</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabel 1: EU Strategic Culture: Illustrative ESDP “Learning by Doing” Matrix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>EDA Commitments</th>
<th>Capability commitments</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>“Civilian Headline Goal 2008”; “Headline Goal 2010”</td>
<td>Agree to establish BGs; counter-terrorism coordinator. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in EU. Civilian Response Teams</td>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>Capability commitments First military missions</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea (BiH) from NATO-led SFOR under Berlin-plus. SHAPE OHQ. 7,000-strong = EU’s largest crisis management op.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>European Police College (CEPOL); European Security and Defence College (ESDC) – virtual institution for strategic level training in ESDP</td>
<td>AMIS II (Darfur) - civilian/military supporting action to assist AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping mission (UNAMID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EU Battle Groups – combat units for rapid deployment</td>
<td>Peace enforcement; autonomy</td>
<td>EGF fully operational.</td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo, supported UN mission in elections. OHQ Potsdam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
publics might be ahead of EU elites in terms of use of force (norm violations and other well publicised moral challenges), as well as situations in which publics lag behind elites (questionable pre-emptive/preventative interventions). Public opinion is perhaps “best understood as setting the outer limits of acceptability with regard to breaks from traditional strategic culture principles”.94

4. Modelling Current EU-Turkey Strategic Cultures

If we accept that the EU does have a strategic culture, how does its strategic culture compare and relate to that of Turkey? One perspective would be to argue that the EU and Turkey have strategic cultures that are poles apart, and that it intuitively follows that strategic cooperative capacity between the two is consequently very low. (See: Table 2: EU-Turkish Divergent Strategic Cultures.)

Table 2: EU-Turkish Divergent Strategic Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Post-modern, post-sovereign, complex multilevel governance</td>
<td>Large modern industrial “warrior” state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Soft civilian power (economic, values, identity), Kantian, rich.</td>
<td>Hard military power, Hobbesian – force projection, territorial defence, poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Humanitarian and crisis management</td>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to world order</td>
<td>Liberal-constructivist, interdependence, win–win outcomes, consensus-orientated</td>
<td>Neo-realist, zero-sum thinking, balance of power, hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Norms</td>
<td>Multilateralism/UN/IL, consensus, humanitarianism, restraint</td>
<td>Unilateralist, statehood (territory and sovereignty sacrosanct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Strategic culture</td>
<td>Consensus driven, regional focus. Or even: no state; no strategic actor; no strategic culture</td>
<td>Allied, Atlanticist, professional military power. Nationalist, authoritarian, Islamist-populous.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey and the EU represent two very different entities. As a result, and crudely put, as well as being too big and too poor for membership, Turkey is considered too alien — nationalist, authoritarian and Islamist-populous — while the EU can be caricatured as liberal utopian that stresses human rights, multilateralism and international law and abhors the use of force. It highlights a divergence in strategic cultures that suggests a weak cooperative capacity in the field of military–security issues, particularly when the question of the use of force is raised. The divide is characterised in various ways. Turkey can be seen as a status quo warrior state willing to use Hobbesian hard coercive power, while the EU represents Kantian trading soft power. As a result, Turkey adopts a realist zero-sum balance of material power approach to international relations, based on self-help, mistrust and buttressed by all pervading fear of encirclement and the loss of territory.\textsuperscript{95} The EU, by contrast, is posited as a liberal institutionalist actor, determined to cooperate and foster interdependence, with a win–win approach to international relations. Turkey is still a modern sovereign state with a low-context strategic culture (that views security politics in terms of simple oppositions, a black-and-white world view), while the EU is a postmodern, post-sovereign entity with a high context strategic culture (acknowledging complexity, interconnections and trade-offs). Here the EU’s strategic culture is viewed as an extension of Germany’s in the Cold War — a culture of restraint and reticence, humanitarianism, multilateral cooperation, and a readiness for compromise.

An opposing perspective would argue that the EU and Turkey are not poles apart in terms of strategic cultures, but are increasingly converging, even overlapping. Turkey is a member of NATO and so part of the transatlantic security community. Turkey therefore shares the norms, values and patterns of behaviours of other states within this security community in which war by one member against another is “unthinkable”.\textsuperscript{96} By treaty, by history, institutional engagement, security orientation and ideological ambition it is part of the “political West” — indeed, a key anchor of that entity. In this context, two trends are relevant to the discussion of EU strategic culture and Turkey.

The first trend is towards increasing overlap in EU and NATO membership and doctrine (role, missions and duties). NATO members have adopted an increasingly robust strategic culture, adapting NATO strategy and doctrine from collective defence to collective security, intervening with military force in Kosovo, enacting Article 5 after 9/11 and leading ISAF in Afghanistan where war fighting occurs. The differences in EU and NATO membership further lessened with the accession of post-communist and post-Soviet Baltic States to the EU in 2004 — all of whom were NATO members. The trend is towards an increased overlap of membership in these two security communities in terms of values, norms and

\textsuperscript{95} The Sevres phobia: the Treaty of Sevres saw foreign powers carve up Anatolia.

identity as security actors. This trend will be reinforced if Croatia gains EU membership (it was earmarked for NATO integration at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit), and if Sweden and Finland abandon their non-aligned status and join NATO (the question for some is not “if”, but “when”) – leaving only Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus as EU non-NATO members, and Iceland, Norway and Turkey as European NATO non-EU members. The question here is the extent to which members of one alliance which has adopted a robust and interventionist global strategic culture will — within a second alliance which is primarily a political and economic union, but with a growing military security component — adopt a different, even clashing, strategic culture. In other words: to what extent are EU/NATO states schizophrenic?

It could also be argued that within the EU there exist multiple national strategic cultures with two dominant clusters or strands; that each strand wants to have its preferred national strategic culture more or less replicated at the level of the EU; and that each is subject to incremental Europeanisation of their foreign and security policies. The first strand can be represented by smaller and non-aligned states which have strategic cultures that favour the current status quo — consensus driven, regionally-orientated crisis management in which cooperation with partners is confined to this limited ambition. The second strand consists of large former colonial great powers — France and UK — which have the capacity and are willing to undertake full spectrum missions globally, including taking decisive military action when necessary.

Turkish strategic culture appears closer to the great power European state approach in terms of capacity, closer to the smaller and non-aligned EU states in terms of regional focus. This relationship suggests that Turkey could offer support to EU missions involving combat operations/peace enforcement. This means that were Turkey to become an EU coalition partner it could bridge the intra-EU divide between the mainly NATO EU members that can project military force – the Dutch, British, French, Polish, Italians and Spanish, for example – and the non-aligned EU members who do not.

A more dynamic understanding of such relations suggests that there is a trend towards convergence, with Turkey becoming less Hobbesian and the EU less Kantian in its approach (See Chart 1: EU and Turkey: Strategic Cultures Past and Present). Turkey has undergone a transformation from status quo post-Cold War warrior addressing primarily a military security agenda, to benign regional superpower focussing on a wider civil, economic and political agenda. The Turkish


military assumes responsibility for “safeguarding Turkey’s westernization — and hence its democratization — while refraining from acting as an instrument of political government”. As the most secular and western of the key institutions in Turkey, the military is most supportive towards increased cooperation with the EU in foreign and security policy. Greater cooperation with the EU embeds the democratic and secular nature of the state.

Chart 1: EU and Turkey: Strategic Cultures Past and Present

In addition, the nature of future force deployments — humanitarian interventions under the responsibility to protect ethos in weak and failing states, environmental catastrophes/disaster relief operations, conflict prevention and crisis management missions — entail operations that may be too ambiguous, complex and uncertain for single states to manage. The cost/benefits analysis of such operations suggests that partnership and greater cooperation are more viable and attractive responses. The more the EU and Turkey do cooperate in the future, the more they will cooperate. The simple and fallacious dichotomy of Kant versus Hobbes will be replaced by a more interesting combination of the two, leading researchers to focus on a better question: under what conditions in this context will


Aybet, Ibid., 543.
the two cooperate more, under what conditions will cooperation be less? This conditions-based determinism is especially pertinent given the rise of non-state and transnational sources of insecurity such as environmental change, terrorism, and organised crime — threats that neither Kant nor Hobbes foresaw — as well as weak and failing states and weapons proliferation, which Kant and Hobbes did address.

The Johnson–Gray debate has a direct bearing on the utility to policy-analysts and decision-makers of strategic culture. One view is that strategic culture provides a distinct and critical explanation for the way different groups of people think and act when it comes to the use of force. Cultural, ideational and normative influences explain the motivations and causes of state behaviour and that of their leaders. An opposing view holds that it is important to study strategic culture as it provides a useful constitutive and discursive context for understanding decisions but does not dictate strategic behaviour: “other domestic and external variables”, for example, political and physical geography, as well as the material (economic and military) balance of power and structure of the international system, also shape behaviour. Strategic culture is an aid to understanding motivations, self-image and behaviour patterns of decision-makers: it “helps shape” but “does not determine how an actor interacts with others in the security field”. It supplements rather than supplants realist approaches to international relations, though, as Duffield notes, the influence of strategic culture is condition-based: it is “particularly strong when the international setting is characterised by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity”.

This paper suggests that strategic culture convergence between the EU and Turkey promote the likelihood of greater cooperation with security and defence policy. If strategic culture determines decision-making, privileged partnership and then membership is more likely (see Chart 2: EU-Turkey Possible Strategic Pathways). If strategic culture merely shapes rather than determines decision-making in the field of foreign and security policy, then other factors will be relevant to EU–Turkish cooperative capacity in this field — strategic culture will just be one factor amongst several and will reflect the balance of factors rather than determine them. In this case, as Yesilda argues, EU public and elite concerns over the consequences of Turkey’s accession for budget allocations (in particular the Cohesion Fund) and EU institutional representation (Parliament and Council of

103 Duffield,“Political Culture and State Behaviour,” 777.
Ministers) are more likely than divergent or clashing strategic cultures to be stumbling blocks to accession. In addition, socio-economic differences, populism and distrust will play a role in determining the outcome of negotiations over Turkish accession process.

Chart 2: EU–Turkey Three Possible Strategic Pathways?

5. Conclusions: Strategic Culture Convergence

That ‘strategic culture’ is under-conceptualised cannot be in doubt. Not only is the concept imported from a Cold War context understanding of strategy and applied in an unthinking manner to the post-Cold War world, but there are no metrics for judging when a strategic culture has been obtained, or anything more than a thumb-nail typology of strategic cultures for those states that are supposed to have them.

What kind of strategic culture does the EU have? Matlary\(^\text{105}\) notes the emergence of a post-national strategic culture based on human security and human rights, multilateral legitimacy, and just, limited collateral damage. CFSP and ESDP form a second pillar sovereignty-sensitive arena, under the veto control of state

governments rather than federal institutions, such as the European Parliament, Courts or Commission. Although the EU has more experience of civilian than military operations, the growing militarization of the EU strategic culture is underway. Operational practice and institutional evolution are reflected in a greater propensity to use force and are driven forward by a socialisation of militaries and cost-cutting at national levels. There is an increasing propensity of some EU member states, such as the UK and Germany, to frame their security strategies and military reform efforts around the framework of the ESS and of others, such as France and Sweden, to legitimise military reductions through the pooling of resources in the name of Europeanisation.

Howorth argues that: “The emergence of an EU strategic culture is one of the greatest challenges facing ESDP”. What is the importance of an EU strategic culture in relations with Turkey? The extent to which such a strategic culture can and does impact on relations with key external partners and potential future membership, not least that of Turkey, underscores its importance. Turkey has a high-intensity, low-context strategic culture, the EU a low-intensity, high-context one — but there is convergence between the two, driven by the nature of future conflict and likely force deployment in the shared neighbourhood.

The 2008 Georgia crisis raised the prospect of an East–West geo-strategic clash and also exposed the lack of an EU strategy towards the South Caucasus. The EU responded by negotiating a ceasefire between Moscow and Tbilisi and then deploying an EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia, which became operational on 1 October 2008. This crisis has highlighted the challenge for the EU to have a voice in the volatile South Caucasus without a more coherent strategy towards Ukraine and Turkey. The crisis also questioned a fundamental long-standing Kemalist foreign policy precept: “Peace at home, peace in the world”. That is to say, “Turkey should bury its imperial past, avoid foreign entanglements, and focus on internal development. Thus the Turkish Republic deliberately isolated itself from its neighbors, especially those to its south and east. It cut cultural and other ties across the board, and preferred cordial but distant relations over close involvement and interaction.” Turkish rapprochement with Armenia and its constructive role in stabilizing the region (not least reducing the prospect of renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and its proposed “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”), underlines Turkey’s pivotal role in this part of the EU’s near neighbourhood. Furthermore, current and potential future ESDP missions in this region are likely to forge a closer strategic partnership between Turkey and the EU. The need and pressure for EU–Turkish geo-strategic cooperation will increase after

---

US military draw-down in Iraq, with the inherent dangers of civil war and the regional fallout that would then ensue.

Eventual Turkish membership of the EU is likely to have more impact on Turkey’s strategic culture than on the EU’s. Privileged partnership will make visible the norms and force projection capacity convergence and so speed eventual membership. Rejection of Turkish membership on the grounds, *inter alia*, of clashing strategic cultures will only highlight dependence: paradoxically, the softer and more Kantian an EU strategic culture, the more dependent it will be on non-EU partners to provide military capacity; the more active, the higher the preparedness to use force and accept greater risks and the lower thresholds for doing so, the less dependent on such non-EU partners the EU becomes.

References


PART C

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AS AN OBSTACLE FOR INTEGRATING TURKEY IN THE EU
On 29 May 2005, the French rejected the draft European Union (EU) constitution by 55% to 45%, and three days later voters in the Netherlands rejected the draft EU constitution by 61% to 39%. Although the French and Dutch rejections of the European constitution was not about potential Turkish membership of the EU, the results were used by some influential circles in the EU to argue that Turkish membership to the EU had to be postponed for some — and probably for a very long — time.

It was only in 1999 that the Helsinki European Council had recognised Turkey as a candidate on an equal footing with other potential candidates. In December 2002 the Copenhagen European Council had decided that “the EU would open negotiations with Turkey ‘without delay’ if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria”. The EU leaders agreed on 16 December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October 2005.

Immediately after the official launching of the EU accession negotiations in October 2005, the screening process started which lasted until October 2006. Thereafter the Commission prepared the screening reports for each of the 35 policy chapters. The first chapter to be negotiated, Chapter 25 on ‘Science and Research’ was provisionally closed on 12 June 2006. Chapter 20 on ‘Enterprise and Industrial Policy’ was opened for negotiation at the end of March 2007, and two more negotiation chapters were opened thereafter, namely Chapter 18 on ‘Statistics’ and Chapter 32 on ‘Financial Control’. More recently, Chapter 21 on ‘Trans-European Networks’, Chapter 28 on ‘Health and Consumer Protection’, Chapter 6 on ‘Company Law’ and Chapter 7 on ‘Intellectual Property’ have been opened. Thus, as of 2008, eight policy chapters have been opened. By way of comparison, in the case Croatia, for which EU accession negotiations also began in October 2005, 21 of the 35 negotiating chapters have been opened and four have been provisionally closed.

Turkey’s accession talks have been dogged by a number of problems, and as a result little progress has been achieved during the last three years. The
perception that Turkey will not succeed in becoming a member of the EU during the foreseeable future is gaining ground both in Europe and Turkey.

Why is Turkey so keen on membership of the EU if the chances of success are so slim? If EU membership is not achieved, what are the alternatives? These are the type of questions dealt with in this paper. The paper is structured as follows: section 1 considers economic growth, principles of sound economic policy and institutions for running a successful market economy; section 2 discusses the alternatives to EU accession, while section 3 assesses those alternatives. Finally, section 4 offers some brief conclusions.

1. Economic Growth and Principles of Sound Economic Policy

The aim of economic activity is to generate wealth for a country’s citizens through the achievement of relatively high but sustainable economic growth measured by growth in real per capita income. Turkey is no exception. Turkey wants to close the economic gap between it and the rich countries in the world. During the fifty years prior to 1980 Turkey tried to achieve this goal through planning and import substitution. As these ideas lost ground Turkey switched over to more market oriented policies in 1980 that emphasized the role of the price system and an outward orientation.

Internationally, views on market oriented policies have converged recently into a set of policy principles known as the “Washington Consensus” or “Post-Washington Consensus”. According to Rodrik,110 the “universal” principles of sound economic policy consist of allocative efficiency, macroeconomic and financial stability and social inclusion. Allocative efficiency requires protection of property rights, contract enforcement, rule of law, market based competition, appropriate incentives, liberalisation of foreign trade, and liberalisation of foreign direct investment. Macroeconomic and financial stability requires sound money, prudential supervision, fiscal sustainability, and current account sustainability. Finally, social inclusion requires social safety nets and targeted poverty reduction programmes.

According to Rodrik,111 market economy is embedded in five sets of non-market institutions: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance, and institutions of conflict management. In a market economy entrepreneurs need to have adequate control over the return to assets, and private appropriability of the returns to

---

accumulation is an essential requirement for achieving allocative efficiency.\textsuperscript{112} Since markets fail when participants engage in fraudulent or anti-competitive behaviour, every market economy also needs to be overseen by regulatory institutions. Establishment of appropriate institutions that will secure sound money, prudential supervision, fiscal sustainability and current account sustainability are requirements for achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. On the other hand, social insurance in a market economy is needed to make it compatible with social stability and social cohesion. Finally, as institutions of conflict management, market economies need the rule of law, a high quality judiciary, and an effective police force. Empirical studies show that countries that have adhered to all of the above principles and have established the associated non-market institutions have done well, while countries that have flouted them have typically done poorly.

How does a country like Turkey acquire the institutions required for running a successful market based economy? During the period prior to the 1980s almost no attempt was made to establish such an economy. Turkey started to place emphasis on market based reforms with the stabilisation measures of 1980. With the help of the World Bank and the IMF, major trade and financial reforms were introduced during the 1980s. Trade liberalisation was followed by capital account liberalisation in 1989, when almost all obstacles to international capital movements were abolished. During the 1990s the policy of further opening up the economy was pursued with the aim of integrating into the EU. With the establishment of the Turkey–EU Customs Union on 1 January 2006, Turkey adopted the European Community (EC) competition law, established the Competition Authority, adopted the EC rules on protection of intellectual and industrial property rights, established a Patent Office, and started to harmonise technical legislation concerning industrial products and the establishment of sound conformity assessment and market surveillance structures internally. With the 2001 crisis Turkey learned about the importance of sound money, prudential supervision and fiscal sustainability.

These are remarkable achievements, but more still needs to be done to have a successful market based economy. As of 2008, Turkey was facing problems securing the protection of property rights, contract enforcement, rule of law, current account sustainability, labour market flexibility, social inclusion, liberalisation of services and network industries, and elimination of technical barriers to trade. The Turkish government realises that the main factors that will ensure convergence with the living standards of advanced countries are acquisition of high quality institutions and following the “universal” principles of sound economic policy.

\textsuperscript{112} Acemoglu et al. showed that the security of property rights has historically been perhaps the most important determinant of why some countries grew rich and others remained poor; see D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development,” \textit{American Economic Review} 91 (2001): 1369–1401.
2. Alternatives to EU Accession

Turkey is aiming for full EU membership. During the pre-accession period it will adopt the *Acquis Communautaire* (hereafter the *acquis*), the entire body of EU legislation, and by that means it hopes to acquire the institutions for running a successful market economy and following the “universal” principles of sound economic policy. Through this process it aims to derive efficiency gains. Once a member of the EU, Turkey expects to be eligible for EU agricultural subsidies and structural funds, to benefit from migration of Turkish labour to the EU, and to derive welfare gains from monetary integration. Finally, Turkey expects to participate in EU institutions and decision-making processes.113

Although EU accession seems to be the best policy option for Turkey, the achievement of EU membership in the near future does not seems feasible. First, there is strong opposition to Turkish membership within the EU. According to the European Commission,114 among all the candidate and potential candidate countries, Turkey’s accession generates the most disapproval: 48% of respondents oppose, and only 39% are in favour of its entry to the EU, even if it complies with all conditions set by the EU. The strongest opposition to Turkey’s accession is observed in Austria (81%), Germany (69%) and Luxemburg (69%).115 Second, it is argued that the EU does not have the capacity to absorb Turkey as a member, and that the dream of political union in Europe will be buried forever with Turkish accession.116 Third, there are geographical and cultural arguments against Turkey’s membership of the EU as emphasised by former French President Giscard d’Estaing and current French President Nicholas Sarkozy. It is argued that Turkey is not a European country and that its culture is very different from that of Europe.

115 For comparison purposes, it is interesting to note that the disapproval rate in Austria is 62% for Macedonia, 73% for Albania, 59% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 65% for Serbia and Montenegro, and 40% for Croatia. In Germany the disapproval rate is 52% for Macedonia, 65% for Albania, 52% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 55% for Serbia and Montenegro, and 43% for Croatia. Finally, in Luxemburg the disapproval rate is 54% for Macedonia, 62% for Albania, 55% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 57% for Serbia and Montenegro, and 47% for Croatia. Unfortunately, there are no similar data available for Ukraine. It is difficult to say whether the disapproval levels for Turkey are a question of religion or sheer size. I thank Patrick Messerlin for pointing out this aspect.
Fourth, it is stressed that the costs of accession to the EU could be substantial for Turkey, and that Turkey will face difficulty meeting these costs.  

In the light of these possible obstacles, let us consider some possible alternatives to EU accession for Turkey, which could involve the following options: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Mediterranean Union, Union for the Black Sea, Privileged Partnership, and/or European Economic Area.

2.1 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
The EU’s policy towards the Southern Mediterranean countries is guided by the Barcelona Process based on the Barcelona Declaration, including subsequent policy documents approved by Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings under the Barcelona Process, bilateral Association Agreements, and, more recently, the five-year Work Programme adopted by the 2005 Barcelona Summit.

The starting point of the EMP was the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27–28 November 1995. The goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration are to: (i) create an area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles, including respect for human rights and democracy; (ii) create an area of shared prosperity through sustainable and balanced socioeconomic development and the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its partners and among the partners; and (iii) improve mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of an active civil society. The Association Agreements provide for political dialogue, free trade in manufactured goods between the partner and the EU through tariff dismantling over a transitional period, and various forms of economic cooperation. On the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State Summit meeting in Barcelona during 2005 set out the objectives for the next five years of the Partnership. These include: (i) strengthening democracy, promoting gender equality, enhancing respect for human rights and freedom of expression, and guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary; (ii) enhancing the security of all citizens, particularly through counter-terrorism policies; (iii) intensifying cooperation on all aspects of illegal and legal immigration; (iv) developing the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development and endorsing a timetable to de-pollute the Mediterranean Sea by 2020; (iv) meeting the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the area of education; (v) acting jointly against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, rejecting extremist views; (vi)

118 The EMP encompasses all EU member states and the European Commission together with Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
strengthening dialogue between governmental and non-governmental players; and (vii) promoting South–South regional integration.\textsuperscript{119}

In support of the Barcelona Process, the EU decided to create MEDA as the principal financial instrument for assisting the implementation of the process.\textsuperscript{120} In addition, the EU introduced the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which has, since 2002, brought together the range of services provided by the European Investment Bank to assist the economic development of the Mediterranean partner countries. Between October 2002 and December 2006, FEMIP has financed operations worth almost €6 billion.

The Barcelona Summit of November 2005 reaffirmed the objective of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. By now, free trade in industrial goods among the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries has been largely achieved. As of 2008 bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements were in force with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Turkey, but not with Syria.\textsuperscript{121} Negotiations between Mediterranean countries and the EU are under way to deepen trade liberalisation in agriculture, improve regulatory convergence and strengthen the legal framework. On agriculture, negotiations have been launched with the Mediterranean countries which aim to further liberalise trade in raw agricultural products, but also in processed agricultural and fishery products. It is recognised that the achievement of legislation in the field of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures would be a major contribution to the Euromed process. At the 5\textsuperscript{th} Euro-Med Trade Ministerial Conference held in Marrakech in March 2006, it was decided to give Euromed partners a stake in the European Union’s internal market by ensuring that Mediterranean industrial products can enter the EU market without additional testing and vice versa. The aim is to conclude bilateral agreements on conformity assessment between the EU and each Mediterranean country that will allow Mediterranean industrial products covered by the agreement to enter the EU market without any additional testing and certification procedure and on a reciprocal basis. In addition a number of South–South Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have recently entered into force, such as the Agadir Agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and those concluded between Turkey and Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia, and Turkey and Egypt. Finally, in line with the


\textsuperscript{120} The legal basis of the MEDA Programme is the 1996 MEDA Regulation (Council Regulation no EC/1488/96). This Regulation, amended in November 2000, is usually called MEDA II. Total funds earmarked under MEDA during 1995–2006 amounted to nearly €8.8 billion, and the beneficiaries of the MEDA programme include Mediterranean countries’ state authorities, both national and local, as well as private sector and civil society actors.

\textsuperscript{121} Turkey has a Customs Union agreement with the EU.
priorities agreed upon at the Barcelona Summit of November 2005, the Commission has launched an initiative to liberalise trade in services and investment. The Istanbul Framework Protocol on services liberalisation, endorsed in July 2004 at the 4th Euro-Med Trade Ministerial held in Brussels, defines the core principles of the liberalisation of services between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries. It includes a regional “most favoured nation” (MFN) clause which aims to ensure consistency and coherence of the bilateral agreements. New prospects for further trade liberalisation opened up at the 5th Euro-Med Trade Ministerial Conference in Marrakech in March 2006. A first wave of Mediterranean countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, opened negotiations with the EU to expand the present FTA coverage to include services and investment liberalisation. Negotiations at regional level started in July 2006 on standard provisions for a future services and investment protocol to form the basis for bilateral negotiations. Bilateral protocols on services liberalisation are expected to be concluded within a timeframe that should deliver progressive liberalisation of services and establishments by 2010.122

2.2 European Neighbourhood Policy
In the wake of the EU's enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries, the European Commission introduced a new policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).123 The overall objective of this policy is to draw both old and new neighbours closer into the EU’s political, economic and cultural realm, short of full membership.124 It seeks to contribute to stability and good governance in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the east and south of the EU with whom the EU can enjoy close and cooperative relations. In return for the implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, the neighbouring countries obtain: (i) the prospect of moving beyond the existing relationship to a significant degree of integration, including the conclusion of deeper free trade agreements and the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU programmes; (ii) enhanced preferential trading relations and market opening; (iii) perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; (iv) intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security

124 The ENP encompasses all EU member states and the European Commission together with Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
threats; (v) closer dialogue in the context of the EU’s ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and ‘European Security and Defence Policy’, based on shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights; and (vi) integration into EU transport, energy, ICT and research markets and networks.

On the economic front the ENP thus presents an opportunity to deepen the market integration of the Southern and Eastern neighbouring countries with the EU and to increase their participation in global production networks. The ENP offer covers a wide range of policy issues, but the prospect of progressively participating in the internal market is the most far-reaching aspect of the ENP. The objective is to gradually create an economically integrated space, with free movement of goods, services and capital between those countries and the EU.

Unlike the EU accession process, which requires the accession candidates to harmonise their regulations with the EU by adopting the entire acquis, countries without accession prospects could, according to European Commission,

implement only those regulatory changes that were expected to result in large benefits and had low costs. In other words, the Mediterranean Partners and the Eastern European countries could adopt not the whole acquis but could, in the words of Hoekman,

choose parts of the acquis, “à la carte”, and, through this partial harmonisation, share the benefits associated with the relevant elements of the EU’s internal market. The European Commission stated that “legislative and regulatory approximation will be pursued on the basis of commonly agreed priorities, focusing on the most relevant elements of the acquis for stimulation of trade and economic integration, taking into account the economic structure of the partner country, and the current level of harmonization with EU legislation”.

But the ENP was changed substantially during 2006. According to the European Commission,
deep economic integration with the ENP partners will be central to the success and credibility of the ENP. With the new policy the EU aims for “deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” (DCFTAs) for all ENP partners including behind-the-border elements such as technical norms and standards, sanitary and phytosanitary rules, competition policy, enterprise competitiveness, innovation and industrial policy, research cooperation, intellectual property rights, trade facilitation customs measures, good governance in the tax

area, company law, public procurement and financial services. The DCFTAs will cover all trade in goods and services between the EU and ENP partners and will include strong legally-binding provisions on trade and regulatory issues. Thus, 2006 has been a turning point in the EC’s neighbourhood policy. It has made the previous European Commission’s approach — Hoekman’s “à la carte approach” — obsolete, or at least much less hopeful. It thus indicates a hardening of the European Commission’s stance via the preferential trade agreements.

Although important steps have already been taken by the neighbouring countries over the last few years, the European Commission states that determined efforts are still required from all parties to take this agenda forward, and that the Union will continue to give active support to the neighbours in their regulatory convergence with financial and technical assistance. The key operational tools of the ENP are the ENP Action Plans. In terms of financial assistance, the ENP is supported by Community assistance mainly from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In addition new forms of technical assistance have been extended to ENP partners.

---


130 The Action Plans mainly cover a 3-year time span, and they will be accompanied by greater monitoring of progress and “tied” or conditional technical and financial assistance.

131 The overall objective of the ENPI is to provide assistance aimed at promoting enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries and, in particular, supporting the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements. As such, the ENPI provides financial support for the objectives of the Barcelona Process, the Association Agreements, the ENP and the ENP Action Plans. From 1 January 2007 onwards, as part of the reform of EC assistance instruments, the MEDA and TACIS and various other programmes have been replaced by a single instrument — the ENPI. For the budgetary period of 2007–2013, approximately €12 billion in EC funding will be available to support ENP partners’ reforms. Funds allocated to individual country programmes depend on their needs and absorption capacity as well as their implementation of agreed reforms. Bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions also provide support to ENP partner countries.

132 Legislative approximation, regulatory convergence and institution-building are being supported through Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term twinning arrangements with EU member states’ administrations, and participation in relevant Community programmes and agencies. Another new instrument is the Governance Facility, endowed indicatively with €50 million annually, which provides additional support to the partner country or countries that have made most progress in implementing the governance priorities agreed in their Action Plans. Finally, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility was established at the end of 2007 and started to support lending to ENP partners in 2008. The Commission will allocate to the Facility an amount of €700 million for the period 2007–2013. The Facility will fund projects of common interest focussing primarily on energy, environment and transport. Under all these instruments, EU assistance priorities are identified, together with the countries concerned and other relevant actors, in general Country Strategy Papers covering 7-year periods, National Indicative Programmes covering 3 years, and detailed annual programmes.
2.3 Mediterranean Union and Union for the Black Sea

The Barcelona Process sought to make the Mediterranean region an area of peace, stability and prosperity, and stabilisation of the region was to be achieved through free trade. But by 2007 many agreed that the Barcelona Process had not been a great success, and that the economic gap between North and South of the Mediterranean had failed to diminish. There are four main reasons for this failure. First, the north refused to accede to the wishes of the southern countries for free market access for agricultural products, freedom of movement for labour, and development aid; second, the Arab members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership failed to reform economically and politically; third, there has been lack of co-ownership by Mediterranean partners; and fourth, there has been lack of institutional balance between the weight of the EU on one side and the Mediterranean partners on the other.133 Furthermore, the Barcelona Process increasingly came under fire as a result of the Middle East conflict.

In the spring of 2007 the then candidate for the Presidency of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, proposed the project of a “Mediterranean Union” to resolve these problems. Mr. Sarkozy later developed the idea at a speech in Tangier, by which only the coastal states of the Mediterranean would aim at a political, economic and cultural union. German Chancellor Merkel and the Slovenian Presidency rejected the idea that policy for the Mediterranean should be restricted to the coastal states, and the plan had to be revised. There is now no longer any talk of a “Mediterranean Union”. The concept has been integrated into a new version of the Barcelona Process, and all the EU member states will now play a part.

The “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” will encompass all EU member states and the European Commission, together with the other members and observers of the Barcelona Process (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Albania), and the other Mediterranean coastal states (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco). The first task of the newly created process is to upgrade the ageing Barcelona Process in political terms.134 This is supposed to inject further momentum into the Union’s relations with the Mediterranean, and complement the ongoing bilateral relations which will continue within existing policy frameworks. It will add an enhanced political and institutional dimension to the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean partners by holding biennial summits of Heads of Government, sharing ownership of the Partnership through the establishment of a co-presidency, and setting up a joint secretariat. Furthermore, projects promoting regional cohesion and economic integration and developing infrastructural

---


interconnections will be at the heart of the new initiative. Financial resources are expected to come from the private sector, international financial institutions and bilateral cooperation, and contributions from EU member states and Mediterranean partners.

The Black Sea area is also at the centre of new initiatives. Based on a Communication from the European Commission to the EU Council and the European Parliament on 11 April 2007, the EU Council, in May 2007, welcomed the ‘Black Sea Synergy — A new Regional Cooperation Initiative’ and invited continuation of EU work on an enhanced and coherent EU engagement in and with the Black Sea area. Black Sea Synergy was officially inaugurated at a ministerial meeting in Kiev in February 2008. It is the first EU initiative to look at the region as a whole, and it aims to strengthen regional cooperation both within the region and with the EU.

The EU is interested in extending the European space of peace, stability and prosperity based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In short, its objective is to pursue the Europeanisation of its new Eastern frontiers through state building. To achieve this objective, the EU plans for cooperation in a wide number of sectors of cross-border activity, including transport, energy, environment, fisheries, migration, science and technology, as well as promoting the rule of law and the fight against organised crime, security, democracy, human rights and civil society cooperation.

As mentioned above the proposed “Union for the Mediterranean” had caused a stir in Brussels. On 23 April 2008 a joint call was issued by the Socialist group in the European Parliament for a Union for the Black Sea based on the model of the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Parliament is discussing the proposal. The socialist parliamentarians call for deeper relations with the Black Sea states which should go a great deal further than the existing approaches and offer a framework for closer multilateral cooperation. They suggest that strategies for the environment, migration and security issues should be jointly devised and implemented. Such a Union for the Black Sea would be managed by a flexible

---

135 Ten states are considered to belong to the Black Sea region in the wider sense: the three EU member states Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, the three large littoral states Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, the three southern Caucasian states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the small state of Moldova. Of these countries Turkey, as an accession candidate, is covered by the EU’s enlargement policy. Negotiations concerning the form and content of a strategic partnership with Russia are currently under way. The other littoral states (insofar as they are not members of the EU) are covered by the ENP and its bilateral action plans.


institutional structure. The prospect of EU membership for states with European ambitions should be maintained in order to strengthen the trend towards Europeanisation in the region.  

2.4 Privileged Partnership

Although the EU leaders agreed in December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from October 2005, the negotiating framework adopted by the Council on 3 October 2005 casts considerable doubt over the EU’s commitments, as revealed by the European Commission: “The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.  

Thus, negotiations are open-ended. In addition to fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, two other conditions for Turkish membership in the EU have been introduced, namely the “absorption capacity of the Union” and the condition that “Turkey should be in a position to assume in full all of the obligations of membership”.

According to Emerson et al., the Copenhagen criteria are about what the candidate states have to do, whereas the absorption capacity is supposedly about the EU itself. It refers to the capacity of the goods and services market and the labour market, as well as the EU budget, to absorb new member states; the capacity of EU institutions to function with new member states; the capacity of society to absorb new member states; and the capacity of the EU to assure its strategic security. Although the Copenhagen criteria set fairly clear and objective benchmarks for accession countries, the same is not true of absorptive capacity. The concept is rather vague. Thus, even if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria, it could fail by reference to the absorptive capacity of the EU. Alternatively, negotiations might founder on the grounds that Turkey has failed to assume in full the obligations of membership.

If accession negotiations were to fail at some point in the future, the opponents of Turkish membership to the EU maintain that there needs to be an alternative final destination such as “privileged partnership”. This is the view expressed by former and current French Presidents Giscard d’Estaing and Nicholas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, German Minister of the Interior

---

138 See A. Fritz-Vannahme et al., “Hello Neighbour! A New EU Policy from Morocco to Azerbaijan” (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008).
140 M. Emerson et al., “Just What is this ‘Absorption Capacity’ of the European Union?.” CEPS Policy Brief No. 113 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006).
Wolfgang Schäuble, Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, and Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plasnik. But “privileged partnership” is also a new concept in need of further development. According to İçener\textsuperscript{141} it would extend the existing EU–Turkey Customs Union. Although it is not clear how it will extend it, one thing is certain: it will not cover all aspects of structural and regional funds, the common agricultural policy, and the free movement of workers. Thus, in the proposed framework, Turkey would be excluded from attaining the most tangible and visible benefits of accession, principally agricultural subsidies, structural policies and free movement of persons. According to Hakura,\textsuperscript{142} Turkey would also be excluded from participation in EU institutions and decision-making processes.

2.5 European Economic Area
In 1985, EU firms enjoyed duty-free access to each other’s markets. However, they did not enjoy free trade. Trade among the EU countries faced significant non-tariff barriers such as differing technical standards and industrial regulations, and administrative and frontier formalities. As the single market programme removed such barriers to intra EC-trade, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) producers found themselves severely disadvantaged and prompted their governments to offset the discrimination by seeking closer ties to the EU. As a result the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement was signed in May 1992 between the (then) 12 European Community member states and the (then) six member states of EFTA: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. Presently, the agreement applies to the EU member states, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The EEA Agreement can be thought of as extending the single market to EFTA economies, with some exceptions. Four basic principles apply for the EEA, namely free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. But the EEA in principle excludes agricultural and fishery products, and has no common external economic policy such as the Common External Tariff. Nevertheless, over 80% of EC Single Market legislation applies within the whole EEA area, as will most future single market legislation. In addition the EFTA states participate in EU programmes in areas such as research, education and the environment.\textsuperscript{143}

Tariffs on industrial commodities in trade between EC and EFTA countries had been eliminated in 1972, when the FTA was signed between EC and EFTA countries. The EEA Agreement extended this to quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect. Legislation on technical regulations, standards, testing and certification have been aligned over time including those covering

\textsuperscript{141} İçener, “Privileged Partnership”.
\textsuperscript{142} F. Hakura, “Partnership is no Privilege: The Alternative to EU Membership is no Turkish Delight,” Chatham House Briefing Paper EP BP 05/02 (London: Chatham House, 2005).
\textsuperscript{143} Where the EEA-EFTA States are admitted to participate in these programmes, they contribute to the budgets of the programmes in question and participate in the committees that manage them, but with no right to vote.
dangerous substances, foodstuffs and wine, and procedures for veterinary controls at frontiers have been aligned. Most European Community competition policy rules apply throughout the EEA area, and nationally discriminatory public procurement is prohibited. The competition rules cover such things as cartels, abuse of dominant positions, merger control, state monopolies and state aid. The provisions in the areas of social policy, consumer protection, company law and statistics have been taken over from the Community legislation to EEA EFTA states’ legislation. Finally, in terms of anti-dumping, these procedures cannot in principle be invoked within the EEA.

The EEA Agreement prohibits exchange controls and other obstacles to the free movement of capital, and freedom of establishment for both businesses and professionals applies throughout the EEA. Furthermore, measures on the equivalence and mutual recognition of qualifications apply throughout the EEA. Over time, freedom to carry out banking, insurance, investment and other financial services has been established within the EEA. The opening up of telecommunications has proceeded in parallel in the EU and EEA, and in the case of transport, agreements have been reached on such matters as the dimensions of road vehicles, the transport of dangerous goods, marine cabotage and safety at sea.

When developing new legislation for the internal market, the Commission first consults the EU member states in expert committees, and thereafter experts from the EEA EFTA states take part in these committees as equal partners. When a Commission proposal for new legislation is submitted to the Council and the European Parliament for discussion and approval, the EEA EFTA states may give joint comments on the draft legislation. Once the Council and the European Parliament have adopted new legislation, it is passed on to the EEA decision-making structures, with a view to incorporating it into the EEA structure. The majority of new legislation is incorporated into the EEA without any substantial adaptations. However, if the legislation contains problematic or politically sensitive aspects, the Commission representing the EU side and the EEA EFTA states will discuss possible adaptations. Any substantial adaptations have to be approved by the Council, and thereafter agreed and formally decided by the EEA Joint Committee, in which the Commission and the EEA EFTA states meet on a monthly basis. Thus, the Agreement gives EEA EFTA states the right to be consulted by the Commission during the formulation of Community legislation, but not the right to a voice in decision-making, which is reserved exclusively for the member states. All new Community legislation in areas covered by the EEA is integrated into the Agreement through an EEA Joint Committee decision and subsequently becomes part of the national legislation of the EEA EFTA states. Finally, whereas the Commission and the European Court of Justice are responsible for surveillance and enforcement of EEA commitments among the EU member states, for the EEA
EFTA states these tasks are dealt with by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court.\(^{144}\)

3. Assessment of the Alternatives to EU Accession

It is clear from the Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, Mediterranean Union, Union for the Black Sea and Privileged Partnership, that the EU is not interested in letting neighbouring countries of the EU benefit from EU agricultural subsidies, EU structural policies and the free movement of persons. They are also excluded from participation in EU institutions and decision-making processes. On the other hand, the EEA Agreement is quite different from the other arrangements, as it extends the single market to EFTA economies, apart from agriculture and the common external tariff.

For Turkey, EU membership is certainly the optimal strategy, but the chances of achieving it are uncertain. The future path of Turkey–EU relations will depend largely on the perceptions of policy makers in Turkey. If they see the chances of EU membership in the foreseeable future as relatively high, then Turkey will probably stick to its current EU policy and carry on with the accession negotiations, however long these may take. From a Turkish point of view, the main issue is to close the economic gap between it and the rich countries in the world, by achieving a relatively high but sustainable economic growth measured by growth in real per capita income. As discussed above, running a successful market based economy requires the acquisition of high quality institutions and the application of the “universal” principles of sound economic policy. The important institutions are those that guarantee property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance, and institutions of conflict management. Sound economic policy consists of policies that will achieve allocative efficiency, macroeconomic and financial stability, and social inclusion.

Turkey could achieve all of this by adopting and implementing that part of the \textit{acquis} which may be considered “pro-growth”. During the period of accession negotiations, therefore, Turkey should concentrate its efforts entirely on these elements of the \textit{acquis}.\(^{145}\) Depending on progress in accession negotiations, Turkey could then, at a later stage, consider adopting and implementing the remaining


\(^{145}\) See Messerlin, “The EC Neighbourhood Policy: Time for an In-Depth Review”, and the “Introduction” of Hoekman and Togan, \textit{Turkey} for similar arguments.
parts of the *acquis*, thus fulfilling the condition that it incorporates the whole *acquis* into its own legislation prior to accession.\(^{146}\)

As emphasized by Messerlin\(^ {147}\) the core of the *acquis* consists of Regulations and Directives. While regulations are binding laws which are directly applicable in all the EC member countries, directives are binding as regards the results to be achieved, but they leave the choice of form and methods to national authorities. As a result, directives need to be “transposed” into national law before they can be enforced. Messerlin\(^ {148}\) also provides estimates of the stock of Regulations and Directives prevailing in the EU as of the end of each year, as shown in Figure 1.

*Figure 1: The size of the EC acquis*

![Graph showing the size of the EC acquis](image)


Messerlin\(^ {149}\) divides the directives into two groups according to their dominant goal from an economic perspective: pro-competition and norm-setting. The pro-competition directives, aiming primarily at improving access to EC member states’ markets, are expected to decrease prices and/or to increase varieties of the products and services supplied to the European consumers. On the other hand the norm-setting directives, imposing norms of different kinds — technical, on safety, on

\(^{146}\) For Turkey the strategy of adopting the entire *acquis* when the chances of EU membership are poor may not be the most appropriate policy as the costs of adopting and implementing the entire *acquis* without gaining accession may far exceed the benefits.


\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
labour skills, on market conditions, etc. — are often expected to be cost increasing and/or competition inhibiting. When classification of a directive into one of the two groups is too difficult, it is classified as “mixed”. Table 1 decomposes the whole set of directives prevailing in 2007 into ten regulatory topics, and gives the shares of pro-competitive, norm-setting and mixed directives for each topic. The Table reveals that the majority of directives are norm setting, with pro-competitive directives representing only 9% of the total. Messerlin\textsuperscript{150} notes that the core economic programme defined for the first decades of the EC by initial Treaties correspond mostly to the first two topics in Table 1, namely competition and the internal market. On the other hand, most of the directives on enterprises, environment and health and consumer protection are norm-setting. The key lesson that can be derived from Messerlin’s study is that the \textit{acquis} can be divided not only into pro-competitive and norm-setting rules and regulations, but also into “growth promoting” and “other” rules and regulations.

\textit{Table 1: EC Directives and their Dominant Content, 2007}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Directives (stock in 2007)</th>
<th>Share by Dominant Content (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Market</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Energy</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprises</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>28.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Consumer Protection</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>34.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation &amp; Customs Union</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment &amp; Social Affairs</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics (Eurostat)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice &amp; Home Affairs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Messerlin (2008)

If, at some point in the future, Turkish policy makers start to perceive the chances of eventual EU membership as small, then the country might consider alternatives to EU accession. In such a case Turkey might be interested in signing a DCFTA with the EU that would make it possible to adopt only the pro-growth part of the \textit{acquis} which would help Turkey to acquire institutions and policies for running a successful market economy. Such a strategy would provide a Plan B in case accession negotiations should fail.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
4. Conclusion

Turkey is aiming for EU membership. Through the accession process it hopes to acquire the institutions for running a successful market economy, and also to learn how to follow the “universal” principles of sound economic policy. After accession the country hopes to benefit from EU agricultural subsidies, EU structural policies and the free movement of persons, and intends to participate in EU institutions and decision-making processes. The current Turkish EU policy of carrying on with accession negotiations, however long the negotiations might take, remains its best strategy, as long as Turkish policy makers perceive the chances of EU membership in the foreseeable future as high. During the period of accession negotiations, Turkey could concentrate its efforts on adopting and implementing the pro-growth part of the acquis and leave the adoption and implementation of the other part of the acquis for later, when the prospects of EU accession might improve. This kind of policy would also provide a Plan B in the event that accession negotiations would ultimately fail.

References


V. The Economics Do Not Hamper, but Do Not Support Turkish Accession to the EU

Arjan Lejour (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

The possible accession of Turkey to the European Union is a major issue of discussion in Europe. The enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was considered to be a European duty after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: it was not a question of whether they belonged to Europe or not. Furthermore, it was clear that these countries needed a new perspective, and EU membership would make them less vulnerable to the influence of Russia. Economic arguments did not play a major role in this enlargement discussion. There were some fears about the costs of accession for the EU in terms of EU spending on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF). To some extent this was solved by introducing phase-in periods, so that the new entrants would not receive much money immediately, and by tightening eligibility criteria for EU funds. The free movement of labour was also considered a risk because of the large income differences of the new countries. This was solved politically by establishing a transition period of a maximum of seven years.

With candidate member Turkey, the situation is quite different. After weighty debates in 2003 and 2004, accession negotiations started in 2005, but these will take a long time. The discussions are primarily of a political nature, but economic arguments also play a role. These arguments include, first, the implications for the EU budget. Some studies have shown that, under the current rules, Turkey would receive a substantial net inflow of EU funds, which would have to be financed by the current Member States of the EU. Second, the economies may be affected by market integration. In particular, some countries fear for either massive immigration flows from Turkey or cheap imports, at the cost of European producers. On the other hand, Turkey is an interesting market for exporters and foreign investors with a rapidly growing economy and about 70 million consumers.

151 This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the conference ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling blocks on the road to accession’, organised by het Turkiye Instituut and CESS Centre of European Security Studies, 26-27 June 2008, Leiden. It has benefited from the comments of the discussant Henk Jager and those of the conference participants.

152 EC, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report.” Commission Staff Working Document, 6 November 2007, SEC(2007) 1436. Brussels: EC [online]; available from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf. So far, negotiations have been opened on four chapters (science and research, industrial policy, statistics, financial control) and provisionally closed on one (science and research). In addition, the EU has informed Turkey about the progress needed to reach a satisfactory level of preparedness to start negotiations on fourteen further chapters.

153 References are presented later on in discussing the EU budget.
This paper focuses on the economic implications for the EU of the possible Turkish accession. It does not aim to specify precisely the economic effects. This would be virtually impossible, since we do not know in advance under what conditions Turkey will accede. Moreover, it is not clear a priori which effects should be attributed to Turkey’s accession and which should not. For instance, would internal reforms of institutions in Turkey also take place without accession? What would happen if Turkey did not become an EU member? Would a deepening of the Customs Union be the likely alternative?

This paper questions whether the economic implications are stumbling blocks on the road to accession. It aims to estimate the long-term economic implications of the accession of Turkey to the Internal Market, the free movement of labour between the EU and Turkey, and the consequences for the EU budget. Subsequently it asks whether the outcomes of this analysis help Turkey in its process towards accession or whether the economic implications will block this. To answer the latter question we need some indications as to the magnitude of the implications for the economy, migration and the EU budget, even though we cannot expect precise numbers.

First, the paper will briefly describe the economic situation in Turkey and the EU and their economic relations. Then it will discuss the effects of the free movement of goods, services and capital. Because the EU is relatively large compared to Turkey, in economic terms, the economic effects for the EU will be modest but positive. The paper will try to identify the gains for the EU. The economic future of Turkey will be substantially affected by the shaping of the country’s economic institutions. According to all rankings, Turkey’s institutional performance is relatively poor, affecting economic growth, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) negatively. A sizeable improvement would make Turkey much more attractive as a place of establishment, and as a consumer market.

The free movement of labour is a fiercely debated topic. Some fear massive migration flows of about 10 million people into the EU. Others expect much lower flows. However, the Turkish migrants already living in EU countries could attract further migration. Recent experience with migrants from Poland and other countries shows that migration is often temporary. Given the growth in cheap transport possibilities, this could also be the case for Turkey. Moreover, income differences between the EU and Turkey will become smaller as the free movement of Turkish workers is allowed. With expected labour shortages due to ageing, this could be beneficial for Europe, although it would have a slightly depressing effect on wages for lower skilled people.

Turkey is a relatively poor country by EU standards, with a large agricultural sector. This implies that Turkey would receive substantial funds from Europe’s cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy. These aspects are difficult to predict accurately as they depend on the unknown rules of new budget cycles applicable at the moment of Turkish accession, as well as on the outcome of the political negotiations. The current budget period finishes in 2013 and the budget is
currently under review. It is likely that there will be changes to the CAP, but it will remain important in budgetary terms, in particular for rural development. The rules for eligibility to other funds could also be changed although the direction of these changes is not clear. Based on the current rules and some likely developments, net budgetary expenditures to Turkey could tentatively amount to €12 billion per year.

The Internal Market

Current Trade Relations

In 2006 bilateral trade between Turkey and the EU amounted to €85 billion, or 4% of the EU’s total external trade, making Turkey the EU’s seventh largest trading partner. This trade was supported by the reduction of national mandatory product standards. Turkey’s trade openness increased marginally: the value of exports and imports of goods and services equalled 63% of GDP in 2006. The share of exports destined for the EU declined from 52.3% in 2005 to 51.6% in 2006. Imports from the EU also declined, from 42.1% to 39.3% of total imports, mainly due to the rising import prices on energy, which Turkey imported almost exclusively from non-EU countries.

The EU is clearly Turkey’s largest trading partner, but this is not true in reverse. This is not surprising, since the EU is much bigger in terms of population (495 million versus 70 million) and in terms of GDP (€12276 billion versus €479 billion). Turkey’s average per capita income is also much lower, at about 40% of the EU-27 average in 2007, measured in purchasing power standards.\footnote{Data source: Cronos database of Eurostat.}

Access to Internal Market

One major aspect of the accession of Turkey to the EU involves the Internal Market, which will affect the economies of Turkey and EU through more intense trade relations. Entry to the Internal Market may increase trade for several reasons. First, administrative barriers to trade will be eliminated or at least reduced to levels comparable to those between current EU members. There will, for example, be reduced costs in terms of passing customs at the borders, with less time delays, fewer formalities etc. Second, access to the Internal Market implies a reduction in technical barriers to trade through mutual recognition of different technical regulations, minimum requirements and harmonisation of rules and regulations. Finally, risk and uncertainty will be mitigated by Turkey’s accession to the EU: political risk and risk associated with macroeconomic instability, especially, may be substantially reduced.
On the basis of estimates for the current trade barriers between the EU and Turkey, Lejour and De Mooij expect that bilateral trade between Turkey and the EU could increase by around 40% once Turkey becomes a mature member of the Internal Market.\textsuperscript{155} According to our estimates, trade would increase most substantially in textiles, clothing, agriculture and services. Other studies have delivered similar results: Flam (2003) estimates an increase in bilateral trade of 45%.\textsuperscript{156}

The question is to what extent this potential trade increase has already been achieved by the Customs Union in goods (except for processed food) between Turkey and the EU. This CU was established in 1995 and also includes agreements on reducing technical barriers to trade, other than the elimination of bilateral imports tariffs and common external tariffs. A large part of this agreement has been implemented and the EU–Turkey goods trade has blossomed, especially EU exports. As discussed above, accession to the Internal Market also includes the acceptance of large parts of the \textit{acquis communautaire}\textsuperscript{157} and agriculture, and to a large extent processed food is excluded from the Customs Union. Based on these considerations, we assume that a third of the potential trade increase has already been realised.

In the meantime the Internal Market has progressed. The recently adopted Services Directive will reduce regulatory barriers for trade in commercial services and could increase trade in this sector by 20% to 40% as compared to the current level.\textsuperscript{158} Commercial services form about 30% of all Turkish exports. Moreover, the Financial Service Action Plan has been introduced to lower transaction costs in financial services. With respect to goods, the European Commission has proposed to improve the principle of mutual recognition.\textsuperscript{159} They estimate that intra-EU goods could increase by 20% for all goods trade applicable to this principle, which is 25% of the total intra-EU goods trade. Together, these policies could increase bilateral trade between Turkey and the EU by about 15%.\textsuperscript{160} As a rough approximation, the progress of Internal Market and the already realised trade effect of the Customs

\textsuperscript{155} A.M. Lejour and R.A. De Mooij, “Turkish Delight: Does Turkish Accession to the EU Bring Economic Benefits?,” \textit{Kyklos} 58, no.1 (2005): 87–120.


\textsuperscript{157} The term \textit{acquis communautaire}, or acquis is used in European Union Law to refer to the total body of EU law accumulated thus far.


\textsuperscript{160} This figure assumes the maximum effect of the services directive: 40% times 30% (share of services in trade) is 12% increase in bilateral trade. Regarding the Financial Services plan: the improvement of mutual recognition is 60% (share of goods in trade) times 20% times 25% is 3%. The total bilateral trade effect of improved integration is thus 15%. 

94
Union cancel each other out. The potential bilateral trade increase of 40% seems reasonable although one could reasonably argue for a figure of 30% or 50%. This implies that total Turkish exports will rise by around 20% and EU external trade by 1.5%. The trade increase could be even bigger if institutions in Turkey are also improved.

Lejour and De Mooij\textsuperscript{161} have carefully simulated the removal of corresponding trade barriers with a general equilibrium model for the world economy, WorldScan. They conclude that Turkey will experience a moderate welfare gain: the level of consumption increases by 1.4% in the long term. This reflects the gains from integration, specialisation and trade creation. The effect for Turkey is substantially larger than that for the EU. For the EU, the macroeconomic impact is positive, but negligible in quantitative terms. This is because only a moderate fraction of European exports flow to Turkey, while a major part of Turkey’s exports flow to the EU.

The WorldScan model ignores the implications of knowledge and technology spillovers associated with increased trade, higher productivity through more intensified competition, and the effects on innovation.\textsuperscript{162} Therefore, the dynamic economic effects are likely to be larger than those derived in the WorldScan simulations. Frankel and Rose suggest that every 1% point increase in trade expressed will raise income by 1.14%\textsuperscript{163} in the long term. The 1.5% increase in trade would suggest that the EU’s income could ultimately increase by about 1.6%. A similar reasoning suggests that Turkish benefits would amount to about 20% of GDP.

\textbf{FDI and a Common Capital Market}

Turkey could be an attractive location for foreign direct investment and investors. For instance, it could serve as a gateway between Europe and the Middle East, while its large domestic market and cheap labour force could yield important location advantages. Moreover, it is geographically closer to the EU than Asia.

These factors do not guarantee a high inflow of foreign investment. The ratio of FDI inflow and outflow as share of GDP in Turkey was 2% in 2006, compared to 4% in Poland and 5% in Romania. The EC\textsuperscript{164} states that FDI inflows from the EU amounted to 82% of Turkey’s total FDI in 2006. FDI stock totalled about 20% of annual GDP of which roughly two thirds originated from EU countries.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{161}Lejour and De Mooij, “Turkish Delight”.
\textsuperscript{162}These effects are often called the dynamic effects of more trade openness.
\textsuperscript{164}EC, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”.
\end{footnotesize}
In 2000 this was only 5%, indicating that Turkey is becoming a more attractive place for foreign direct investment. In the 1980s and 1990s the economy moved erratically with high inflation rates, large fluctuations in exchange rates, and problematic public finances. This unstable macroeconomic environment scared away foreign (including European) investors. Over the last five years, high and steady GDP growth and improved macroeconomic stability have clearly contributed to the rise in FDI.

In spite of these improvements current FDI inflows are still low compared to new accession countries. Institutional factors are one cause of this:165 potential investors often encounter a difficult institutional environment when they come to Turkey (this issue is covered in more detail below). Another deterrent to investors is corruption. Complaints about Turkey’s system of corporate taxation abound among potential investors: the system is complex and full of distortions.

It is hard to estimate how much Turkey’s FDI performance can be improved. As a reasonable, but certainly not perfect example, we use the study of Demekas et al.166 They conclude that the gap between actual and potential FDI ranges from 50% in Serbia to 82% in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These countries in Southeastern Europe are not Turkey, but the recommendations are more or less the same: regulatory reform, enforcement of anti-corruption measures and enforcement and improvement of the tax system. If similar figures would apply to Turkey, FDI flows as share of GDP could increase to 3%, comparable to many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Institutions and Corruption

The EC167 concludes that overall corruption in Turkey is widespread and there has been limited progress in the fight against it. The development of an anti-corruption strategy, the creation of a central body to coordinate its implementation, and strengthened legislation are of great importance. The 2007 corruption perception index168 ranks Turkey at number 64 with 4.1 points — the same as Bulgaria and Croatia, a little better than Romania. Compared to 2002, Turkey has improved its position on the index from 3.2 to 4.1 points. This is good progress, bearing in mind the difficulty of improving transparency related to institutions. It is still a long way from the countries that rank number 1 in the index — Denmark and Finland, each

167 EC, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”.
with 9.4 points — but if Turkey can maintain this progress, it will soon be within reach of other countries such as Italy and the Czech Republic, with 5.2 points.

Better economic institutions, greater transparency and less corruption all improve economic relationships, stimulating trade and foreign direct investment. Lejour and De Mooij\textsuperscript{169} argue that institutional reforms could be more important for the Turkish economy and lead to greater economic gains than the benefits from the Internal Market. Their results indicate that EU support for improving institutions could reap rich rewards.\textsuperscript{170}

**Conclusions**

The static gains to the EU of Turkey’s accession to the Internal Market are positive but limited. In the longer term, the effects could be bigger, climbing to 1.6% of GDP, which is nearly €200 billion at 2007 prices. In my view, this still underestimates the potential gains for Turkey and the EU. An improvement of Turkey’s economic institutions, more transparency and less corruption could more than double the trade increase from the Internal Market and could also significantly increase FDI from the EU to Turkey. Although Turkey would benefit most from these improvements, the benefits spill over to the EU from increased trade, more competition and extra FDI, easily surpassing the 1.6% GDP increase. The benefits of the Internal Market would be important for Turkish GDP and welfare growth and could therefore be a stepping stone rather than a stumbling block in its progress towards EU accession. Even if Turkey does not accede to the EU, it would be beneficial for it to enter the European Economic Area, as one of the scenarios in Togan’s contribution suggests. However, the economic benefits are not automatically “cashed in”: that would require much economic and institutional reform in Turkey. Moreover, it will take at least two decades before the benefits of these reforms are realised in Turkey and in the EU. The size of the reforms required would affect not only the European economic gains of Turkey’s membership, but also the size of migration flows and the budgetary outlays needed to support Turkish economic convergence.

\textsuperscript{169} Lejour and De Mooij, “Turkish Delight”.

\textsuperscript{170} Dekker, P., A. Van der Horst, S. Kok, L. Van Noije and C. Wennekes. “The new neighbours.” *European outlook* 6. The Hague: CPB/SCP, 2008. They illustrate that if the neighbouring countries of the EU would improve their institutions to the level in Poland, income could be raised by between 15% (Jordan and Tunisia) and 85% (Belarus), depending on the current level of institutions.
Migration Flows

Expected Flows

Large income disparities between Turkey and the EU provide incentives for Turkish people to migrate to the EU. Predicting the size of the potential flow of immigrants is difficult, however. One way to get a feel for this effect is by estimating the sensitivity of migration flows for income differentials on the basis of historical patterns. Most studies predict a flow of about 3 to 4 million migrants in the long term, the majority of whom would be likely to settle in Germany, because of network effects of previous Turkish settlers. If Turkish incomes were to converge rapidly with the EU-average, the estimated number of immigrants would be lower: according to Lejour et al. it would fall to around 1.8 million. With no such convergence, it will increase to 4 million.

Most of these studies were conducted in 2003 and 2004, before the free movement of workers from the new accession countries. Moreover, most studies assume that Turkey will accede in 2015 and that the free movement will not be upheld. The political discussions on the immigration flow from the new accession countries to the old member states has already led to the ruling that the free movement of labour can be restricted for seven years by the receiving member states, on an individual base. It is therefore not unlikely that free movement for Turkish labourers would not be realised before 2020. Current income per capita is 40% of the EU average; by 2020 this could be 50% or even higher if the economy grows about 2% per year faster than in the average EU(-15) countries. This reduces the incentives for migration. Moreover, regional disparities in Turkey are large. Around 2000, the region of Istanbul was at least 50% richer than the average region and five times richer than the eastern part of Turkey. This trend has not been reversed. If economic growth in Turkey proceeds (also depending on reform measures) it is not likely that many inhabitants of the Istanbul region would have an incentive to migrate to other EU countries based on income differences.


173 Lejour et al., “Assessing the Economic Implications“.
Economic Effects

Some of the old member states, especially the UK and Ireland, have experienced high inflows of migration from the new member states, particularly Poland. Issues of language and scarcity of labour were important considerations. These migrants often work in agriculture, construction and services such as cleaning in hotels and restaurants. They are prepared to accept lower wages and work more hours per day. This imposes a serious threat for low-skilled workers in the host countries. Lejour and De Mooij\textsuperscript{174} have estimated that if the majority of Turkish migrants were low-skilled workers, immigration would also affect wage distribution in the EU. Wages for low-skilled workers would fall while those for high-skilled workers would rise. On the other hand, these migrants often fill vacant positions for which others have less interest, and from this perspective the inflows are beneficial for the old member states. Because the population will age during the coming decades, labour shortages will probably increase, and the inflow of workers from other countries could reduce some pressure on the labour market.\textsuperscript{175}

From past experience we know that permanent migrants with low skills from countries like Turkey and Morocco perform less well in the labour market and depend more heavily on social benefits than the average worker. This is not the case for the Polish workers recently. Much of the free movement is temporary migration, for some months or some years. This is different from previous inflows in the 1960s. Østergaard-Nielsen\textsuperscript{176} expects that most of the free movement from Turkey will also be temporary. It is even possible that some of the old migrants will go back, although it has to be acknowledged that most of them have already lived abroad for decades. Of course, Turkey is further away from the richer member states than Poland is, but the ample availability of cheap buses and low-cost air carriers have reduced transportation costs substantially.

Even if the inflows are not temporary, the economic effects in the old member state countries are likely to be modest. Lejour and De Mooij\textsuperscript{177} have explored the macroeconomic effects of the flow of 2.7 million migrants, assuming that Turkish migrants have the same skill characteristics as typical Western employees. The results suggest a 1.5\% GDP fall in Turkey, and a 0.5\% increase in the EU. Since the corresponding effects in terms of population are larger, income per capita rises in Turkey and falls in the EU with a few deciles of a percentage point. This is because firms are not perfectly mobile, so that the ratio between the number of employees and the amount of capital increases in the EU and declines in Turkey. Therefore, wages in Turkey tend to rise while they fall in the EU.

\textsuperscript{174} Lejour and D Mooij, “Turkish Delight”.
\textsuperscript{175} See also E. Østergaard-Nielsen, “Migration: More than a Question of Demographics, in Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?,” Record of the high-level round table conference, Amsterdam, 6 and 7 November (2003): 93–98.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} Lejour and De Mooij, “Turkish Delight”.

99
However, the assumption about skills characteristics is not realistic given the educational level of the whole population. While the top students in Turkey perform well, the vast majority of Turkish students perform at the lowest proficiency levels in basic competencies and problem solving. The distribution of Turkish scores is highly skewed toward the lower levels of proficiency. In 2007, 26% of the Turkish population has completed upper secondary education while the EU-27 average is 81%. Participation in higher education also remains low relative to international standards, although education levels are increasing. Around 40% of 20 to 24 year olds holds a secondary degree now, much higher than in the past, and about 90% of school-age children are enrolled in primary schools. Reforms and increased spending on education are generating some positive impacts on educational attainment, but significant problems persist. Given the young and large population, a skilled labour force could generate many economic benefits for Turkey and the EU in the future, and could contribute much to the knowledge society. However, this would require substantial investment in education.

Conclusions

It is difficult to predict the magnitude of Turkish migration to the old member states in response to the free movement of labour, or the economic impact thereof. From an economic perspective there is less reason to be concerned than a few years ago, firstly because a number of EU countries are experiencing labour shortages, particularly for less skilled workers, and secondly because most of the inflows will probably be temporary, as the experience with Polish workers has shown. Furthermore, incentives for migration are likely to decrease because the Turkish economy has been developing well over the last decade: if this continues (for instance until 2020) average income differences between Turkey and the EU would be substantially lower. However, there are still reasons to be cautious. One of these is the issue of public opinion, as discussed in more detail by Cuperus in this volume. Another is that we cannot take for granted that the Turkish economy will perform well in the coming decade. Economic reforms are necessary to sustain economic growth. Finally, there is the possibility that many low-paid and low-skilled workers from the eastern and agricultural part of Turkey will migrate. They have fewer skills to manage well in the old member states, but also less ability to cope with structural changes in the Turkish society from an agriculture-oriented economy towards an industry and service-oriented one. This could be a reason for them to migrate permanently.

\(^{178}\) EC, “Turkey 2007 Progress Report”.
EU Budget

Introduction

With regard to financial assistance, some €500 million of the EU budget have been earmarked for Turkey from the new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007. In addition, Turkey is benefiting from a series of regional and horizontal programmes under IPA. This new instrument is also available for other candidate member states. However, the budget available for pre-accession is negligible compared to the budget of the Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate the EU funds available to Turkey. The conditions change with each budget cycle. The current cycle runs until 2013, and Turkey would not join the EU before that time. In the new cycles, 2014–2020 and 2021–2027, new conditions will apply; moreover, eligibility also depends on the economic characteristics in Turkey itself at that moment. In spite of this uncertainty, I will give some indications of the size of likely EU-budget flows to Turkey, based on the current budget systems and economic characteristics of Turkey. These indications at least give some idea of the magnitudes of the flows, although they do not pretend to be accurate, nor are they based on extensive research.

Structural and Cohesion Funds

In the current budget cycle (2007–2013), €347 billion is available for cohesion policy, with 82% of that earmarked for the purpose of economic convergence. Regions with a per capita income of 75% of the EU average (or lower) qualify for funding. The remainder is earmarked for competitiveness and employment of restructuring regions (17% of the budget) and territorial cooperation (1%). For the latter, only neighbouring regions of different member states qualify and for the former, per capita income has to exceed 75% of the EU average. In practice most of these budgets flow to the richer member states and regions. If this policy does not change in the future, Turkey will be eligible for EU funds aimed at convergence.

About €98 billion of the total SCF funds will flow to Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic together. These three countries have the same economic and population size as Turkey. This amount of money is reserved: actual spending depends on the availability of good projects, feasible funds for co-financing and the absorption capacity of member states (always less than 4% of GDP). Experiences with other countries show that final spending will be less than €98 billion or on average €14 billion per year. If the same conditions apply for Turkey as in the

present budget cycle, we could assume that Turkey would receive about €12 billion per year.\textsuperscript{180}

After seven years the Turkish economy is likely to have moved slightly closer to the EU-27, but average income per capital would still be less than 75% in nearly all regions (with the possible exception of Istanbul). So, Turkey will probably be eligible for substantial EU funds in a new EU budget cycle.

**Common Agricultural Policy**

EU spending in agriculture is declining. From a subsidiarity perspective it can be argued that most policies should be assigned to the national or regional level, apart from direct market policies and external trade policy.\textsuperscript{181} This conclusion will not hold in the negotiations on the EU budget, because a number of countries benefit substantially from the CAP. However, it is expected that CAP spending will decline in the future at least in relative terms. Moreover, the focus will shift from direct income payments to rural development. This implies that CAP spending will be less generous for Turkey than it was for accession countries in the past, in spite of its large agricultural sector. Moreover, a large share of Turkish agriculture produces vegetables and fruit, products which are not eligible for EU support.\textsuperscript{182} The recent rise in agricultural prices, which is expected to continue, will be used as an additional argument for reducing direct income payments. Gross\textsuperscript{183} estimates that CAP payments to Turkey could add up to 2% of Turkish GDP (as a maximum): that would be €9.5 billion. Other studies suggest lower figures: Quaisser en Reppegather\textsuperscript{184} mention €5 billion per year as a maximum, and Burrell and Oskam\textsuperscript{185} conclude that CAP support to Turkey will cost €4.5 billion at 2004 prices after the phase-in. If the phase-in rules of the new members apply for Turkey, the initial CAP budget for Turkey will be about €1.5 billion and will be increased step by step over a period of 10 years.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{180} This is about 2.5% of current GDP and thus much lower than the maximum of 4% of GDP.
\textsuperscript{184} Quaisser and Reppegather, “EU-beitrittsreife der Turkei”.
\textsuperscript{185} Burrell and Oskram, *Turkey in the European Union*.
\end{footnotesize}
Total Net EU Flows towards Turkey

If we take the Quaisser and Reppegather estimate of €5 billion as indicative for CAP payments (mainly for rural development) to Turkey, and assume that the SCF will deliver €12 billion,\(^{186}\) then total EU outlays towards Turkey will be around €17 billion. This is not counting other EU expenditures to member states. These would not be significant at present, but this could change in the future if more money is allocated to knowledge and innovation, for example. Turkey’s own resources would be about 1% of GDP, €4.8 billion. The net budgetary flow would thus be €12 billion, about 0.1% of the EU’s GDP. This estimate is in line with other studies\(^{187}\) which predict an amount of €10 to €15 billion per year. The lower range outcomes were often the result of more restrictive assumptions on the absorptive capacity for SCF funding in Turkey.

Is this a lot? We should assume that Turkey needs these contributions for about 20 years. Spain also received structural funds for about 20 years and it started with a relatively higher level of GDP per capita: it is likely that Turkey will receive money for a longer period, but the amount will decline due to the increase in its own contributions, decrease in CAP spending and reduced need for structural funds. In addition, the budget in the first years after accession will be smaller, due to the phase-in restrictions. The cumulative net effect on EU GDP would be 2% in terms of current prices. This is more or less the same size as the economic gains from the Internal Market of 1.6% for Europe.\(^{188}\) However, the analysis above showed that much depends on economic progress in Turkey and improvement in its institutions. More convergence raises the benefits of the EU from the Internal Market in terms of trade and FDI. Turkish EU contributions will also increase, the need for cohesion policy funds will decline and the size of the agricultural sector will diminish. The 2% GDP costs of the budget merely shows that Turkish entrance to the EU will probably not be directly beneficial in economic terms for the EU but that the main economic benefits lie in a more distant future. How far ahead depends to a large degree on Turkish economic and institutional convergence towards the EU.

Are the Economic Implications a Stumbling Block?

The previous sections addressed the economic implications of a possible Turkish EU membership with respect to the Internal Market, migration and the EU budget,

\(^{186}\) This assumes that potentially €2 billion is not used through lack of absorptive capacity.


\(^{188}\) I should stress again the lack of precision around all of these numbers.
focussing on the implications for the EU. Turkish accession to the Internal Market would also deliver benefits for the EU. Trade in goods and services would increase, and stimulate competition and innovation and productivity. The economic effects for the EU are much smaller than for Turkey because the EU is a much more important trading partner for Turkey than the other way around. The benefits for both the EU and Turkey would be larger the faster Turkey reforms its economy and institutions. At the beginning of the 21st century, the possible start of accession negotiations did act as a catalyst for reform. The benefits of the Internal Market could make membership more attractive from the EU’s perspective, making it more of a stepping stone than a stumbling block. The integration of capital markets could contribute to this.

For the free movement of labour this is probably not the case. Migration is often perceived as a stumbling block, but there is a discrepancy between perceptions and estimated effects. The perceptions are often based on experiences with Turkish guest workers who have resided more or less permanently in the EU, and the free movement of Polish workers who arrived in the old member states in large numbers. The estimated effects are surrounded by a large degree of uncertainty. On the one hand, there is less reason to be concerned than a few years ago. In a number of EU countries labour shortages will increase due to ageing; most of the inflows will probably be temporary and incentives for migration will decrease, because the Turkish economy has been developing well in recent years, reducing the incentive for migration. On the other hand, there are still reasons for caution. The sustainability of economic growth will depend on economic reforms. Also, it is possible that many low-skilled workers (from the eastern and agricultural part of Turkey) will move permanently rather than temporarily. Migration could be a stumbling block for accession but with temporary restrictive policies and other supporting policies it could be handled, at least from an economic point of view.

Turkish membership will also have consequences for the EU budget. Turkey will be a net beneficiary of the budget. Preliminary calculations in the light of the current rules point to annual net benefits of about €12 billion. If this continues for about 20 years, total expenditure will amount to 2% of the EU’s GDP. That is a substantial amount, unprecedented in the history of the EU for one country, but not if compared to the 2004 accession of ten countries together. The necessary EU funds also depend on development of the Turkish economy. If the EU wants Turkey to become a member, the budget need not be a stumbling block, but it will need careful deliberation and calculation.

In summary, taking the effects on the Internal Market, migration and the budget together, Turkish accession will not bring big economic benefits to the EU. It seems likely that there would, in the long run, be net income benefits, particularly if the Turkish economy develops swiftly. The economic implications for the EU do not necessary constitute either a stumbling block or a stepping stone, although institutional and economic reforms in Turkey could tip the balance in favour of the
latter. This is not surprising: in the history of the EU, economic arguments have never been the prime motive for enlargement. This economic analysis does not come out firmly either for or against Turkey’s accession; the implications of accession are still open for discussion.

References


Østergaard-Nielsen E. “Migration: More than a Question of Demographics.” In: *Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?* Record of the high-level round table conference, Amsterdam, 6 and 7 November 2003, 93–98.


PART D

POPULISM IN THE EU AND TURKEY AS A THREAT TO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
VI. Turkish Populism and Anti-EU Rhetoric

Hakan Yilmaz (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University)

In Turkey, one can find both a Western European type “policy Euroscepticism” and an Eastern European type “identity Euroscepticism”, although the latter is more well-known and widespread than the former. Policy Euroscepticism has been a characteristic of the mainstream political parties of the left and the right, particularly of the centre-left. Identity Euroscepticism, on the other hand, has been adopted by the radical parties, especially on the Turkish nationalist and Islamist extreme right. There is a further form of Euroscepticism: party Euroscepticism, which depends on whether a given party is in the government or in the opposition. This last form can be observed in the Turkish case, particularly since the November 2002 elections. The centre-left RPP (CHP), which had been on a strongly pro-EU platform before the elections, gradually shifted its position to one of policy Euroscepticism some time after the elections. This was largely because the pro-EU stance had been taken over by the conservative JDP (AKP) and opinion polls made it clear that the RPP (CHP) did not stand a chance of winning the next elections.

Policy Euroscepticism emerged in the economic arena after the EU–Turkey Customs Union came into force on 1 January 1996. Parties from both left and right, as well as some business associations and corporations, were critical of the policy because of the potentially detrimental effects of the Customs Union on Turkey’s industrialisation and economic development. A second wave of policy Euroscepticism emerged after Turkey’s candidacy for the EU was ratified by the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in December 1999. In this second wave, the single most important issue was EU policy towards the Cyprus question, which was presented by both the left and the right-wing mainstream parties as unfair for the Turks and biased towards the Greeks.

Since the elections of November 2002, the Cyprus question has become the dominant Eurosceptic issue of the main parliamentary opposition party, the centre-left RPP (CHP), which has criticised the governing JDP (AKP) for supporting the Annan Plan (promoted by the former UN Secretary General) for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The JDP (AKP) promised the EU that it would open Turkish sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels in return for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. One should note, however, that although the main Eurosceptic trend of the RPP (CHP) has been policy-based, the party has also been waging an identity war against the governing JDP (AKP), accusing the latter of pursuing a hidden Islamist agenda behind its pro-European face. The RPP (CHP) leaders have claimed that

the JDP (AKP) has been abusing the EU-related democratic reforms to “soften” the military and other forces of the secularist establishment, thereby clearing the ground ready to realise their final goal — ending the secular order and Islamising the Turkish state and society.

Identity Euroscepticism has been traditionally voiced by the radical right parties in Turkey, the Turkish ethno-nationalist NAP (MHP) and the Islamist FP (SP). The NAP (MHP) sees in the EU demands for minority rights a direct threat to the power of the Turkish state and the unity of the Turkish nation. This is, according to the NAP (MHP), nothing but a continuation of the age-old Western strategy of dividing the Turkish nation by first creating “artificial minorities” within it, then taking them under Western patronage and provoking them to rebel against the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{190} The NAP (MHP) has traditionally embodied a hard-line nationalist Euroscepticism. However, that same party was an important partner in the ruling coalition from mid-1999 until late 2002; as a candidate state to the EU, Turkey promised to develop minority rights in its National Programme, abolished the death penalty and provided the non-Turkish speaking minorities with broadcasting and limited educational rights in their own languages. This confirms Sitter’s observation that even an identity-based Eurosceptic stance becomes “softer” when the party in question shares power and thus has to behave more “responsibly”, and it becomes “harder” when the party falls into opposition with no apparent chance of bouncing back to power.\textsuperscript{191} The classical Islamist view of the EU has portrayed it as an exclusive “Christian Club”, with no place for a Muslim country like Turkey. In this view, Turkey has long been the bastion of the house of Islam, protecting the Islamic world against the European “crusaders”. The basic nature of this religious conflict is no different today. What Turkey needs is not more humiliation at the doors of Christian Europe but to be the leader of a union of Muslim nations.\textsuperscript{192}

The argument that being in power softens identity-type Euroscepticism can also be applied to the Islamist party. The forerunner of the FP (SP), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was the major partner of a coalition government from early 1996 to mid-1997, when Turkey had just entered into a Customs Union (CU) with the EU. Despite its earlier rhetoric against the CU and its electoral promise to “tear


\textsuperscript{191} Sitter, “The Politics of Opposition”.

down” the CU agreement, the Islamist party largely played according to its rules. The only radical move of the Islamist-dominated government was an attempt to form a club of the major Islamic countries, called the D-8, apparently influenced by the western G-8 “club”. The D-8 still continues on paper, but with little real substance.

This paper will briefly review the international context of regime change in Turkey between 1946 and 1960. It will then focus on the relationship between the EU and Turkey, from the Association Agreement of 1963 until the present, examining the different sub-periods of this long process. Finally, by way of conclusion, it will offer a descriptive outline of the major characteristics of the Eurosceptic and Euro-supportive groups in Turkey today, and their approximate size within the general population, based on the findings of a survey carried out in September 2007.

The International Context of Regime Change in Turkey: 1946–1960

The economic and political restructuring which has taken place in recent years in connection with Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union constitutes the second major wave of democratisation in post-war Turkey in response to the international context. The first such wave was the dismantling of the one-party regime and the initial transition to democracy in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the Turkish state launched a series of democratic reforms as part of its foreign policy strategy of full integration with the US-led Western camp.

At the end of the Second World War, the Turkish government found itself facing two equally pressing international problems. First, Turkey’s standing in the eyes of the Allies was at an all-time low because of its consistent refusal to enter the war on the Allied side or to actively cooperate with the Allied war effort, its continuation of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany until very late in the war, and its implementation of the extraordinary Capital Tax (a war-time measure) that had discriminated heavily against the non-Muslim minorities. Even Turkey’s right to participate in the San Francisco Conference had only just been secured by British and American efforts at Yalta, against the strong opposition of the Soviet Union. Second, Turkey’s authoritarian one-party regime and statist economic system had become an anachronism in the face of the rising stars of democracy and free market economy. Turkey felt an urgent need to restore its international prestige in the eyes of the victorious democratic powers of the West, and in particular of the United States, in order to assure its place within the newly emerging economic, political and military organisations of the US-led Western world, and in order to have a say in the important decisions that would shape its own region and much of the world for years to come.

The elections of May 1950 marked the conclusion of this first wave of democratic transition. The Democrat Party of the Civilian Kemalists won the
majority of the votes and came to power. However, I would argue that this was not a transfer of power from the Kemalist ruling bloc to the representatives of some social groups and classes. It was rather a power transfer within the Kemalist ruling bloc, from the Civilianised Kemalist leadership organized in the RPP to the Civilian Kemalist leaders united in the DP. The DP won the general elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957, and remained in power for ten years, from May 1950 until the military coup of May 1960.

In the international context, the principal dimension of the DP period was the intensification of Turkey’s economic, political and military relations with the US, particularly after the Turkish quest for NATO membership became a reality in October 1951. The DP government followed an uncompromisingly pro-American line in its foreign policy. Turkey was one of the first countries to dispatch a brigade to Korea to fight alongside American troops. In line with the American strategy of building a pro-Western defensive pact in the Middle East, Turkey led the formation of the Baghdad Pact which brought together Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. In January 1957, shortly after the formation of the Baghdad Pact, President Eisenhower announced a new US policy towards the Middle East, which included increased cooperation with the Baghdad Pact countries. After the revolution of July 1958 had detached Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and distanced it from the Western camp, the rapprochement between the US and Turkey gained an additional momentum. One outcome of that new momentum was the conclusion, in March 1959, of a US–Turkish bilateral military cooperation agreement, under the terms of which the US had the right to intervene in Turkey in case of armed rebellions against the government.

In the economic field, its alliance with the US provided the Turkish government with unprecedented amounts of hard currency funds. As a result, the first half of the 1950s witnessed a rapid expansion of the Turkish economy, fuelled by American military and economic aid. The expansion was particularly noticeable in agriculture: farming incomes were made legally exempt from taxation; farmers were provided with abundant credits at low interest rates and their crops were bought by the government at high prices; pastures and barren lands were brought under cultivation with the aid of tractors and other mechanical tools, nearly doubling the total cultivated area; and the government built new roads connecting villages to nearby towns and distant cities.

This rapid economic expansion came to a standstill by 1955. It was a growth based not on the more efficient utilisation of existing resources, but on the utilisation of more resources — land, labour and capital. When resource utilisation reached its limits, the rapid growth slowed down and then stopped. The first reaction of the Turkish government was to knock on the doors of the US to ask for additional loans, but the US refused to supply Turkey with new money unless the Turkish government reversed its imprudent economic policies, its politically-motivated and haphazard investments, and its routine resort to deficit-financing instead of collecting more taxes. Turkey, according to the US, was
living beyond its means. The remedy proposed by the US was an economic stabilisation programme, and only under these circumstances would the Turkish government be provided with new credit. Turkey’s imprudent economic policies were not the only cause of US uneasiness with the DP. It was also critical of the increasingly authoritarian bent of the Turkish government in its dealings with opposition parties, the press, the universities and the judiciary.

Economic crisis, followed by the severe US criticism of the government’s economic policies and authoritarian leanings, prepared the ground for DP dissidents, the progressives, to launch a challenge against the majority faction, the populists. The progressives wholly embraced the American critique of the Turkish government and hoped that by so doing they would win US support for their cause. After all, this was what the DP had successfully done in the 1940s. The progressives argued that they were the representatives of the new US thinking while the populists had already fallen behind.

The populist–progressive fight within the DP raged throughout 1955. The progressives made an attempt to conquer the DP from within. When that failed, they left the DP and founded the Freedom Party (FP). This was closely reminiscent of the Civilian Kemalist tactic in 1945; they had first tried to overthrow the Civilianized Kemalist leadership of the RPP, failed, and then left the RPP to found the DP. From the moment they founded the FP in December 1955 until the elections of October 1957, the progressives’ hopes ran high and they were sure that they would comfortably win the majority of the votes. In the event, their performance was dismal.

The self-evaluation of the progressives can be traced in the pages of the Forum, the leading progressive journal of the 1950s. They considered themselves to be the new generation, much more in tune with US thinking about democracy and the economy, and much better suited with their technocratic skills to the complex tasks of conflict management and economic regulation. Their illusions were shattered in 1957. When the FP got no more than 4% of the votes in the election, the progressives shut down their party and joined the RPP. This injection of DP dissidents revitalised the RPP. Many young progressive leaders were given influential party posts, and the party platform was modified to include the long-held ideas of the progressives. With the assimilation of the progressives, the old RPP became the power-house of the progressive coalition. The DP was now facing a much more vigorous opposition, which brought together the charisma of the RPP leader İsmet İnönü and the intellectual potential of the progressives.

The US was indeed sympathetic to the progressive cause. However, the populist government too was making moves towards meeting the economic conditions set by the US for the provision of new aid. After waiving for about three years, the DP government finally yielded in August 1958 to the US proposition of implementing a comprehensive economic stabilisation plan. At the same time, and particularly after the Syrian–Egyptian union of February 1958 and the Iraqi revolution of July 1958, the US and Turkey established an even closer cooperation
in the Middle East. The Turkish government allowed US troops to use military bases in southeastern Anatolia during the American occupation of Lebanon, and it also permitted the stationing of mid-range nuclear missiles on Turkish soil. In March 1959, the new élan of the US–Turkish collaboration was given a concrete shape with the conclusion of a bilateral defence treaty between the two states.

From 1959, while the DP government was implementing the US-proposed economic stabilisation programme and deepening the US–Turkish military alliance, it was also adopting increasingly repressive tactics to deal with the opposition. To counter the new strength of the progressive coalition, it called for the organisation of a Fatherland Front or what we might call a populist coalition. During 1959 and early 1960, there was an intense power struggle between the progressive and populist coalitions. In April 1960, the governing populist coalition decided to strike at the progressive coalition, and established an extraordinary parliamentary commission to investigate the alleged subversive activities of the opposition and some elements of the press. The response of the progressive coalition to that blatantly authoritarian action was firm, and was accompanied by anti-government demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.

The secret junta of officers who overthrew the DP government on 27 May 1960 justified their action on the grounds that the government was headed towards a civilian dictatorship and that they acted to save the democratic regime. I would argue, on the contrary, that the military intervention killed a historic momentum for the institutionalisation of democracy in Turkey and established in its place a “military democracy”, a regime in which basic democratic institutions function, but the military holds significant reserves of power. The officers’ junta was making active preparations for over two years. Shortly before the intervention, these preparations almost became visible: the government was about to launch large-scale investigations among the officer corps, and was planning to bring in loyal troops to the capital as a precaution. Such an investigation would have uncovered the junta and put its plans in jeopardy. Under the circumstances, the intervention became literally a matter of life and death for the secret junta: as some of the members later wrote in their memoirs, any delay would have given the government valuable time to put its preemptive plans into action.

The populist DP government was intending to establish a hegemonic party system, a “democracy with a strong state”. It made a serious attempt to silence the progressives by authoritarian methods. However, finding itself faced with the opposition of the progressives, dissension within the DP ranks against the heavy-handed methods of the leadership, and the disapproval of the US, the government was about to retreat from its plans and hold general elections. In other words, there was a real chance that the government would have to put an end to suppression because of the unacceptably high internal costs that came with it. If that had happened, then Turkish democracy, which was born as a reform from above because of foreign policy considerations, could have become based on an internal balance of forces. Of course, this might not have been the outcome: the
government might have managed to overcome the opposition or the situation might have deteriorated into violent civil strife. Despite the uncertainty, however, there was a real chance that a democratic compromise could have been built. That chance was lost with the coup d’etat.

**Turkey–EU Relations during the Two Decades of National Developmentalism and Populism: From the Association Agreement of 1963 to the Military Intervention of 1980**

Contractual relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) began on 31 July 1959, when the Turkish government applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) for membership. On the one hand, this application reflected the overall Western and European orientation of Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, Turkey had already become a member of such critical organisations as the Council of Europe, OECD and NATO; seeking membership of another newly founded European organisation, the EEC, seemed quite natural. Yet a second, and equally powerful, motive behind the Turkish application for EEC membership was the fact that Greece, Turkey’s regional rival, had already made a similar application two weeks earlier. It is worth noting that Greece and Turkey were the first countries to seek membership of the EEC almost immediately after the organisation had been founded by the original six countries in 1958, and long before any other country — including some of today’s well-entrenched member-states which oppose Turkey’s accession to the EU, such as Austria. One dominant and understandable strand of Turkish foreign policy after the Second World War was not to leave Greece alone in any important international organisation. The Turkish governments of the 1970s diverged from this important strategy, under the influence of the rising radical left and radical right parties and groups in the coalition governments, and made the mistake of not following Greece when it sought full membership in the EEC. This mistake cost Turkey dearly in the coming years, as Greece made very efficient use of its secure position in the decision-making organs of the EEC, and later in the EC and the EU. Not only did it surpass Turkey in terms of socioeconomic development, but it also managed to influence the European Community, individual governments and European public opinion in its own favour during competition with Turkey over such vital bilateral issues as the Aegean and Cyprus questions.

The EEC’s answer to both Greece and Turkey was to offer a form of relationship that fell short of full membership, in view of the less developed economies of the two countries. This relationship was termed an “association” and it was formulated in the Association Agreements that were signed first with Greece in November 1962 (the Athens Agreement), and then with Turkey in September 1963 (the Ankara Agreement). The Turkish agreement envisaged a three-stage transition (a preparatory stage, a transitional stage, and a final stage), leading first to a
Customs Union and then to full accession to the EEC. Indeed, it is stated in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement that “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community”. During the long transition process envisaged in the Ankara Agreement, the relatively weaker economy of Turkey would be gradually adjusted to the competitive environment of the EEC, in terms of developing the productive capacity, liberalising trade and building the necessary new institutions.

The Agreement also created the principal organs that would oversee the transition process, namely, the Association Council (which brings together the ministers), the Association Committee (which is composed of high-level bureaucrats), and the Joint Parliamentary Committee (which is made up of parliamentarians from the European Parliament and the Turkish National Assembly). The Association Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol, which was signed in November 1970 and came into force in January 1973, establishing a timetable of technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the Customs Union within a period of 22 years. The Additional Protocol provided that the EEC would abolish tariffs and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years; it also called for the harmonisation of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation of persons within a given timeframe.

The 1960s and 1970s were years of ideological radicalisation and political polarisation in Turkey. Radical left parties and movements, from the parliamentary-socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey to the various guerilla-type revolutionary groups, established a remarkable hold over university students and academics. By the early 1970s, the radical left’s influence was extending towards the newly expanding industrial working class, and left-wing emancipatory agendas began to find echoes among the millions of new migrants living in the squatter areas of the big cities, as well as among such major ethnic and religious minorities as the Kurds and the Alevis.

Parallel to the rise of the radical left, the radical right was also gaining ground throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The radical right was represented in the political arena by two political parties: the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) embodying Turkish ethno-nationalism and the National Salvation Party (NSP) representing Islamism. Both the radical left and the radical right were vehemently opposed to Turkey’s entry into the EEC. In the parlance of the radical left, the EEC, or Common Market as it was commonly known at that time, was an appendage of American imperialism, from which they were trying to save Turkey. One famous leftist slogan of the day was “they are the ‘commons’ or ‘partners’ and we are the ‘market’”. In the eyes of the Islamists linked with the NSP, the EEC was nothing but a “Christian
Club", sponsored and maintained by the Vatican, in which a Muslim Turkey would have absolutely no place. Turkish ethno-nationalists of the NAP, on the other hand, while adopting both the “anti-imperialism” of the radical left and the “anti-Christian Club” discourse of the Islamists, added another prong to their attack. They claimed that joining the EEC would give the European states a historic opportunity to meddle in Turkey’s internal affairs, with the purpose of weakening the state structures, provoking the minorities and “over-Westernized Turks” to rebel against the Turkish state, and finally to divide the country and take its various parts under their rule. Although the radical right parties did not have large electoral followings, they were large enough to weaken the major centre-right Justice Party (JP) to the point that the Justice Party could form a government only by accepting the two radical right parties as its coalition partners. As coalition partners between 1975 and 1977 in the so-called “Nationalist Front” governments, and then as parliamentary supporters of a JP minority government in 1980, the radical right parties exerted an enormous influence on both domestic and foreign policies, effectively blocking any meaningful attempt to move Turkey closer to the EEC.

The radical left parties and movements did not play such a role with respect to the main centre-left party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP). However, the RPP leadership itself, particularly the party’s chairman Bülent Ecevit, no doubt influenced by the rising popularity of left-wing anti-imperialist ideas in general public opinion, came to adopt a radical left position in matters of foreign policy, distancing itself from both the US and the EEC. It was during the RPP government that, in October 1978, Turkey proposed a 5-year freeze on the progress of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EEC, because trade liberalisation and the lowering of import tariffs were diminishing the much-needed foreign currency revenues. Although the EEC did not agree to the proposal, the Turkish side went ahead and suspended its obligations towards the EEC unilaterally, which effectively brought relations to a standstill. It was only in December 1989, more than ten years later, that Turkey picked up its obligations towards the EEC once again, with the Turkish government offering the EEC a timetable to resume its responsibilities under the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970.

In the 1970s, taken hostage by the radical parties, groups and ideas, none of the major centrist parties in government could make a meaningful move towards the EEC. During the same period, however, three other southern European countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain, which had just come out of US-supported dictatorships, were making determined progress towards democratic Europe. In June 1975 Greece applied for membership; this was followed by the Portuguese application in March 1977 and the Spanish one in July 1977. There is some reason to believe the much-told story that some EEC states urged the Turkish governments to go ahead and apply for full membership in the Community, so as not to lose Turkey to the anti-Western camp under the geopolitical exigencies of the Cold War, but none of the Turkish governments of the 1970s, either right or left-wing, was in a position to listen to these appeals.
It was only in 1980, shortly before the military intervention on 12 September of that year, during the minority government of the centre-right JP, that the foreign ministry decided to revive its EEC ambitions and make an application for membership. The prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, initially — and cautiously — backed the foreign minister, Hayrettin Erkmen. However, once the plan to apply for full EEC membership became known by the opposition parties, the Islamist NSP, whose parliamentary support was critical for the survival of the JP minority government, and the centre-left RPP, which was the main opposition party, came together to overthrow the foreign minister by a vote of no-confidence, on the grounds that the minister was acting in a way that would jeopardise the country’s national interests. In order to save his government, the prime minister sacrificed his foreign minister, and with him the EEC idea. This early period of Turkey–EEC relations came to an abrupt end with the military takeover in Turkey in September 1980.

Turkey–EU Relations during the Last Decade of the Cold War and the Early Years of the Post-Cold War Period: From the Military Intervention of 1980 to the Customs Union Agreement of 1995

Curiously, the EEC showed no strong reaction to the Turkish coup, which was in marked contrast to the Community’s fervent and unequivocal protest against the Greek colonels’ coup in 1967. The EEC finally decided to suspend its relations with Turkey in January 1982, almost one-and-a-half years after the intervention. This show of “understanding” towards the Turkish military regime was an outcome of the realpolitik of the Cold War. Firstly, the coup was effectively backed by NATO and the US, which supported the Turkish military as the guardian of the country’s political stability and alliance with the West. In the eyes of most European and US observers of Turkish politics in the late 1970s, the country was moving fast towards economic crisis and political turmoil; communist, Islamist and other anti-systemic forces were gaining ground, and if nothing had been done, Turkey’s position in the Western camp might have been irreparably damaged. Secondly, in contrast to the large-scale popular opposition and student demonstrations against the Greek colonels, the Turkish generals did not face much opposition from within the country; the Turkish people, by and large, remained calm, apparently tired of the crisis and the bloodshed that preceded the military intervention.

This compliance, or complicity, of the EEC and individual European countries with respect to the Turkish military coup, in the name of stability and security, created an atmosphere of disillusionment and mistrust on the part of the Turkish civilian political leaders. They saw a Europe which turned a blind eye and a deaf ear while the Turkish military government closed down their parties, put them in jail, and barred them from active politics for ten years. This sense of disillusionment and distrust with European politicians, the feeling that they had
stood by while Turkish politicians were suffering under military oppression, was undoubtedly a factor in widening the emotional, personal, ideological and institutional gap between the Turkish political parties and their European counterparts.

The military regime in Turkey lasted for two years, during which time the political system was speedily and almost completely redesigned, from top to bottom. The driving idea behind this reform was depoliticisation, which was to be achieved by dramatically curbing freedom of speech and political participation. This political re-engineering resulted in new institutions, new rules of the game, and new actors. A new Constitution was approved in a public referendum in November 1982. New political parties, all closely checked and monitored by the military government, were founded, and three of them were allowed to run in the elections: the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Populist Party (HP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP). New leaders emerged, the most notable among them being Turgut Ozal. New laws on political parties, professional and civic associations were enacted, which drastically curtailed the scope of citizen participation in civic and political life. Last, but certainly not least, an effective system of military tutelage was introduced to hold civilian politics in check by means of a fortified National Security Council and a strengthened presidency. The first occupant of this post was General Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup, who held the presidency for seven years, from November 1982 to November 1989. Following these sweeping political changes, the military regime formally ended when elections took a place in November 1983 and a newly elected civilian government, under the Motherland Party led by Turgut Ozal, took office in December of that year.

As noted above, it took more than a year for the EEC to suspend its relations with Turkey in protest at the military intervention; the suspension, which came into force in January 1982, was lifted in September 1986, when the EEC–Turkey Association Council met for the first time after a long break. The decision of the EEC to normalize its relations with Turkey was motivated by Turkey\'s return to civilian rule, and the pace of liberalisation, particularly in the economic arena. The Ozal government had already made up its mind that Turkey should become a member of the EEC. The recent Greek, Spanish and Portuguese accessions, and the positive role that the EEC accession process had played in consolidating democratic-civilian rule and the market economy in these southern European countries, pushed the Turkish government to move in the same direction. Certain key individuals played a critical role in this decision, including Ali Bozer, the strongly pro-European minister of state in charge of EEC affairs, and a group of equally pro-European top bureaucrats in the foreign ministry. In other words, a handful of individuals played a decisive role in convincing the prime minister that his and Turkey\'s interests would be best served by forging closer ties with the EEC. As a result, on 17 April 1987, Turkey submitted its formal application for membership of the EEC. It took more than two years for the European Commission to draft its “Opinion” on the Turkish application, which was published on 18 December 1989. In
its Opinion, the Commission reiterated Turkey’s eligibility for membership in principle but claimed that neither Turkey nor the EC were ready to start membership talks. Turkey, according to the Commission, was not ready to take on the obligations of membership, given its existing level of economic and political underdevelopment. The EC, on the other hand, had to put its house in order and complete the Single Market before contemplating any further enlargement. The Commission went on to underline the need for a comprehensive cooperation programme aiming at facilitating the integration of Turkey and the EC, and added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995 as envisaged.

The two years between submission of Turkey’s application in April 1987 and the delivery of the Commission’s Opinion in December 1989 were fateful years in the history of Eastern Europe. In a revolutionary wave that began in Poland, the communist states of Eastern Europe started to crumble one after another and it became apparent that the post-Second World War Soviet domination over the eastern part of Europe was fast coming to an end. The first non-Communist government in Eastern Europe, led by the Solidarity movement, was sworn into office in Poland in September 1989. A month later, Hungary stepped onto the reform path: the Hungarian Communist Party reinvented itself as socialist and the parliament passed a number of laws enabling multi-party elections. Shortly thereafter, hundreds of thousands of East Germans flocked into West Germany, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the tangible and ominous symbol of the “Iron Curtain” and the Cold War. By December 1989, the power monopoly of the East German communist party had ended, leading to the reunification of Germany in October 1990. After Poland, Hungary and East Germany had opened the gates, other countries followed suit, so that by the end of 1990, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had been completely swept away.

With the Western European leaders and the EC busy planning for the future of post-Communist Eastern Europe, it was not surprising that Turkey’s calls for membership in the EEC went mostly unheeded. Soon after the Eastern European countries emerged from Communist rule, the EC offered them prospects for joining the Western club by signing association agreements with each of them. EC membership was seen, by both West and East Europeans, as the best protection for the emerging democracies. The EU’s eastern expansion, termed “back to Europe” by many Eastern Europeans, can be described as a “euphoric enlargement”, in the sense that it was motivated more by moral value judgements and ideological commitments and less by a cold calculation of costs and benefits. The reunification of Germany played a particularly important role in the West’s rush to embrace the East. In many ways, the EU’s opening up towards the East looked more like a “reunification” than the enlargement of a transnational organisation. German reunification seems to have set the trend: with West Germany so promptly embracing East Germany as part of one nation and one state, on subjective ethno-national grounds, it would have been very difficult to tell the other East European
nations that they were not welcome even to join the EU because of “objective”
criteria, such as political and economic development.

It is important to remember that Germany had been trying since the end of
the Second World War to strip itself of its “national” image, loaded as this was with
bitter memories of the Nazi invasion and occupation of East Europe, and to replace
it with a more cosmopolitan “European” identity. A German reunification on ethno-
national grounds carried with it the risk of seriously tainting Germany’s new
“European” image and reviving its old, unwanted “national” identity. Such a reversal
might have seriously threatened Germany’s leading position in the EU. It had to do
something to prove that it was, first and foremost, a European power and that there
was no going back to its earlier nationally motivated hegemonic pursuits in Eastern
Europe. A fast-track accession process to the EU for all the post-Communist
countries of Eastern Europe, promoted and defended by Germany, was a strong
signal to the elites and peoples of those countries that they too — and not only the
Germans — would be warmly embraced by their Western neighbours. The net
effect of this “euphoric enlargement” towards Eastern Europe was that while Turkey
was trying to catch the Southern European train, it was suddenly left behind by an
unexpected and fast-moving Eastern European one. From that point onward, the
Turkish strategy became one of entering the EU through the back door. Given the
contrasting subjective nature of Eastern enlargement and the objective criteria by
which the Turkish accession would be judged, it was hardly surprising that both the
elites and the public in Turkey began to feel that they were being treated unfairly by
the EU. In fact, the issue of the EU’s “double standards” has been one of the pillars
of Turkish Euroscepticism in recent years.

Although the membership application in 1987 did not bring any tangible
results, it put Turkey back on the agenda of the EEC and, much more importantly, it
brought Europe back into the agenda of political decision-making and public debate
in Turkey. Agreements between the EC and Turkey, particularly in the commercial
and economic arena, continued to proliferate in the years that followed the
membership application. As a result of the Ozalist reforms of economic, and to a
lesser extent political, liberalisation in the 1980s, by the early 1990s the country had
come to the point of undertaking the obligations of a Customs Union with the EC. In
the eyes of the Turkish government of the day, under Turkey’s first woman prime
minister, Tansu Ciller, the Customs Union would be the first step towards full EC
membership. Many European leaders, however, saw this quite differently: for them,
Turkey was to be firmly linked to the EC but was to be left beyond the borders of the
Community. In their eyes, the Customs Union with Turkey represented not the
beginning but the end-point of Turkish–EC relations.
The 1990s in Turkey: Political Radicalisation, Ideological Polarisation, and the Rise of Euroscepticism

The 1990s were a decade of trouble, turmoil and crisis in Turkey. This curious transition period between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of Europeanisation involved intense and conflicted feelings, and sometimes violent actions, including disillusionment, denial, soul-searching and hope. The “long 1990s” really started in 1989, with the fall of the iron curtain in Eastern Europe. This was the year when the European Community began to embrace the Central and Eastern European countries, as they were released from the Soviet yoke. It was also the year when, nearly two years after Turkey’s application for membership in the EC, the European Commission finally issued its opinion that Turkey was eligible for membership but that neither Turkey nor the EC were ready to start accession talks. This period entered its final phase in December 1999, when the Helsinki European Council declared Turkey to be a candidate destined to join the European Union. The period truly ended, however, in November 2002, when a general election swept away the political actors who had shaped the decade and brought to power new actors with a clear commitment to the cause of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The 1990s can also be seen as a political merry-go-round, in which almost every political actor, right or left, Turkish or Kurdish, radical or centrist, military or civilian, man or woman, found themselves on the political podium with a share of governmental power, sometimes for long periods and sometimes for just a few months. At the same time, almost every possible electoral and governmental combination and coalition — likely or otherwise — rose to power and fell again.

As this would suggest, the 1990s were years of electoral volatility, governmental fluidity, and political instability. There were three general elections (1991, 1995 and 1999) which produced six governments, all of them rather weak coalitions comprising partners with very low levels of cooperation and high levels of mistrust. The series of coalition governments began with a centre-right and centre-left coalition between 1991 and 1995 (the True Path Party of Süleyman Demirel and the Social Democratic Populist Party of Erdal İnönü). This coalition between the successors to the grand old parties of Turkey created high hopes initially, promising to restore democracy, heal the wounds of the military regime of 1980–1983, bring a political solution to the Kurdish question, and pursue economic policies to reduce the income gap that had opened up so alarmingly in the years of unrestrained economic liberalisation in the 1980s. As part of the commitment to finding a political solution to the Kurdish question, a number of representatives from the pro-Kurdish People’s Labour Party were elected deputies on the list of the Social Democratic Populist Party, in the hope that they would articulate Kurdish problems on the parliamentary platform rather than resorting to terrorism and anti-systemic popular mobilization. Most of this government’s initial promises, however, remained...
unfulfilled. The only tangible achievement of the first half of the 1990s was Turkey’s joining the Customs Union with the EU by the end of 1995.

On 6 March 1995 the EU–Turkey Association Council took a decision regarding the inauguration of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, following the pattern set out in the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970. The decision on a Customs Union provided for the following: (1) the immediate reciprocal abolition of customs duties and equivalent levies on manufactured goods; (2) the immediate reciprocal abolition of quantitative restrictions or equivalent measures on imports and exports on industrial goods; (3) immediate and full adoption by Turkey of the common commercial policy; (4) immediate adoption by Turkey of customs laws which conform to the Community Customs Code; (5) adoption by Turkey of existing Community competition law; (6) adoption by Turkey of existing Community law and some of the provisions relating to intellectual, industrial and commercial property. It did not deal with the right of establishment and provision of services or with the free movement of Turkish workers within the EU. The Council’s decision received the assent of the European Parliament on 13 December 1995, enabling it to enter into force on 1 January 1996.

Following the Association Council’s March decision, in July 1995 the Turkish government launched a series of democratising and liberalising reforms, which represented the first package of amendments to the 1980 military-era Constitution. Debates in Parliament led to 360 votes in favour of the amendments, from a total of 450 MPs. They covered a range of constitutional changes, including the following: (1) the part of the preamble to the Constitution which praised the military takeover of 12 September 1980 was removed; (2) trade unions and other civil and professional associations were given the right to be politically active; (3) civil servants were given the right to form trade unions, but not the right to strike; (4) the voting age was lowered from 20 to 18; the Parliament also agreed to pass a special law granting citizens abroad the right to vote, and detainees and inmates the right to vote under the supervision of a judge; (4) the age requirement for membership of a political party was reduced from 21 to 18; (5) a deputy whose party is dissolved by the Constitutional Court will be able to remain as an MP, provided that he or she has not caused the banning of the party by statements or activities.

It should be noted that the constitutional amendments extending political participation rights to the civil and professional associations have brought about substantive improvements. However, those that touched upon the sensitive issues of freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and minority rights, such as the attempt to liberalise the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, have produced no more than cosmetic changes. It is clear that the tactical goal of the Turkish

---

194 Sources: the daily Hurriyet and other newspapers, issues of 22–23 July 1995.
government in initiating these reforms was to obtain the European Parliament’s consent for the Association Council’s Customs Union decision. The government’s strategic goal, on the other hand, was to fulfil the necessary political conditions, such as those formulated in the June 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council,\textsuperscript{195} to qualify for full membership of the EU. Similar recommendations for democratisation have come from the United States; these have stressed the need for legal reforms that would institutionalise the rights of the Kurdish minority, isolate the terrorism of the separatist PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), and restore the stability of Turkey that is much needed in a world region (the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus) which is susceptible to wars and religious and ethnic conflicts.

In Turkey, the Customs Union agreement triggered the formation of three coalitions concerned with the domestic political implications of economic integration with Europe. The strongest of these coalitions is dominated by the secularist or Kemalist conservatives. The Kemalist conservatives are led by the military, but the coalition also includes the centre-right, far-right, and the so-called “nationalist left” parties, as well as some media groups. This coalition wants the best of both worlds: it is in favour of the Customs Union but unwilling to pay the price in terms of democratisation. It particularly opposes any rights or freedoms that would threaten the unitary structure of the state. On the opposite side is the liberal coalition which includes the social democrats, the so-called “new democrats”, a number of media groups, the major professional associations, and some labour unions. The liberals want both the Customs Union and the associated democratic reforms, including new rights for the ethnic Kurds. The liberals see the Customs Union as a major step towards full membership of the EU, and membership itself as the culmination of Turkey’s two centuries-old experiment in Westernisation. The third coalition is that of the Islamic conservatives, led by the Welfare Party, which opposes both the Customs Union and the democratic reforms that have been required by it. The Islamic conservatives see in the Customs Union a revival of the Ottoman–British commercial treaty of 1838 and they consider the accompanying new rights for the ethnic minorities as the embodiment of the Tanzimat reforms of 1839. The Islamists argue that what the Europeans want to achieve now is exactly the same as what they wanted — and to a large extend did achieve — in the early 19th century: to colonize the Turkish economy by means of economic liberalisation and to divide the Islamic unity of the Turks and the Kurds under the guise of ethnic rights.

\textsuperscript{195} In June 1993, the European Council meeting in Copenhagen adopted the criteria for membership to be applied to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These include: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. For more information on the Council’s decisions see the official web site of the EU at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index.htm)
Serious governmental instability set in after the elections of 1995. Between 1995 and 1999 the country was governed by coalitions of the centre-right (the True Path Party of Tansu Çiller and the Motherland Party of Mesut Yılmaz), the centre-right and Islamic groups (the True Path Party of Tansu Çiller and the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan), and centre-right and centre-left (the Motherland Party of Mesut Yılmaz, the Democratic Turkey Party of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, and the Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit). The last government of the period was a caretaker minority government of the centre-left Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit. It was in this turbulent second half of the 1990s, under prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from the Islamist Welfare Party, that the military, with the backing of the big business community, the major media organs, the labour unions, and certain segments of the secular urban middle classes, staged a so-called “soft” or “post-modern” intervention in early 1997 that overthrew the Islamist prime minister and had his party closed down by a ruling of the Constitutional Court.

The 1990s were a time of cultural, as well as economic and political crisis. Perhaps the most important facet of politics in the 1990s was the politicisation of identities. First to arrive on the public scene were political movements organized around Kurdish, Sunni Muslim and Alevi identities; these were quickly followed by political and civic movements attempting to mobilise their followers by an appeal to gender, region, life-style, sexual choices, age and other subjective and mostly symbolic issues, feelings and attachments.

One of the most important sources of the political crisis of the 1990s was the armed Kurdish secessionist movement led by the PKK, which reached its peak in the second half of the decade. Apart from its costs in terms of human life, one of the most detrimental consequences of PKK terrorism was the creation, within the state apparatus and the security forces, of various para-legal or completely illegal organisations. Referred to as the “gangs” in the Turkish popular parlance, they brought together state officials and mafia members who followed their own agendas and operated largely outside the control of the democratic authorities. These self-appointed protectors of the state seriously damaged the credibility of the state in the eyes of the large majority and dealt a severe blow to efforts to build a state based on the rule of law in Turkey. A second and equally destructive effect of PKK terrorism was that it gave rise, among the Turkish people, to nationalist extremism of unprecedented proportions. This nationalist extremism also fuelled anti-Western and anti-European sentiments among the Turkish people, because of a general belief that the PKK has been tacitly or openly supported by the Western governments.

A second source of the crisis of the 1990s was the rise of political Islam, represented by the parties of the National Outlook movement (the Welfare, Virtue, and Felicity parties), all founded and led by Necmettin Erbakan. A number of factors have been suggested to explain the growing strength of political Islam. One is the chronic inability of the secular parties of both left and right to deal with the pressing problems of the country; a second is the intense Islamisation of Turkish educational
and intellectual life after the military coup of 1980, intended to counter-balance the perceived threat of communist ideology. A third factor often cited is the massive rural–urban migration of the 1980s. This migration, it has been claimed, resulted in the formation of poor urban peripheries inhabited by people of rural origin, who were very receptive to religious indoctrination and mobilisation.

The first embodiment of the National Outlook movement in the political arena of the 1980s was the Welfare Party. In its early years the Welfare Party was a rather small political entity which garnered only 7% of the votes in the general elections of 1987. In 1991 the party’s electoral support more than doubled to 17%, and in 1995, it was the strongest party in the country with 21% of the popular vote. The Welfare Party became the dominant partner of a short-lived coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party in 1996. After the Welfare Party had been closed down during the “soft” military intervention of 1997, the National Outlook movement set up the Virtue Party as its successor. The Virtue Party received 15% of the national vote in 1999. That party was also closed down by the Constitutional Court shortly after the 1999 elections. Today the National Outlook movement has become a mere shadow of its powerful and glamorous past, losing much of its support to the Justice and Development Party. It is currently represented in the political arena by the Felicity Party, which won only 2.5% of the votes cast in the 2002 elections.

A third source of the crisis of the 1990s was something quite unexpected and entirely non-political: it was the Marmara earthquake of August 1999. The utter inability and lack of capacity of the government, and of state institutions more generally, to deal with the devastation and the problems created by the earthquake discredited not only the political parties that were then in power, but the political establishment in general. This protest mood is likely to have played an important role in the almost total electoral annihilation of all the parties of the 1990s in the general elections of November 2002.

As often happens at times of crisis, radical solutions began to be articulated and applied. Hence, the 1990s also witnessed the decline of pro-systemic and centrist parties in Turkey, and the rise of anti-systemic and radical politics; it was a decade of severe and sometimes violent radicalisation and polarisation of political choices, cultural identities and even economic policies. While the combined electoral power of the centrist parties of the left and the right fell from 83% in 1991 to 57% in 1999, that of the radical parties, largely of the right, rose from 17% to 42% during the same period. Perhaps a more dramatic expression of the rise of radical politics can be seen by contrasting the electoral performance of the centre-right parties with that of the radical right parties. The total vote of the centre-right parties, which had been 51% in 1991, fell steeply to 26% in 1999. At the same time, radical right parties of nationalist and Islamist varieties doubled their combined electoral support from 17% to 34%. Although there was no really significant increase in support for the radical left parties (their total vote increased from 0.2% in 1995 to
The electoral base of the Kurdish nationalist parties did grow, from 4.2% in 1995 to 5.6% in 1999.

The Elections of November 2002 and Beyond: The Chances for Democratic Consolidation and the Crisis Dynamics

For all practical purposes, Europeanisation of the foreign policy as well as domestic politics of Turkey started with the elections of November 2002. As a rule of thumb, one can say that democratic consolidation requires two or more free, fair and competitive elections, with no outside intervention in the political system. The first such election was held in November 2007, and a second will (under normal circumstances) take place in 2012. After these two consecutive elections, one can expect a certain stabilisation of the rules of the game and of the party system and political actors. What is critically needed is that Turkey’s EU accession process should continue unabated — yet this is precisely the factor which creates so much uncertainty for Turkey’s democratic consolidation. The EU is usually thought of as an anchor, a force for political stabilisation in candidate countries. In Turkey, however, while the EU has served as an anchor in the stabilisation and development of the economy, it has played a rather destabilising role in the area of politics. Today, much of the rise in popular and party-level nationalism and Euroscepticism in Turkey can be accounted for by the policies of individual European countries such as France, as well as the attitude of the EU more generally, in the areas of the Cyprus problem, Kurdish rights, and the Armenian question.

Two types of potential crisis await the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). In this particular context, a “crisis” is largely a subjective feeling, a belief which spreads among the people that the country faces one or more “unsolvable” problems, and that the current government is unwilling or unable to deal with them. Clearly, the forging of such a public perception requires the support of the major media organs. This kind of crisis, in other words, cannot occur by itself; it is, rather, created by political actors. It occurs as a result of the efforts of political agents who carry out “crisis engineering”. In today’s Turkey “crisis engineering” appears to be the only real way for the opposition parties to make any significant headway in elections.

The ethno-nationalist opposition to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), represented by the Turkish Nationalist Action Party (MHP), claims that the government is failing to defend Turkey’s national dignity and interests in the face of European pressures over the Cyprus problem, Kurdish rights, the Armenian question and minority rights in general. Hence, one crisis area facing the AKP is a “nationalism” crisis. A second potential crisis area could be a “secularism” crisis. The major peddler of this type of crisis is the main parliamentary opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The secularism issue is less related to the
policies of the EU or individual European countries, but it is the type of crisis that is more likely to be backed up by the major media organs. The actions and rhetoric of the government will be critical. If it makes mistakes, even at the rhetorical and symbolic levels, that could provide the opposition with excellent ammunition to portray the government as Islamist and anti-secularist.

Interestingly, the governing party may not lose votes in a secularism crisis. On the contrary, it might even expect to increase its electoral backing if it portrays itself as the defender of the Islamic masses against the attacks of the secular establishment. What such a secularism crisis would bring to the opposition party, in terms of electoral support, is also uncertain. The Republican People’s Party would hope to steal votes not only from the Justice and Development Party, but also from the secular parties of the centre-right. Whether this plan will work is anybody’s guess. A nationalism crisis, in which the government is portrayed as being unable to defend Turkey’s national unity and dignity, would hit the government hardest. At the present time, the Cyprus and Armenian questions are important but are unlikely to reach the proportions of a crisis in the near future. The most likely cause of a nationalism crisis would be an intensification of PKK terror activities. The government knows this and is trying to take domestic as well as foreign policy measures to prevent such an eventuality.

Clusters of Euro-supportive and Eurosceptic Groups: Findings from a Survey, September 2007

The final section of this paper will outline the major groups in the urban areas of Turkey (consisting of approximately 70% of the total Turkish population), according to their attitudes towards and expectations from Turkey’s membership in the EU. The data are drawn from a nation-wide survey carried out in September 2007 in the urban areas of Turkey (Yilmaz 2007).

A cluster analysis yielded the following three major groups, based on their attitudes towards Turkey’s EU membership:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Groupings Based on Attitudes towards Europe</th>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>Share in the Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUROSCEPTICS</td>
<td>Support for EU membership lowest; opposition to EU membership highest; supporters slightly more than opponents</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURO-SUPPORTIVES</td>
<td>Support for EU membership highest; opposition to EU membership average; supporters much more than opponents</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAROCHIAL-ETHNIC EURO-SUPPORTIVES</td>
<td>Support for EU membership low; opposition to EU membership low; supporters slightly more than opponents</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The characteristics of the groups that topped the “Eurosceptic” category were, in order of significance, as follows:

- They have a left-wing political orientation.
- They think that European political and cultural values are not compatible with Muslim or Turkish values.
- They feel that they have not personally benefited from the EU-related reforms in Turkey.
- They feel that they have not personally benefited from globalisation and Turkey’s economic and political integration with the outside world.
- They think that compromise and consensus building is not the best way for solving social and political conflicts in Turkey.
- When necessary, they are ready to withdraw their support from the democratic regime and give their support to a military coup.

The groups that came at the top of the “Euro-supportive” category, on the other hand, exhibited the following characteristics, again in order of significance:

- They have a right-wing political orientation.
- They think that they have experienced a positive change in their economic situation in recent years.
- They feel that they have personally benefited from the EU-related reforms in Turkey.
- They think that European political and cultural values are compatible with Muslim or Turkish values.
- They feel that they have personally benefited from globalisation and Turkey’s economic and political integration with the outside world.

Finally, the major groups that belonged to the category that we called “Parochial-Ethnic Euro-supportives” showed the following major characteristics:

- They have a pro-Kurdish political orientation. They would vote for the Kurdish nationalist DTP (Party for a Democratic Society), if there were to be a general election tomorrow.
- They did not express an opinion on the questions aimed at measuring the respondents’ self-positioning along the left–right, nationalism, and religiosity lines, on a scale from 1 to 10.
- They did not express an opinion on:
  - Whether they have personally benefited from the reforms made for Turkey’s membership in the EU
  - Whether they think European, Muslim, and national values are compatible
  - Whether Turkey’s social and political conflicts should be resolved by way of compromise and consensus
  - Whether they would support democracy and oppose a military coup
  - Whether they have personally benefited from globalisation and Turkey’s economic and political integration with the outside world.
References


VII. Europe’s Revolt of Populism and the Turkish Question

René Cuperus (Wiardi Beckman Foundation)

“Attacks on the EU-Turkey process became a proxy for popular concerns about immigration, worries about jobs, fears of Islam and a general dissatisfaction with the EU”

Independent Commission on Turkey (2009)\(^{196}\)

A wave of anti-establishment populism is sweeping through Europe. Populist parties are managing to enter the political centre stage. This is partly the result of the breakthrough of former extreme-right parties to the ‘regular right’ of the political spectrum, and the general drift in the European political discourse concerning issues of immigration, multiculturalism and post 9/11 Islam. Populism comes not only from the right, but increasingly from the anti-liberal protectionist left wing as well. In this paper it will be argued that the populist wave points to a more deeply rooted crisis of the political and societal system at large.\(^{197}\)

Western Europe is in the grip of a political identity crisis. The traditional mass parties that have ruled the region at least since the end of the Second World War have lost members, voters, élan, and a monopoly on ideas. A widening gap has opened up between the political and policy elites and large groups within the populations of the continental European welfare states. There is a groundswell of unease in many Western countries, and trust in institutions and politics is at a record low. There are alarming signs of a crisis of political representation.

In the process of reform and adaptation to the New Global World Order, there has been a fundamental breakdown of communication between elites and the general population. The overall discourse of adaptation and competitive adjustment has a strong bias against the lower middle class and non-academic professionals. This bias is one of the root causes for populist resentment and revolt. Public concerns are focussed on disenchantment with the European Project, i.e. the cosmopolitan self-abolition of the nation state; fear for the future of the European welfare state model due to globalisation’s impact on employment patterns; fear of Islam, provoked by Islamist terrorism and by “cultural” integration conflicts; and worries about new waves of immigration on top of already serious segregation problems in the major cities of Europe.

Against this background, the accession of Turkey to the European Union is

---


highly sensitive and delicate, because it is a double-sided identity issue: externally, concerning the identity and boundaries of the European Union; and internally, through immigration and failing integration policies and practices, concerning national identity and social belonging. The Turkish question is at the crossroads of a (perceived, felt or feared) undermining of traditional identities both from within — “parallel societies” in the multi-ethnic nation states of Germany, France, Austria or the Netherlands; and from the outside — a hypernationalist-secular/Islamic state potentially threatening the fragile identity and value-community of the present-day EU.

In the public perception, developments within Turkey do not play a prominent role. Even the current intensified instability between secular and Islamic forces within Turkey, the clash between the AKP and the Court of Justice, do not have a visible impact upon the European public opinion. There is a general lack of knowledge and information about Turkish politics and society, as was the case for all so-called enlargement countries.

To a great extent the question of Turkey’s accession to the EU is a matter of symbols, perceptions, imagery. It is about the politics of fear. Precisely because of this, it is at the very heart of the populist identity crisis of contemporary European societies.

Unease and Discontent

Western Europe’s identity crisis has many facets. The disrupting effects of globalisation, the permanent retrenchment of the welfare states and the development of a “media audience democracy”\(^\text{198}\) are accompanied by fundamental changes in the political party system: the triumph of the floating voter, the unprecedented rise of electoral volatility, and the spectacular rise in the political arena of neo-populist movements. Because the traditional mass parties have been the pillars of both the party-oriented parliamentary system and the welfare state, their slow but steady decline affects European societies as a whole. Due to changes in labour, family and cultural lifestyles, the Christian Democratic (conservative) and Social Democratic parties are being eroded, leaving behind “people’s parties” with shrinking numbers of people. This decline of political representation eats away at the foundations of the European welfare states and European party democracies.

A second ingredient of the European crisis is what might be called the paradox of the Holocaust trauma. Europeans seem unable to cope with the question of ethnic diversity. Intellectual discourse was long characterised by a form of political correctness which praised multiculturalism and “The Foreigner” as

enriching society while turning a blind eye to the de facto segregation and marginalisation of many new immigrants and the stress they placed on the welfare system in many nations. The potential culture conflict between Europe’s liberal-permissive societies and orthodox Islam was also ignored or denied. The established democratic parties reacted to the rise of extreme right, racist parties with a cordon sanitaire, but made the mistake of refusing to address the issues which led to the rise of these parties, i.e. the shadow sides of mass migration and the transformation into a multi-ethnic society: problems of integration and segregation, high unemployment and crime rates; “multicultural discontent”, especially within the constituencies of the people’s parties. These problems did much to provoke a populist-xenophobic reaction. Europe is facing two dilemmas: how to maintain its “communitarian” welfare states under conditions of permanent immigration; and how to balance the extent to which integration patterns in Europe are determined by multiculturalism or assimilation.

A third ingredient of the crisis is widespread unease over the process of European integration. What could be a proud achievement of cosmopolitan cooperation between nations has become, instead, a cause of increasing insecurity and national alienation. This discontent with the European Union has been fuelled considerably by the unintended effects of the so-called European enlargement: the arrival of a series of new East and Central European member states to the EU and by the neoliberal makeup of the Economic Monetary Union.

A fourth component is the fact that much of this discontent has been channelled through the rise of right wing or radical right populist movements and in Europe, unlike the American tradition, populism is more or less associated with fascism and Nazism, the pathologies of the “voice of the masses”. This in itself has added to a sense of crisis.

To sum up: the representation problem of the traditional political party system; the widespread discontent with ill-managed mass migration and the subsequent rapid, radical and unprecedented “multiculturalisation” of European societies; growing unease with the European integration process (not a shield against globalisation, but rather the transmitter and “visible face” of globalisation) — these have all fuelled the political and electoral potential of (right wing) populist movements.

Populism can be defined as a particular style of politics, referring to “the people” as a (falsely understood) homogeneous entity against “a corrupt elite” and in this sense the neo-populist citizens’ revolt in Europe must be understood. This revolt is rooted in the perception that “the people” are being betrayed by the ruling elites. They feel not represented in, but victimised by, the great transformation of (post)modern society, in particular the processes of post industrialisation, multiculturalisation and Europeanization. “Populism can be read as a fever warning which signals that problems are not being dealt with effectively, or points to the
malfunctioning of the linkages between citizens and governing elites.” 199

Many of the new parties that emerged in the last decade of the twentieth century can be called populist because they claim to represent “the people” and to be mobilising them against a domineering Establishment. And they can be classified as right-wing populist because they claim to be defending and shielding national, cultural or ethnic identity against “outsiders” or external influences.

Some of these parties have their origin in extreme-right quarters or have included neo-Nazi or fascist party activists (such as the Haider Party in Austria, the “Vlaams Belang” party in Flanders). Most parties tried to transform themselves (although sometimes just as a cover) into “normal” democratic parties; others cannot be associated at all with “black European history”, especially the Pim Fortuyn party in the Netherlands, which has been called “postmodern populist”, because of its founder’s bricolage of right wing and left wing ideas. One could call this kind of new populism a “third way of the right”, a middle road between the democratic and the undemocratic right, between traditional conservatism on the one hand and the anti-democratic extreme right of the past on the other.200 It has been espoused by Berlusconi (Italy), Blocher (Switzerland), and the late Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands.

It is common in Europe to identify populism with the new radical right parties. But in fact the new anti-globalisation populism is no longer restricted to the relatively small “home constituencies” of the far right parties. The populist discontent with established politics and with the perceived disruptions caused by internationalisation (global neo-liberalism, mass migration, the destruction of national borders) are extending to large parts of the middle class electorate. 201

Therefore, it might be more clarifying to link the trend of neo-populism with a broad, cross-class appeal to protest voters, to the so-called Modernisierungsverlierer (losers of the accelerated process of modernisation). It’s this mix of anti-immigration and anti-globalisation discontent and protest, especially against the “perceived degeneration of representative democracy by privileges of particular groups”, which characterises the new successful European populist revolt.202

This chapter focuses on the widening gap between the political and policy elites and large groups of the population of the continental European welfare states.


201 We might think, for example, of the anti-reform results of the recent Austrian national elections; the French and Dutch “No” vote on the European Constitution; and the electoral penetration of the “Vlaams Belang” party in Flanders or Le Pen in France. Recent polls in Le Monde suggest that up to 25% of the French electorate agree with the basic ideas of Le Pen.

There is widespread unease in many countries, a lack of trust in institutions and politics, a crisis of confidence and a crisis of political representation.\textsuperscript{203} The disturbing thing is that these signs of distrust and unease can be encountered not only in countries which have postponed welfare state reform (the German and French disease), but also in countries which have actually carried through reform programmes, such as Denmark, Austria or the Netherlands. The ever-growing pan-European presence of populist movements on both the right and the left, which often appear following a reform of the welfare state, serves as a grim reminder of the crisis of confidence which besets the established political scene.\textsuperscript{204}

The pressures of adaptation to the new globalised world weigh particularly heavy on those who do not fit into the new international knowledge-based economy, the unskilled and the low-skilled. This bias against the lower middle class and non-academic professionals is a root cause of populist resentment and revolt. Rather than representing security and stable leadership in a world of flux, political elites are peddling insecurity and uncertainty. With the exception of some Scandinavian countries, European policy elites have shown no pride in the stability of the welfare state in times of change and reform. This ambivalence about the very foundations of the European welfare state model is producing populist unrest.

However, unease and distrust in contemporary European society must be located at more levels than just that of welfare state reform. We are experiencing a shift right across the board. The magic of the post-war period is over: the post-war ideal of European unification, the welfare state model and the post-Holocaust tolerance for the Foreigner, all seem to be eroding under pressure. The overall process of internationalisation is producing a shortfall of trust and representation between elites and populations around questions of cultural and national identity. This essay will take a closer look at precisely this complex of problems, the new populist condition of contemporary politics, especially in relation to the question of immigration, integration and the question of the Turkish accession.

A Pan-European Populist Revolt

In the wave of anti-establishment populism, populist parties of left and right are


becoming more and more successful in local and national elections. Populism was seen as the main trigger of the “No” vote in the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution. A populist discourse and agenda are taking over mainstream politics in many European countries, not least in post-communist East and Central Europe. In Western Europe, establishment parties, especially those on the right, are copying populist themes and messages, producing a powerful cocktail of cultural conservatism, nationalism, Euroscepticism and latent or manifest xenophobia.205

As noted above, the core characteristic of this so-called new populism is that groups and movements no longer identify the structural conflict in modern society and politics as being between left and right, but as between “the people” and “the elite”, both perceived as homogeneous groups.206 But it is more complex than that. We can differentiate at least three faces of populism.

Formerly, populism was exclusively associated with right wing movements, populism being a euphemism for radical right racism or aggressive xenophobia. This is the first type. A second type of populism can be labelled “media populism”, or populism as a new style of communication politics. In the new information society and “mass media democracy”, with ideological differences between the parties shrinking, populism is increasingly becoming the dominant style of politics. Through election campaigns and communication strategies (spin doctors) political leaders are trying to connect to mass audiences and electorates for vote maximisation and popular approval. In a way, modern democracies are doomed to be populist in this sense.207

In the third sense — and this essay concentrates on this dimension (which sometimes overlaps with the first dimension) — the new populist revolt can be characterised as a revolt against the New Global World, as conceived and promoted by the mainstream political, cultural and economic elites, and driven by the international forces of economic liberalism and cultural liberalism.

The biggest risk for contemporary societies is the breakdown of social cohesion under the attack by populism. What is at stake is the fragmentation of society into two camps: a cleavage between academic professionals and semi-skilled workers, between highly educated and less educated, between cosmopolitan and nationalistic or libertarian and authoritarian orientations. We are increasingly facing a fragmentation within the middle class society, as a result of the forces of

205 The conservative-liberal VVD in the Netherlands is split between a traditional liberal wing and a new right populist wing under the leadership of Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk; also inside the German Christian Democrats, right wing populist voices can be heard, especially at Bundesland-level.


globalisation, mass migration, individualisation and the post-industrial knowledge-based economy.

What is fundamentally under attack is the social cohesion, the social fabric, the solidarity of our societies. What could be under attack is the European social model.

In facing the challenge from populism, one should be (paraphrasing former British Prime Minister Tony Blair) tough on populism and tough on the causes of populism. Populism is a concept with a Janus-head. On the one hand, European populism — unlike the American equivalent — is a dangerous political animal, associated with fascism and Nazism, the pathologies of the “voice of the masses”. On the other hand, populism can also be a legitimate warning against technocratic policy making, against the bias towards the academic professionals in the world of politics, against new inequalities, and the failures of representative democracy. In this sense of the word, populism should not be demonised, but taken seriously. Populism might act as an alarm, signalling a crisis of representation, a communication breakdown between elites and ordinary people. It is a sign of popular distrust and discontent.

The process of economic and cultural modernisation results in a new social polarisation between winners and losers. Economic changes associated with globalisation and new technologies do not have the same effect on everybody but result in a redistribution of opportunities for participation and success. The level of education, in particular, pre-determines individuals’ life-chances, their confidence in politics and public institutions and their expectations of the future. In the process of reform and adaptation to this new global world order, there has been a fundamental breakdown of trust between the elites and the general population, creating a deep cleavage between winners and losers, between future-optimists and future-pessimists. A new dividing line is emerging between those who embrace the future and those who fear it, people who believe that the new world holds nothing good in store for them and who feel betrayed by the political elite. This is both a cultural-political cleavage and a social-economic class divide. On the right, this new division creates a breeding ground for anti-immigrant right-populist parties; on the left it provides a basis for more traditional or left-populist parties.

The Paradox of National Boundaries

The existence of a “New Populist European Revolt” has been empirically demonstrated by a research team from the Universities of Zurich and Munich, under the leadership of Hans Peter Kriesi. In a comparison of six European countries, they conclude that “the current process of globalisation or denationalisation leads to

---

the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, opposing those who benefit from this process against those who tend to lose in the course of events”. They observe a structural opposition between so-called globalisation “winners” and “losers”, which is transforming the basic national political space. “We consider those parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of the ‘losers’ of globalisation to be the driving force of the current transformation of the Western European party systems” (p.920).

Kriesi et al. assume that:

“The processes of increasing economic (sectoral and international) competition, of increasing cultural competition (which is, among other things, linked to massive immigration of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European populations) and of increasing political competition (between nation-states and supra- or international political actors) create new groups of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The likely winners include entrepreneurs and qualified workers in sectors open to international competition as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens. The expected losers, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, and unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community” (p. 923) On the subject of national boundaries, Kriesi et al. note an interesting paradox: “the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries renders them politically more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance increases”. They therefore expect globalisation losers to support protectionist measures, stressing the importance of national boundaries and independence. On the other hand, winners, who benefit from the increased competition, tend to support the opening up of national boundaries and the process of international integration. The new antagonism between winners and losers of globalisation is labelled the conflict between integration and demarcation.209 Kriesi’s main argument is that this conflict represents a new political cleavage emerging from the process of denationalisation, which is influencing the political space, the supply side of politics. The traditional left/right class conflict around social-economic politics — the regulation of the market and social protection by the welfare state — and the traditional cultural conflict around religion and libertarian post-materialist values and identity issues of the new social movements are now extended and complicated by the new cleavage of integration versus demarcation. The new demarcation/integration conflict will be embedded within a two-dimensional basic structure, as Kriesi puts it:

“On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the classical opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position .... The pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protectionist .... On the cultural dimension, we expect enhanced opposition to cultural liberalism of the new social movements as a result of the ethnicisation of politics: the defence of tradition is expected to increasingly take on an ethnic or nationalist character. ...

209 Ibid., 922.
The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterised by an opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration; these are issues which correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization.\textsuperscript{210}

Kriesi et al. suggest that: “in Western Europe, a) mainstream parties will generally tend to formulate a winners’ programme (i.e. a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration), but that b) mainstream parties on the left will attempt to combine the economic integration with the preservation of the social protection by the welfare state, while mainstream parties on the right will tend to reduce the role of the state in every respect…. Left wing mainstream parties may also face the dilemma that market integration in Europe (and more globally) poses a threat to their national social achievements. In those countries where mainstream parties tend to moderately opt for the winners’ side, we face an increasing political fragmentation, with the strengthening of peripheral actors, who tend to adopt a ‘losers’ programme: i.e. on the right a culturally more protectionist stance, on the left a socially and economically more protectionist stance” (p.928).

According to the Convergence thesis, the convergence of the major parties will be compensated for by the emergence of new parties.\textsuperscript{211} Kriesi et al. see the radical left’s opposition to the opening up of borders as mainly an opposition to economic liberalisation. The populist right’s opposition is protectionist on the cultural dimension, to preserve the national identity:

“The main characteristics of this ‘national-populism’ are its xenophobia or even racism, expressed in a fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants, and its populist appeal to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the dominant political elites. Given the heterogeneous economic interests of the ‘losers’ of denationalisation, the defence of their national identity and their national community constitutes the smallest common denominator for their political mobilisation.. This could explain why the populist right’s appeal to the losers is more convincing than that of the radical left.”\textsuperscript{212}

\textbf{A World in Flux}

In my own work, I arrived at the same conclusion as Kriesi and his colleagues, seeing populism as the protest vehicle of losers of the current modernisation process. Populism or protectionism or “politics of demarcation” may be analysed as reactions of fear and discontent to globalisation, denationalisation or detraditionalisation. It should be understood as a revolt against economic and

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 924.
\textsuperscript{212} Kriesi, et al., “Globalisation and the Transformation of the National Political Space,” 929.
cultural liberalism, against the ideology of the modern internationalised professional elites, which embraces the universalistic, cosmopolitan global village without boundaries and distinctions. This revolt is at the core of the new populism, both in its moderate version (legitimate resistance to a rapidly changing world) and in its darker side, which includes xenophobia, racism or aggressive nationalism.

Indeed, we live in perilous times. History teaches us that the acceleration of a modernisation process is often accompanied by counter movements, not infrequently of a violent or dangerous nature. The process of modernisation is a story of trends and countertrends, movements and counter movements. The Industrial Revolution and the evolution of the modern liberal society ultimately produced democracy and prosperity, but also totalitarian pathologies such as Communism and National Socialism.

We are once again in a period of hypermodernisation. All the signals suggest fundamental change, transition and transformation — globalisation; European unification; the ICT revolution; the development of a post-industrial knowledge economy; immigration and the rise of multi-ethnic societies; individualisation and social fragmentation; environmental degradation; a commercial entertainment revolution in the media; geopolitical power shifts at the global level; international terrorism linked to political Islam.

This points to a world in flux, placing traditional institutions and attitudes under great pressure. As noted above, such a process of change produces both optimism and pessimism — fear and unease exist alongside a sense of adventure and spirit of enterprise. Divisions are appearing not only between winners and losers, but also between countries and within countries: China and India versus Japan, the Arab world and Africa; Ireland, Poland, Finland and the UK against France, Germany and Italy. And within countries: young, well-educated double-income earners in the “exposed” private sector against older, less well-educated industrial workers and immigrants who are discriminated against on the labour market. New inequalities and polarisations are being produced. Van Kersbergen and Krouwel describe this division between those who greet the future, and those who fear it:

“On the one side is the group of people enjoying a reasonable measure of protection, who are neither insecure nor anxious. They see the market as an opportunity for progress, they view the unification of Europe as a success, they live alongside rather than within the multicultural society, they have a strong, individualised lifestyle and are not interested in the neighbourhood as a centre for solidarity and social control. They feel perfectly safe and secure and their individual prosperity gives them the means they need to avoid contact with the degenerating public domains and services. They usually cope well with bureaucracy and feel competent in their dealings with the various branches of government. They view the established political parties as legitimate organisations for shaping the democratic process, but consider them totally irrelevant in terms of their personal lifestyles.

On the other side are the people who fear the future and feel threatened by
the market, European expansion, continuing immigration and the multicultural society, the collapse of the social infrastructure, the loss of the tradition of helping your neighbours and solidarity in working-class areas, the internationalisation of the economy, the inadequate safety of the public domain and the deterioration of public services. They live in the midst of the multicultural society and have experienced enormous change in the social relations that used to form part of their lives. The monoculture of working-class neighbourhoods with a high degree of social control has made way for multicultural ‘deprived’ neighbourhoods. This group of people has lost all confidence in the traditional political parties, because they do not see them as organisations that represent their interests, but as part of the failing state machinery. Government is perceived as the opponent or the enemy. In the eyes of this frightened, insecure part of the electorate, all their problems are directly linked to the arrival of the foreigners. The presence of foreigners has allowed globalisation to become a concrete reality, and all the associated dangers (the disappearance of low-paid jobs, the undermining of national identity) have been personified. 213

Identity Issues: Europe and the Multicultural Society

The problem of social unease and distrust regarding the reform of the welfare state, and the demarcation line between future-optimists and future-pessimists is strongly related to the issue of threatened identity. In Europe, the welfare state is an identity issue in itself. In many European countries after the Second World War, a progressive view of national identity arose around the concept of the welfare state. This may be described as “welfare chauvinism”, which is a “civil religion” of communitarianism associated with the national solidarity of welfare state arrangements in countries like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands or Germany.

In Europe people thought that with the European social model (the sum of national social welfare states), they had achieved something resembling Francis Fukuyama’s End of History: the apogee of human civilisation, the social paradise on a human scale, the final mental stage of social politics. This self-assurance has suffered a major blow now that the welfare state is coming under serious pressure (from within and without 214). This is not just a question of slimming-down the welfare state, but involves its very foundations, its sustainability and thus its continued existence.

The European self-image has been shaken so strongly that even the contrast with the American capitalist model is no longer proudly and unanimously supported. This is causing identity problems. The consequences of globalisation,

modernisation, Europeanisation and immigration for the well-being of the welfare state have repercussions at the level of national identity and societal self-image. For this reason we cannot afford to ignore feelings of national identity in the debate on the European Social Model. Only in this way can we understand the unease which is spreading so alarmingly in Europe and acting as a political and mental block to reforms, be they necessary or not.

By broaching the subject of national identity we are venturing onto thin ice. Historically thin ice, in that, in its dark incarnation, nationalism is an extremely dangerous raw material with the very worst of antecedents. And politically thin ice, as there is a taboo on this theme in progressive academic circles. Just as for Thatcher there was “no such thing as society”, so for the cosmopolitan intellectual there is “no such thing as a nation state or national identity”. For those who like to regard themselves as post-national cosmopolitan global citizens, national identity is a fiction, a dangerous, vulgar, populist, reactionary, collective construction. William Pfaff puts it this way: “The conventional political wisdom since World War II has identified nationalism with fascism. Fascism and Nazism both were nationalist historical moments, but nationalism is not fascism or Nazism. The US at this moment is arguably the most nationalistic country on earth.”

Especially centre-left and social democratic parties have long been embarrassed by this type of cultural theme. Yet it seems neither wise nor advisable for progressives to deny the “lived reality” of national identities and thus to allow this issue to become the monopoly of the right. In fact it is the task of progressives to develop an open, hospitable, non-xenophobic definition of national identity: a greater “us”. National solidarity, the moral foundation of any welfare democracy, cannot survive without this.

There is a tension between these “national” communitarian values and the ongoing trend of internationalisation. This involves a double “integration issue” — the integration of the nation states in the European Union, and the integration of

---

215 William Pfaff, “What’s Left of the Union?,” *New York Review of Books* September 2005. To quote more extensively: “Nationalism is an expression of the intense need for affirmation of national or communal identity as the anchor of individual identity. It is one of the fundamental forces at work in political societies, giving them meaning. It is also one of the ‘strong’ forces in the physics of international relations, if not the strongest. It overrides short-term deviation or distraction. Although it may accompany high-minded internationalism, it does not readily yield to it; the repressed returns. For this reason nationalism has to be accommodated, not stubbornly resisted.”


immigrants within these the nation states. Here the issues of European integration and the multicultural society are interlocked.

**European Integration: The Revenge of National Identity**

For many, the EU is seen as the heavy-handed transmitter or accelerator of globalisation and liberalisation; it is seen as the shears used to keep the member states uniformly trimmed.

This has made Europe — and this is the real crux of the matter — into more of a problem than a solution. This is what I will call the “nationalism paradox” of European unification. The original objective of European cooperation was to transcend the aggressive nationalism of the 19th century, which in the following century resulted so catastrophically in two world wars. But with its current changes of form (expansion in size, introduction of a neo-liberal currency union, a “superstate” Constitution, technocratic centralisation and regulatory spill-over) the EU would seem to have reached a critical boundary. Strong national counter forces have been generated and, like a magician’s apprentice, Europe is now the unintended producer of the very nationalism which it aimed to transcend. People are unwilling to give up their country for an imaginary ever closer and ever bigger — as referendum exit-poll research in France, the Netherlands and Ireland has clearly demonstrated.218

**The Multicultural Society: A Disruptive Concept**

“For some time I have been thinking that the Europeans, and especially the Dutch, have had their heads stuck in the sand. It now seems clear to me that the entire concept of the multicultural society has been a serious mistake. What has been achieved is not something like a liberal society, but a collection of groups who don’t talk to each other. You can’t call that a nation, I think”, remarked Francis Fukuyama during a recent visit to the Netherlands.219

The term multicultural society, however inviting it is intended to be for incoming immigrant groups, has done a lot of damage. It is at odds with the quite successful integration, acculturation and assimilation patterns which we can observe over generations in true immigration countries such as America and Australia, in terms of employment, equality, social and political inclusion. The concept has also seriously dented support for immigration among autochthonous

---


219 Interview in Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant*, 17 September 2005.
populations, leading instead to xenophobia and resentment.\textsuperscript{220}

The multiculturalism concept, as used by post-national cosmopolitans, suggests that the autochthonous population is no more and no less than one of the “multicultures”, a minority among the minorities. In the longer term, this may indeed be a lived reality in some cities (and assuming that the processes of integration, emancipation and acculturation have succeeded, this need not present any problems), but applying such a normative imperative description at the start of a mass immigration process is probably the most confrontational way of organising race relations\textsuperscript{221} between established populations and newcomers. It is unsettling and potentially disruptive for the host society. In this respect I share the view of Prospect’s Editor-in-Chief David Goodhart; it is disproportionate to imagine that:

“Britain must radically adapt its majority way of life or reach out to meet the newcomers halfway. … But in the nature of things most of the adaptation will, initially, be on the side of the newcomers who have chosen to live in an already existing society with a majority way of life and at least some sense of itself. … It’s important that newcomers acknowledge that Britain is not just a random collection of individuals, and that they are joining a nation which, although hard to describe, is something real.” \textsuperscript{222}

The breakdown in communication regarding the core idea of multiculturalism between the politically correct elite of minority experts, highly educated representatives and immigrant organisations, on the one hand, and the average population, on the other hand, has (perhaps unnecessarily) caused much damage. Prompted by legitimate feelings of guilt about Western colonialism, racism, apartheid and the Holocaust, the counter reaction has taken the form of heightened attention and respect for the cultural ethnicity, individual qualities and group culture of minorities/immigrants, accompanied by at best a denial of the group culture and ethnicity of the autochthonous majority.

It is this multicultural illusion — a clear deviation from lived reality — which drove many “ordinary people” into the arms of highly dubious parties. Initially, small numbers were drawn towards extreme right wing, racist parties (which in the 1980s agitated against the idea of multiculturalism), but more recently there has been a drift towards large populist right wing movements such as those of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Hagen in Norway and Kjaersgeld in Denmark. Now mainstream politicians, experts and social scientists (after a delay of some 20 years!) have arrived at the same conclusion regarding multiculturalism. But David Goodhart is still forced to conclude, about one of the most burning contemporary social issues,


\textsuperscript{221} “Race relations” is a problematic term for many Europeans, conveying as it does nationalist and even Nazi associations. The whole concept and terminology of race are rarely used in Europe, but are hidden under layers of history.

that “at present there is a large conceptual and linguistic space between racism, at one end, and liberal cosmopolitanism, at the other. Most people reside in this middle space but it is empty of words for us to describe our feelings.” What should not be underestimated is the extent to which many European countries are facing a creeping revolt by parts of their autochthonous populations, reaching deep into the (non-racist) middle classes, a slow-burning but stubborn fire, against both the optimistic idea and the segregated reality of the multicultural society. This revolt is not always expressed in voting patterns, due either to the nature of the electoral system (as in the UK), or to a massive historical burden (as in Germany), or to a lack of corresponding parties to vote for, as in the Netherlands, where no anti-multicultural party has appeared on the left of the spectrum. But make no mistake: voter research in the Netherlands, for instance (a country whose low level of national identity consciousness is both proverbial and also repeatedly indicated in comparative European studies) shows that a large (70%) majority rejects multiculturalism and believes that minorities should adjust to “the Dutch culture”. In the research (see Table), respondents were asked to position themselves on a sliding scale between two extreme propositions concerning the degree to which immigrants should be expected to retain their own culture or integrate into the host country’s culture. In contrast to what political correctness has prescribed for decades, the great majority of the Dutch population is in fact “uniculturalist”. This means that people want and expect cultural minorities to adapt (up to a certain point) to the culture of the host country (see table 1).

Table 1: Multiculturalism versus Uniculturalism in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Sliding scale</th>
<th>Response in 1994 (%)</th>
<th>Response in 2002 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants and ethnic minorities are allowed to stay in the Netherlands with maintenance of all customs of their own culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants and ethnic minorities must adapt completely to Dutch culture</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

223 Ibid., 172.
In the words of the researchers:

“This table shows that already in 1994 there was little support for multiculturalism under the Dutch population. In those days more than 60 percent already had the opinion that minorities should adapt to ‘the Dutch culture’ (positions 5, 6 and 7). … In 2002 the overall climate further moved into the direction of uniculturalism (70 percent and only 14 percent supporting multiculturalism). So based on the majority opinion of the Dutch electorate in 1994 already a lot of support existed in 1994 in favour of a uniculturalistic policy towards immigrants.” 226

And the Turkish Question?

The Netherlands is fairly representative of a group of countries in Continental Europe which includes Germany, France and Austria. These countries have large Turkish migrant communities; at the same time, opinion polls in these countries show clear majorities having quite negative attitudes towards Turkish EU membership. Why is this? How to explain this coincidence?

As noted before,, the accession of Turkey to the European Union must be considered highly sensitive and delicate, because it poses a double-sided identity issue: externally, concerning the identity and boundaries of the European Union; and internally — through immigration and failing integration — regarding national identity and social belonging. The Turkish question is at the centre of the dispute about the presumed problematic erosion of traditional identities, both from within and from the outside.

In the public perception of most Europeans, developments in Turkey itself, such as instability between secular and Islamic forces within Turkey, such as the clash between the AKP and the Court of Justice, do not play a major role. There is a general lack of knowledge and information about Turkish politics and society, which is comparable to the lack of knowledge and information about all other enlargement countries.

There might also be a mistaken belief that the concern of the general public in Europe over Turkish accession is related to foreign policy issues, such as the problem of Cyprus or the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria or the case of the Armenian genocide. However, these are the topics of the international policy community, the concerns of the political elites. The general population, in sharp contrast, is dealing with an overall disenchantment with the European Project, with uncertainty about the future of the European welfare state model, worries about globalisation and mass unemployment, fear of Islam and fundamentalist terrorism, anxieties about new waves of immigration when there are already serious

the propositions read: “allochtonen en etnische minderheden moeten in Nederland kunnen blijven met behoud van alle gewoonten van de eigen cultuur”, and “allochtonen en etnische minderheden moeten zich volledig aanpassen aan de Nederlandse cultuur” (ibid., 235).

226 Ibid., 235. Translation by René Cuperus.
integration problems in the major cities of Europe. In this gloomy worldview, Turkish accession symbolizes overstretch and overkill in all these aspects.

The paradox is that although there are strong (negative) sentiments about Turkish accession, as opinion polls show again and again, there has not been any real public debate on Turkey, let alone an informed debate, in countries such as the Netherlands. What passes for a debate on Turkey is really a fracture line between the political elites — the policy makers and decision makers — and the general public. While the establishment of politics, academia and journalism is overall in favour of Turkish accession, the majority opinion in society is against. The clash over the Turkish question is thus by and large a clash between government reports, academic research and newspaper articles versus polls and statistics.

So there is hardly any real debate about Turkey’s accession to the EU, and yet a majority of the French, Germans, Dutch, Italians and Austrians seem to oppose Turkish EU membership. Why so? What lies behind these sentiments? The two main reasons mentioned in opinion polls are that Turkey is not a European country, and that Turkey — being Islamic — does not fit within the EU. This is a variation of the remark made by French President Sarkozy: “If Turkey would have been a European country, we would have known before”. Research suggests that this attitude towards Turkey is fuelled by a number of basic fears. It is worth stressing again that this has little to do with Turkey itself; people in Europe don’t know much about Turkish history and Turkish politics. The fears and insecurities are all about issues of identity which are stirred up by the idea of Turkish membership of the EU. At the heart of the matter are insecurities about the direction, scope and boundaries of Europe, and insecurities about the future of the multi-ethnic societies in Europe. Let us take a closer look at each of these, starting with unease over Europe. Disenchantment with the European Project or what I have called elsewhere “New Euroscepticism in Old Europe”, is one of the main ingredients of anti-Turkish public opinion.

1. Insecurity about Europe

In my analysis of the massive Dutch “No” vote in the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty, (Cuperus 2005) I developed the metaphor of a hurtling train. This image has recently been confirmed in official focus group research by the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The metaphor goes like this.

*For ordinary people, the present European Union is a train that is blindly gathering speed. Not long ago, ten new carriages were coupled to the train. It is uncertain whether more new carriages will be added and if so, how many. The Dutch passengers are wondering if this will affect the stability of the train as a whole. Confusion reigns on board the train: nobody seems to know the exact route,*

---

227 ‘Nicolas Sarkozy in Quotes’: www.guardian.co.uk
the train is passing through strange, unfamiliar stations and the final destination remains a mystery. The fact that some passengers have had to pay more for their tickets than others is a source of considerable irritation. And as is so often the case in life, the most forthright passengers with the most to say are getting the best end of the deal.

A conductor who vaguely resembles a French President is patrolling the train. Every now and then, he allows the passengers a glimpse of a new railway timetable with new regulations and new prices. It appears to be an unreadable, incomprehensible ‘telephone book’, full of stipulations and protocols, vague and open to interpretation, which mainly causes resentment and distrust amongst the passengers.

Rumours are rife on the train. It would appear that the passengers are not going to be allowed to get off. People may never see their homes again. Alarm and panic spread like wildfire. At a complete loss, the French and Dutch passengers pull the communication cord. It is time for a break. It is time to stop and take stock of the speed, direction and length of the train. Is the journey still mind-broadening and justified, or is it starting to constitute a serious risk? The metaphor is basically a story about losing grip, about lack of direction and conviction. This sense of being out of control is causing serious discontent about the EU, and other factors have added to the disappointment. For example, the Single Market and European Monetary Union did not deliver: they did not solve the problem of mass unemployment, and the euro made life much more expensive in many countries. Socio-economic insecurity is widespread, especially in Germany and France: fears around globalisation, unemployment, outsourcing and “delocation” are not being allayed. Europe is traditionally an elite project. Because of the overall problems of trust and representation within national political systems (the phenomenon of mass parties without masses) in a lot of member states, elites are no longer supported as easily as they were. To what extent can leaders nowadays count on being followed? How many unpopular policies and dossiers will the population swallow?

The EU itself is an example of a risky elite adventure: what we might call integration by stealth. The same applies to enlargement and the Turkish question: the public see this as enlargement by stealth, or incomprehensible salami-tactics over generations in the case of Turkey. People do not feel involved or engaged. To the contrary: they distrust their political and expert elites more and more. In the eyes of many, the European adventure has become the victim of imperial overstretch in the form of the seemingly endless expansion, the EMU, the Constitution for a new Superstate, and so on. People also feel betrayed by the EU. Europe has not been a protective shield against globalisation and liberalisation, but instead has acted as the neo-liberal transmitter of these processes: enlargement as a source of cheap labour.

The EU is also perceived as the perpetrator of uniformity. Far from being the umbrella under which the rich European diversity could flourish, the short-sighted regulations and restrictions accompanying the internal market are damaging
national specialities and traditions, from German beer to Dutch social housing, and from Swedish pharmacies to French cheese. The whole Eurocratic view of the future focuses, consciously or unconsciously, on a European Superstate-structure.

In the master-narrative, nation states are declared dead and buried. They are unable to survive on their own in the new global world order. So we must form a strong European Union that is able to compete with the economic and geopolitical power of America, China and India. This master-narrative about a strong Europe and the self-dissolution of the nation state is precisely what is causing so much concern, as people worry about the lack of respect for national and cultural diversity in the European discourse.

This is a potentially dangerous situation. A cosmopolitan, post-nationalist elite is perceived to be casually dismissing the nation state and national identity, at the very time that many people are clutching onto those notions as their last elements of security and sources of identity in a world of flux. This kind of cosmopolitan response also ignores the highly polarising forces that are currently at work in society, and which are affecting various groups in very different ways. It fails to recognise the highly unstable socio-cultural and political climate in Europe, symbolised by the pan-European emergence of right wing (and to a lesser extent left wing) populism. It does so at its peril.

Europe is thus a much more vulnerable project than the elites seem to realise. The EU cannot thrive on endless new adventures. The accession of Turkey might prove to be one such wild adventure which would threaten the integrity and survival of the European Union itself. Such was the judgement of the French and Dutch electorates in their referenda. The EU is not an international aid or development agency; it is not aimed at reconciling civilisations (or supporting American foreign policy aims). The Dutch and French votes reflect the intuition that the first obligation of any political society, whether national or multinational, is to itself, its own security, integrity, and successful functioning. The EU has to be a success if it is to have a constructive influence on others, and this is what seems to be in jeopardy. As a success it may radiate its influence to neighbouring societies through many forms of more or less intimate association — but not through full membership.228

The start of EU negotiations with Turkey under the Dutch Presidency coincided with the moment that the EU entered its existential crisis. With the French and Dutch voting against the European Constitutional Treaty, Europe turned out to be a much more vulnerable project than anticipated. Without guaranteed popular support, the EU is a giant on clay feet. The continuation of the negotiations will take place against the background of a mood of fear, unease and pessimism within a lot of member states. It would perhaps be an understatement to say that Turkish accession might be the victim of a huge timing problem.

2. The Problem of Multicultural Integration

The second complex of fears and anxieties surrounding the issue of identity is related to the idea and practice of multi-ethnic societies. As already noted, the debate about the Turkish entry represents questions of identity or belonging — who are we? how can we live together? — for both immigrants and native Europeans. The Turkish question raises issues about the undermining of traditional identities, both from within and from the outside. It is also a sensitive issue for the Turks themselves. Saying “no” to Turkey’s accession seems to be the same as saying “no” to having Turks in European countries. This is most certainly not the case, but there is inevitably a strong emotional connection.

Furthermore, Turkey considers itself (to some extent quite rightly) to be a modern secular society. In the debate, however, Turkey is approached both by supporters and opponents of Turkish EU membership as a Muslim Country, even as a bridgehead to the Arab world. British Minister Jack Straw, speaking on BBC television, called the political falsification of the Clash of Civilisations (the Huntington Thesis) the main reason for Turkish accession, thereby underpinning the “Muslim” character of Turkey. This is a delicate matter for the Turkish self-image, and for the debate within Turkey between the old Kemalist elites and the new AK elites.

Adding to this mix of sensitivities is the pitiful state of European multi-ethnic societies. One might have expected that in those countries with large Turkish migrant communities, the knowledge and understanding of Turkey and the Turkish way of life would have been the most advanced, and that this would have resulted in solid support for accession. Sadly, the contrary is true.

In the Netherlands for instance, the Turks, although they are doing relatively well in employment and business, form the ethnic group which is least integrated into Dutch society. The resulting “parallel societies”, the lack of integration, and the relatively high crime rates in these areas, are reducing support for accession instead of stimulating it. Recent research showed that 50% of the native Dutch population think that the Muslim way of life is not compatible with the Western, Dutch way of life; the same research shows that 50% of Turkish migrants have the same opinion. There is very little inter-marriage, and there are few intercultural contacts. 229

In the end it is as simple as this: as long as the integration record of Turkish migrants in countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Austria continues to be so problematic, there will be no majoritarian popular support for Turkey’s EU membership, no big welcome party for Turkey in the EU. For the general public of Europeans, Turkish accession has little to do with the Copenhagen criteria, but everything to do with the Berlin-Kreuzberg criteria, the Rotterdam Criteria, the

---

Evreux criteria or the Vienna criteria! It’s all about the “integration and living well together” criteria. Domestic politics, not foreign politics!

Thus the main antagonism to Turkish membership stems from serious integration problems in European societies, and bears very little relation to developments in Turkey itself. Turkish minority groups in Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands are perceived as representative of Turkey as a whole. Of course, this is not at all fair to Turkey, but this is the hard fact of popular perception and public opinion and should be the main focus for informed political debate.

To Conclude

To sum up: opposition towards Turkish accession to the EU has only partly to do with Turkey itself. A lot of discontent and unease in present-day Europe can be explained by developments within the EU itself, such as disenchantment with the neoliberal and technocratic-centralist makeup of the European Project and concern about the future of the welfare state model in the new globalisation era. Or by national settings, such as integration problems, multicultural discontent, and fragmentation caused by individualisation.

Finally, one could also argue that both the elites and the general public perceive Turkey as a risk factor. These are fears which overlap: the fear evoked by the Huntington Thesis, the Clash of Civilisations, and the fear that Islamic value systems and Western liberal value systems may be incompatible or conflicting. This is the overlapping fear of both the elites and the population, but their responses differ: the elites want to overcome this fear, and want to falsify the Huntington Thesis by Turkish EU membership – the final inclusion of a “Muslim” country in the western democratic value community. The majority of the non-elite respond in protectionist terms: they don’t want to support the Turkish adventure, because of economic fears and immigration fears. Only time will tell whether the elites or the general population are proven right.

Concluding Observations

This essay has examined unease and popular distrust, an unstable undercurrent in European society, with particular reference to the issue of threatened identity and the Turkish question. In dealing with the theme of national identity I ventured into treacherous terrain, certainly for centre-left progressives who mostly prefer to sing a post-national cosmopolitan and laconic multiculturalist melody. National identity is understood in a broad sense, as it is typically the social model of the post-war welfare state and the social market economy which form a substantial part of the positive self-image of various European populations.

The unease is to be found in the perception of threat and undermining of
national characteristics through processes of internationalisation: the globalisation of production of goods and services, as well as capital markets, and the apparently boundless European unification on the one hand; and a seemingly uncontrollable immigration and the development of multi-ethnic societies with problems of integration, segregation and multicultural “confusion” on the other.

Research shows that, with the exception of Britain until 2005, immigration has become the most salient and most polarising issue for Europe since the 1970s. In some eurosceptic countries (Switzerland, Britain and the Netherlands), the question of European unification is also part of the new political-cultural conflict. According to Kriesi et al., this cultural dimension has become the primary basis on which new political parties, or transformed established parties, seek to mobilise their electorate.\(^{230}\)

Contrary to the call of the ultra-modern pundits who advocate the self-abolition of the nation state in favour of new regional power centres, unstable and dislocating undercurrents in European society require not only prudence in modernisation and innovation but also the rehabilitation of and return to the nation state as a forum for the restoration of trust, an anchor in uncertain times, a renewed test case for socio-economic performance, and a source of social cohesion between the less- and the better educated, between immigrants and the autochthonous population. The restoration of trust between politicians and citizens will, first and foremost, have to take place at the national level, as will the creation of a harmonious multi-ethnic society. Europe must facilitate this process, not obstruct it. In other words, the future of the EU, the European Social Model and a harmonious multi-ethnic society lies with the nation state. The motto for the coming period of transition is therefore: \textit{How the nation states must rescue the European Union and the multicultural society!} \(^{231}\)

[Parts of this paper/essay have been published in: Policy Network, \textit{Rethinking Immigration and Integration: a New Centre-Left Agenda}, London, UK, 2007]

\textbf{References}


\(^{230}\) HansPeter Kriesi et al., “Globlization and the Transformation of the National Political Space”, 950.


PART E
DISCONTENT AND DISTRUST
The “soft power” of the European Union (EU) — its ability to attract and persuade countries to adopt its norms and goals — has united most of the European states on the basis of the principles of “democracy, human rights, rule of law, respect for and protection of minorities”. It has transformed Europe into a bastion of peace and prosperity in the world. Enlargement, through the extension of membership to an increasing number of European countries, has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool. The conditions laid down by the EU for membership have helped transform both the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and the totalitarian regimes of Central and Eastern Europe into stable market democracies.

The prospect of EU membership, especially with the declaration of its candidacy for membership in December 1999, greatly encouraged Turkey to liberalise its democracy and modernise its economy along EU norms and standards, leading to the start of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. Since then, however, with increasingly negative signals coming from the EU regarding the future of the relationship, the reform process has largely stalled. As the hopes of EU membership have faded in the minds of many, including the Turkish elites, Turkey has, since the summer of 2007, faced a series of political crises that question whether Turkey has achieved the stability of institutions “guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”, which is the requirement for pursuing accession negotiations. Turkey may thus be seen as a test case for the impact of the EU’s soft power — or lack of it — on candidate countries.

In this paper, I will first present a brief overview of the relationship between Turkey and the EU since its beginnings in the early 1960s. Secondly, on the basis of that overview, I will show how the fluctuating credibility of the prospects of EU membership, or the EU’s soft power over Turkey, have affected the political and economic transformation of the country. I will then discuss the factors behind falling domestic support for EU accession, and possible scenarios for the future of the Turkey–EU relationship, together with their probable consequences for Turkey.

232 “Soft power” was to the concept developed by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in his book entitled “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”.
Turkey’s relations with what was to become the EU in 1992, began with the signing of an Association Treaty with the EEC in 1963 which envisaged a stage by stage integration, including the establishment of a customs union. The treaty also included a “membership option clause” that involved a vague promise of full membership in the future. Ankara’s motivation for signing the treaty was primarily to prevent Greece, which had signed a similar agreement in 1961, from gaining an unfair advantage in its relations with Europe. At the time, Turkey was pursuing an import substitution development strategy, based on state-led and tariff-protected industrialisation. Its political and economic elites were not truly interested in European integration, while negative attitudes prevailed among its intellectual elites. When Greece applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1975, Turkey did not. It was not, in fact, until the middle of the 1980s that a broad consensus began to emerge among Turkish elites on the desirability of European integration for Turkey, which had from 1980 onwards adopted a more open and market-oriented economic policy. With this change of heart, Ankara finally applied for membership in the European Communities (EC) in 1987. Its application was rejected by the EC Commission in 1989 on the grounds that Turkey was not yet politically and socio-economically ready to join the community. However, its general eligibility for membership, its status as a European country, was confirmed.

Ankara’s pursuit of EC membership coincided with the end of the Cold War, when the EC’s interest turned towards the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Turkey’s Western and European character was never questioned throughout the Cold War years, when it was accepted as a member of the Council of Europe, NATO, the OECD and other European international organizations. With the end of the Cold War, however, Turkey’s “Europeanness” became a topic of growing controversy.

A Customs Union (CU) involving trade in industrial goods between Turkey and the EU, which was regarded by Ankara as a step towards EU membership, came into force in 1996. Greece gave up its opposition to the CU agreement with Turkey in return for opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus. The CU put Turkey’s external trade under the jurisdiction of an international organisation in whose decision-making it could not participate: it was broadly criticised in Turkey, and especially by the Islamist movement which was against Turkey’s association with the EU in principle, advocating instead a union of Muslim states under Turkish leadership. The CU was criticised as a serious breach of sovereignty that would

pave the way for the ruining of Turkish industries. It was followed by the adoption of regulatory reforms in the economy, and also of certain constitutional amendments towards broader democracy. Although trade with the EU displayed an ever larger deficit, contrary to the expectations of opponents to the CU, Turkish industries became increasingly competitive and exports to the EU and the world at large increased.

Closer relations with the EU through the CU did not stop public pressure, together with the Turkish military, from ousting from power the coalition government of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) and the centre-right True Path Party (DYP) led by the RP’s leader Mr. Necmettin Erbakan. However, Turkey’s closer relations with the EU could at least partially explain why there was no outright military takeover, but rather what has been called a “lite”, “soft” or “post-modern” coup.235 It may also be argued that EU membership hopes have played a role in enabling Turkey to preserve a largely democratic regime, despite the violent separatist insurgency led by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) that broke out in 1984. The EC had referred to the PKK insurgency as one of the arguments for rejecting Turkey’s application for membership in 1989. The fact that the PKK was regarded as the sole representative of the suppressed Kurdish identity in Turkey by certain circles in the EU, and the covert support provided by Greece to the PKK, clouded Turkey–EU relations.236 The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by the PKK in early 1999, helped open the way for Turkey’s candidacy for the EU at the end of that year. The EU would not, however, include the PKK in its list of terrorist organisations until May 2002.

Despite the CU, a sense of exclusion and isolation from the EU prevailed in Turkey, and reached its peak in June 1997, when the EU decided to open accession talks with six candidate states, including Greek Cyprus, while Turkey was not even considered a candidate for membership. Ankara reacted strongly, suspended comprehensive political dialogue between Turkey and the EU, and even threatened to withdraw its application for membership.237 The dialogue was to resume only after changes of government in both Germany and Turkey in the following years.

In November 1998, the EU Commission issued the first Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession, although Turkey had not yet been declared a candidate for membership. In a letter addressed to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, leader of the Social Democratic and Green coalition government in Germany, in the summer of 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit declared Ankara’s intention to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership, adopted by the EU in 1993, and asked for Germany’s support for Turkey’s EU bid. The exchange of letters between Ecevit and Schröder, as well as the reversal of the Greek government’s

policy of blocking Turkish accession, paved the way for the EU to declare at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, that Turkey was a “candidate State destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States”.

**Impact of the EU: The 1999 Helsinki summit decisions**

In Turkey, the candidacy announcement was greeted with joy, as a major step forward in the country’s 200-year history of Westernisation. Opinion polls showed at least two thirds of the public in favour of EU membership. A strong pro-EU consensus formed among the political, economic and cultural elites, and even among the civilian–military bureaucracy. The prospect of accession to the EU appealed to nearly all segments of society. Liberals hoped EU membership would help the country to enhance its democratic rights and freedoms, consolidate democracy, and bring an end to military interventions. Secularists hoped that EU membership would guarantee the secular nature of the state; Islamists hoped the EU would help ease restrictions on religious freedoms. The Kurds — the largest ethnic minority — hoped that the prospect of EU membership would facilitate the official recognition of Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, while Alevi — the largest religious minority — hoped that the EU would open the way to the recognition of their identity and equal treatment by the state. Non-Muslim minorities looked to the EU for removal of restrictions on their rights. Employers thought the EU would open up new investment opportunities, and employees hoped for broader social rights. The population at large hoped the EU would bring greater prosperity and broader freedom. Even the military, despite the threat to its political role enshrined in the constitution, supported the EU bid, hoping that EU membership would help secure the secular nature of the regime and the territorial integrity of the country, and fulfil Atatürk’s dream of a fully Westernised Turkey.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki decision, however, various coalition governments composed of parties with widely different agendas were slow to initiate the reforms necessary to fulfil the Copenhagen Political Criteria, the precondition for starting accession negotiations with the EU. The reforms were finally started in early 2002 by the three-party coalition government led by the Democratic Left Party (the DSP) under Bülent Ecevit, and gained momentum only after the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power at the end of that year.

AKP was one of the two parties formed when the Islamist movement split following the banning by the Constitutional Court of the Virtue Party (FP) in 2001, the last party in the chain of the Islamist-oriented National Vision movement. The leaders of the “Renewalist” faction of the Islamist movement, R. Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, pioneered the establishment in the same year of AKP which declared itself to be a “Conservative Democratic” party committed to secularism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, market economy and EU membership.
The AKP had made EU accession the centre-piece of its platform in the parliamentary elections of November 2002. This partly explained its success in winning about one-third of the national vote and two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, when only two parties succeeded in crossing the 10 percent threshold needed to gain seats in parliament. AKP was thus able to form a single-party government, bringing to an end a decade of in-fighting coalition governments riddled with incompetence and corruption. From 2002 to 2005, the government of Prime Minister Erdoğan pursued an energetic reform policy aimed at fulfilling the Copenhagen Political Criteria, and starting accession negotiations.

Between February 2002 and May 2004, the Turkish parliament adopted eight legislative packages that substantially reformed the constitutional and legal framework for human rights and democracy. Most significantly, reforms were undertaken to suppress human rights violations, expand freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and decrease the influence of the military in politics, as well as reforms aimed at the recognition of Kurdish identity, allowing for broadcasts and education in Kurdish.238

The prospect of EU membership affected not only domestic politics, but also foreign policy. The success of pro-solution and pro-EU forces in the parliamentary elections of Turkish Cyprus in 2003 opened up the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem. The AKP government was finally able to persuade the military leadership (if not the entire military establishment) to agree to the fifth version of the plan for the unification of the island put forward by United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan. The Annan Plan was submitted to referenda in both parts of the island in April 2004, but failed when the Greek side rejected it with a three-fourths majority, although the Turkish side adopted it by a wide margin. Greek Cyprus became a full member of the EU in May 2004, while Turkish Cyprus was left out. Membership in the EU of Greek Cyprus, which Ankara did not recognise, posed a serious obstacle to Turkey’s accession. However, unexpectedly swift and comprehensive reforms by Ankara, which were dubbed a “silent revolution”, prepared the ground for the decision of the European Council in December 2004 to conclude that Turkey had “sufficiently fulfilled” the Copenhagen Political Criteria, and accession negotiations could begin in October 2005.

Change of climate in relations
Accession talks formally began on 3 October 2005, but the positive nature of Turkey–EU relations had substantially changed. During the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitution in the summer of 2005, public debate within the EU member states on enlargement in general and Turkish accession in particular gave some very negative signals to the Turkish membership bid. The would-be

French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the would-be German Chancellor Angela Merkel started talking about offering Turkey “privileged partnership” rather than full membership in the EU. The decision to start negotiations was taken after what Foreign Minister Jack Straw, representing the British presidency, called “a pretty gruelling 30 hours of talks” to persuade Austria to withdraw the demand that Turkey be offered a “privileged partnership”, an idea that was flatly rejected by Ankara. The Framework for Negotiations with Turkey adopted by the European Council stipulated that the negotiations were open-ended, that there could be “long transition periods” and “permanent safeguards” in some policy areas, and that the negotiations could be suspended if there was continued breach of Copenhagen Political Criteria in Turkey. The framework was, according to the opposition in Turkey, effectively offering Turkey a second class membership even if the negotiations were concluded successfully.

In 2006, relations between Turkey and the EU seemed to be on course towards what Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner in charge of enlargement, called a “train crash”. The EU insisted that Turkey should open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot vessels in line with its commitment to extend the CU to include the ten new member states of the EU. Turkey, however, steadfastly refused to do so unless the EU ended the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, as promised following the referenda in Cyprus, and opened Northern Cyprus to direct trade with the outside world. Faced with Turkey’s rejection of its demands over the CU, the European Council decided in December 2006 to suspend 8 chapters out of 35 in negotiations with Turkey. In 2007, the French government suspended 4 more chapters it regarded as directly related with full membership. In the accession negotiations between the Turkey and the EU, only one chapter has so far been provisionally concluded, and 8 chapters have been opened.

A proposed amendment to the French Constitution (not yet in place at the time of writing) obliges France to hold referenda before approving new members after Croatia. If adopted that would make Turkish accession talks pointless given that vast majorities of the French, German and Austrian electorate are opposed to Turkey’s membership of the EU. Clearly, as The Economist magazine remarked, “If membership is ruled out as destination, the journey cannot continue”.

The Nature of Turkey–EU Relations

What can be said of the nature of relations between Turkey and the EU on the basis of this brief overview? Oxford historian John Redmond arrives at the following conclusion:

---

EU policy has frequently been unclear, ambiguous and even misleading, to the extent that it has at times encouraged high expectations on Turkey’s part when in reality there was no possibility of the country’s accession in the foreseeable future. While this policy did little to facilitate the advancement of Turkey’s membership aspirations, it suited the EU very well to have some degree of ambiguity in this relationship. Some would even go further and argue that in fact the EU’s attitude has been self-serving — that it has wished to keep Turkey on board for security reasons alone — and that, furthermore, its approach to Turkey has on occasion been unfriendly and insensitive, even hostile. Turkey, for its part, has shown an eagerness to embrace the high expectations engendered by occasional Commission rhetoric to the point of self-delusion, and has simply failed to deliver on many of its commitments to the EU.²⁴¹

Germany’s foremost expert on EU–Turkey relations, Heinz Kramer, makes a similar assessment:

From its very beginning, EU–Turkey relations have not been perceived as an integral part of the European integration process by most EU member states. Turkey has always been regarded as an ‘outsider’ to Europe with whom special relations had to be established mainly for security (policy) reasons… More than four decades of Turkey’s association with the EU did nothing to change this perspective. To the contrary, the feeling of mutual estrangement deepened. Turkey was and remained to be the ‘other’ to a majority of Europeans and vice versa. For many Turks, the EU… still is a political entity… that cannot be trusted. It is more than often perceived as heir to the European imperial powers that tried to carve-up Turkey after the First World War with the infamous Treaty of Sevres.²⁴²

Redmond and Kramer may be making fair assessments of the general state of affairs, but the relationship is more complex and dynamic than this. It needs to be analysed not in terms of a two-sided but rather a four-sided relationship, and changes that take place over time also need to be taken into account. There is no monolithic attitude towards Turkey among Europeans, or among Turks towards Europe, and the attitudes on all sides are subject to change over time. Both the elites and the general public of EU member states are divided, with some in favour and some against Turkish accession. Similarly there are pro- and anti-EU membership groups among the elites and the people of Turkey, whose relative weights in Turkish politics have shifted considerably over time, depending on the positive or negative signals concerning Turkish accession coming from the EU.

For and against camps in the EU
Heinz Kramer has provided a review of arguments in the European debate in favour of and against Turkey’s membership bid, and of member states’ positions on the subject. There are many arguments against Turkish accession, and these prevail in European public opinion. These arguments maintain that Turkey is “too large, too poor and too Muslim”, that it does not belong geographically to Europe, and that it does not form a part of the history of European civilisation. If Turkey were to join the EU, it is argued, this would dilute the identity of the EU: it has a different political culture that would lead to problems in EU decision-making. Being a very populous country, Turkey’s national interests would dominate the EU. It would open the door to membership of other non-European countries. Moreover, the arguments go, Turkey does not even fulfil political criteria for the opening of accession negotiations. Labour immigration to the EU could negatively impact the social fabric of other member states. It could turn the EU into a front-line actor with regard to the most insecure region of the world.

On the other hand, there are arguments in favour of Turkish accession which may be said to prevail among foreign and security policy experts. These include the following: Turkish membership would provide strategic advantages by creating a secure and prospering EU country in a politically sensitive area. It would enhance energy security for the EU by becoming a regional energy hub. It would signal to the Islamic world that the EU is not a “Christian Club”, and the non-radical Turkish Islam would contribute to the development of a “Euro-Islam” that could overcome the potential of Islamist radicalisation in some member states. It would enhance the EU’s potential as a global actor and could contribute to the EU’s economic growth.

Kramer points out that governments within the EU are deeply divided over the issue of Turkey’s membership. There is full consensus among member states that it would be in the EU’s best interest if Turkey were to develop into a stable democracy with a functioning market economy. What divides them, however, is the question of whether EU accession is necessary to enable Turkey to reach that goal.243

According to Kramer, EU member states fall into four broad groups in terms of their attitudes towards Turkish accession: 1) Favourable: Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic states are, to varying degrees, favourable. In all of these countries, however, there is public opposition against Turkish accession mainly within conservative circles; 2) Special cases: Greece and Greek Cyprus support Turkish accession because they believe that it would improve the chance of resolving conflicts with Turkey; 3) The “Bicephal” case: in Germany, the coalition partners are divided, with the Christian Democrats advocating “privileged partnership”, and the Social Democrats supporting membership; 4) Opponents: France, Austria, the

Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark are all against Turkish membership.

Kramer thus provides a more varied and nuanced picture of prevailing attitudes in the EU towards Turkey’s accession. In most member countries, public opinion seems to be against Turkish membership, as indicated by Eurobarometer and other surveys. However, there appears to be a more positive attitude among most member governments and political elites than suggested by earlier conclusions by Redmond, or Kramer himself, on the nature of the relationship.

For and against camps in Turkey

Prevailing attitudes to EU membership in Turkey may be said to be equally mixed. A consensus on the desirability of EU membership emerged in Turkey only in the late 1980s, after the brutally suppressive military regime of 1980–83. Since then, the debate over EU accession has led to deep divisions among Turkey’s elites.

Europhile elites have argued that EU membership would bring major advantages. The semi-liberal democracy under the guardianship of the military–civilian bureaucracy would be replaced by a democracy more akin to EU norms. An open market economy would be consolidated, and the country would prosper as a result of increasing foreign direct investments. The Kurdish problem would be resolved and the territorial integrity of the country secured. Turkey would become an important regional player in international politics, building bridges between Europe and the Muslim world, and helping to avoid a “clash of civilisations”.

Even among the Europhiles, however, there are divisions. There are some who argue in favour of pursuing the EU road on the grounds that it would lead to the consolidation of a liberal democracy and modernisation of the economy, whilst at the same time expressing a lack of trust in the EU and a scepticism that Turkey would ever be accepted into the Union.

Those sections of Turkey’s elites which are opposed to EU accession have argued that membership would not only dilute Turkish identity, but would also be a serious threat to national independence and sovereignty. They claim that fulfilment of the criteria for membership would lead to nothing less than a dismembering of Turkey and a dismantling of the secular regime, citing EU demands for recognition of minority rights, and ending the guardianship role of the military. The hidden agenda of the EU, it is argued, is to revive the Sevres Treaty of 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious powers of the First World War which (although it never to come into force) stipulated the carving up of Turkey and the founding of Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia.

What has been termed the “Sevres syndrome” or the “Sevres phobia” describes a widespread belief among Turkish state elites. Kemal Kirişçi, distinguished scholar of Turkish foreign policy, describes it as follows:

One important aspect of Turkish political culture… has been the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and carve up Turkey. Turkey is
depicted as surrounded by enemies, who are extremely efficient and can act in unison... The military plays a critical role in perpetuating the ‘Sevres phobia.’ Turkish national security culture, which is heavily influenced by the military establishment, emphasizes thinking and analysis influenced by the ‘Sevres phobia’.  

The Euro-sceptics among Turkey’s elites are divided between those who are against EU membership in principle and those who are not against it in principle, but who demand that the EU should water down the conditions of membership for Turkey, given its vulnerable geographical position in a volatile and potentially dangerous region. The debate over EU membership has become increasingly polarised in Turkey since the end of 2005, particularly in response to what were perceived as negative signals coming from the EU, discussed above. 

The rise and fall of popular support for EU membership

Surveys conducted by academic research groups regarding popular support within Turkey for EU accession have revealed that support increased from 55 percent in the spring of 1996 to 74 percent in January–February 2003; it remained at around 70 percent until December 2005, then dropped dramatically to 50 percent by July 2007. Eurobarometer surveys of popular support for EU membership have been available since 2004, and indicate that support for EU membership has declined from 71 percent in the spring of 2004 to 49 percent in the autumn of 2007.

The general observable trend in the survey results indicates that the declaration of Turkey as a “candidate State destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States”, at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, significantly boosted public support for accession, which continued to climb to above 70 percent in 2004. With the negative signals coming from the EU from 2005 onwards, the level of support has sharply declined to about 50 percent by the end of 2007, with certain surveys suggesting that public support dipped below 40 percent in 2006. It is remarkable, however, that despite the dark clouds hanging over the future of the relationship, half of the population is still in favour of EU accession. According to a survey by Sabanci University among people who voted in the July 2007 elections, those most supportive of EU accession were pro-Kurdish DTP (63 percent) and AKP voters (59 percent) with significantly higher proportions than the average (50 percent). Among voters for CHP, which reversed its position from a pro- to an anti-EU stance after 2004, 47 percent supported EU


accession. Even among the voters of the strongly anti-EU party, MHP, almost a third (32 percent) were in favour.247

However, belief that Turkey will one day become a member of the EU, and trust in the EU institutions have continuously been at a lower level than support for accession. The “Eurobarometer 68: Public Opinion in the European Union” survey conducted in the autumn of 2007 indicated that trust in the EU (institutions) is lowest in Turkey, at only 25 percent, barely half the EU average of 48 percent.248

The EU’s Impact on Turkish Politics

The fluctuating relations with the EU have affected Turkish politics in a variety of ways. The heightened prospect of membership of the EU after the Helsinki declaration of 1999 unified Turkish society on an unprecedented scale and resulted in a major political realignment.249 Traditional cleavages of secularists–Islamists, Turks–Kurds, Sunnis–Alevi, capitalists–workers, civilians–military, etc., were superseded by the divisions between those who were in favour of the Europeanisation of Turkey and those who opposed it. The split between proponents and opponents of EU accession cut across all traditional divides. Forces in favour of the consolidation of an open, democratic society based on EU norms came together, while opposition united dogmatic Kemalists, Turkish ethnic nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, radical Kurdish nationalists, unreformed communists and militarists, who together formed what has been called the “Red Apple Front”, referring to the symbol for world hegemony among ancient central Asian Turkic tribes.

Perhaps the most important impact of the EU on Turkish politics has been the transformation of the Islamist movement. The Turkish Islamist movement led by Mr. Necmettin Erbakan, strongly opposed to association with the West in general and with the EU in particular, began to change its position in the middle of the 1990s. The Welfare Party (RP), which was to become the party with the largest share of the vote (21 percent) in the elections of 1995, conducted a staunchly anti-EU, anti-Customs Union campaign. Soon after forming a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP) led by Tansu Çiller, however, RP enacted a series of U-turns and gave up its opposition to EU accession, declaring it to be a “state policy” binding on all.

The split between “Traditionalists” and “Renewalists”, which began in the ranks of the RP in the mid-1990s, gradually evolved into a division in the Islamist movement between what may be called a liberal Muslim faction, and a Muslim nationalist faction. The primary representative of the former faction is the AKP.

247 “Turkish Election Study – 2007”, Isik and Sabanci Universities.
while the Felicity Party (SP) represents the latter. In power the AKP has pursued a liberal political and economic agenda while maintaining a culturally conservative, Sunni Muslim identity. The adoption by the Islamist movement in Turkey of increasingly liberal positions is one of the major achievements of Turkish democracy. Through this evolution, the post-Islamist AKP became the leading force for political democratisation and economic modernisation in the country. The EU’s “soft power” has undoubtedly played a role in this development.

The soft power of the EU also contributed to a major split in the secularist ranks, between pro-EU liberals on the one hand, and anti-EU authoritarian nationalists or Kemalists on the other. The latter, who accuse AKP of having a “hidden agenda” to bring about a religious regime in Turkey, are represented mainly by the CHP, which garnered about 21 percent of the national vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections.

Promise of EU membership has even split the ranks of Kurdish nationalists. Groups that hope for an improvement in the situation of the Kurds as Turkey moves towards the EU have an increased following, while the once separatist and violent PKK has lost considerable ground, as demonstrated by the July 2007 elections in which the AKP won approximately 55 percent of the vote in the Kurdish-majority region. The return to violence by the PKK from the summer of 2004 onwards, and the escalation of that violence in the fall of 2007, can perhaps be explained by its desire to avert growing isolation.

EU conditionality has also provided an important anchor for the economic stability and reform programme adopted by the former coalition government, and strictly implemented by the current AKP government. In the four years up to 2008 the economy enjoyed a 7 percent annual growth rate, increasing annual per capita income from around US$ 3,200 in 2002 to (using the calculation system based on EU norms adopted recently) close to US$ 10,000 in 2008. During the same period the annual inflation rate fell from about 80 percent to just 9 percent. In 2007 and 2008, annual foreign direct investment inflow amounted to US$ 18 billion and US$ 19 billion respectively, up from about US$ 1–2 billion in 2001. Turkey’s exports have reached US$ 130 billion, and imports US$ 150 billion dollars, with the EU representing more than 60 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade. On a less positive note, the current account deficit rose from about 6 to 8 percent of GDP in 2008, raising concerns about the future stability of the economy.

EU conditionalities have thus helped Turkey to substantially improve its level of democracy and its economy. Turkey is, on the whole, a far more open and free society today than it was just ten years ago. If the accession process were to continue, it is likely that Turkey’s democracy would be further consolidated, thereby also helping to secure its territorial integrity.
The Turkish military and the EU

It may be said that the support provided by the military, the most powerful institution of the country, was crucial for the EU reforms adopted between 2001 and 2004. The prospect of EU membership has confronted the powerful Turkish military elite with a dilemma. The overriding aim of Atatürk’s reforms of the 1920s and 1930s was to transform Turkey into a modern, Western state. By 1999 that meant joining the EU. But membership required the radical reform of several of the keystones of the Kemalist state, including the withdrawal of the military from the political arena, concessions which the military feared could eventually lead to the dismemberment of the country or establishment of an Islamist state.

Tensions between the military and the government increased when the AKP came to power, due to the widespread distrust among the officer corps of AKP’s commitment to Kemalist secularism. However, under the leadership of General Hilmi Özkök, the Chief of General Staff between 2002 and 2006, the military gave its support to the EU reforms. The constitutional and legal reform packages prepared by the AKP government introduced fundamental changes to the functions and composition of the National Security Council, the main vehicle through which the military controls the general direction of the country, as well as to the conditions relating to the control of military expenditures by the judiciary.250

The military’s position regarding EU accession was perhaps best captured in an article which argued that the EU reforms “have called for a virtual revolution of the military’s mindset”.251 Nevertheless, under General Özkök’s command pragmatism prevailed, and the military chose to comply with the reforms with the understanding that the EU road could provide solutions to some of Turkey’s major problems:

First, joining the EU would bring Turkey economic benefits, which would indirectly help Ankara battle terrorism and maintain the country’s territorial and political integrity. Second, as Turkey progressed toward EU membership, European nations might grow less supportive of the PKK… Without legitimacy and significant external support, it would be harder for the PKK to continue its armed struggle. Third, and perhaps most important, the EU membership process would provide a framework to deal with the Kurdish issue.252

The authors of the article concluded that:

Although so far it has relinquished some of its footholds in civilian institutions, the military may need to see more evidence that Turkey’s march toward membership in the EU – a new guardian for stability – is irreversible before it gives up more of its traditional prerogatives… If the EU process reaches a level at which

252 Ibid., 86–87.
the military no longer feels the need to preserve the ideology in its current form in order to meet Turkey’s security challenges, the Turkish General Staff will redefine Kemalism again.\textsuperscript{253}

**Reasons for the Decline in Support for EU Accession**

In Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council had declared Turkey to be a “candidate State destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States”. But in December 2004 the EU Council decided that the accession negotiation was “an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”, meaning there was no commitment on the part of the EU to accept Turkey into the Union at the end of the negotiations. Even if the process were to be concluded successfully, the EU would have to consider its “absorption capacity”, and reserved the right to stipulate “long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses” before Turkey could join the Union. An increasing number of Turks believe that the EU is changing the rules of the game and discriminating against Turkey.\textsuperscript{254}

Decisions by France and Austria to subject future member states to approval by referenda is perceived as a measure intended to lock Turkey out of the Union. Awareness is growing within Turkish public opinion that, even if accession negotiations are concluded successfully, Turkey’s membership will have to be approved by the governments of all (at least 28) member states and by the European Parliament. This means that Turkey will have to win over European public opinion — which is currently opposed to Turkish accession — with a two-thirds majority. That may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle even after ten or fifteen years.

Greek Cyprus, whose government actively campaigned against the Annan Plan, nonetheless joined the Union in May 2004, while Turkish Cypriots, who had strongly embraced the Plan, were left out. While Turkey is required to resolve its border disputes with its neighbours before joining the EU, Greek Cyprus was accepted into the Union without any such solution. While the EU has supported the Annan plan, implicitly recognising the existence of two different peoples and political entities on the island, it regards the Greek part as the sole legal representative of the whole island. These inconsistencies are widely seen as evidence of double standards on the part of the EU towards Turkey. The Greek Cypriot government is perceived as using its EU membership as leverage for a return to pre-1974 conditions in Cyprus. To many Turks it is incomprehensible how a state the size of Greek Cyprus can dictate to the EU the terms of Turkey’s accession. The conviction

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{254} Ziya Onis, “Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey”, \textit{DIIS Brief}, November 2008: 2–5.
that the Greek Cypriot state is simply being used by certain bigger member states to block Turkish accession is widespread.

Other issues have also played a role. The European Court of Human Rights, whose judgements form part of the EU Acquis Communautaire (the body of EU legislation), endorsed a headscarf ban in Turkish universities, while the Progress Reports of the EU Commission on the Turkish negotiations have never taken up the question of the headscarf ban. This is regarded by a large segment of society as a violation of the religious rights of the Sunni majority. Such disregard for their complaints have disappointed and alienated many, especially devout Muslims who had hoped that EU accession would help lift restrictions on religious rights and freedoms.

Calls from the European Parliament for the recognition of the “Armenian Genocide”, and similar calls by other Europeans regarding other “genocides” (Greek, Assyrian, etc.) committed by Turks, and demands by French politicians that recognition of the “Armenian genocide” be set as a precondition for Turkish membership in the EU, are perceived as part of the prevailing anti-Turkish stance of Europe. At the same time, the widespread identification of Islam with terrorism and the rising tide of Islamophobia (and by extension Turcophobia) in Europe in the aftermath of 9/11, have contributed to the growth of anti-West, anti-EU sentiment in Turkey. The crisis created by the publication of cartoons about the Prophet Muhammed in Denmark and elsewhere, followed by Pope Benedict XVI’s references to Islam as being “inhuman and evil”, also helped spread the image of the EU as a “Christian Club”, where Turkey is not wanted.

In explaining the declining support for EU accession in Turkey since 2005, the perennial “love–hate” relationship the Turks have had with the West in general and Europe in particular is also relevant. Turkish elites may be said to be caught between a feeling of admiration for the Western world for its achievements, on the one hand, and resentment against its superiority on the other. It may be argued that when Europe shows its “love” for Turkey, the public support for EU accession goes up, and vice versa.

Increased ambiguities in the EU and Turkey
The PKK’s return to violence in the summer of 2004, the EU’s increasingly ambiguous attitude towards Turkey and suspension by the EU of several chapters of the accession negotiations in 2006, have all had major consequences for Turkish politics.

With a new Chief of General Staff, Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, in command from 2006, the military stepped up their interventions in the democratic process, with various commanders making comments on political issues. An upsurge of
xenophobic nationalism resulted in attacks against Catholic priests. In 2007, the highly esteemed Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and three Christian missionaries were murdered. It was suspected that these and other provocations against domestic political stability and Turkey's relations with Europe and the West, were the work of the “Deep State,” that is gangs with roots and accomplices in the state security and intelligence apparatus.

When the ruling AKP decided to nominate Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to the presidency in April 2007, the military placed a statement on the website of the Chief of Staff, making it clear that it would not accept a president with a headscarved wife. The statement was immediately dubbed an “e-memorandum” or “electronic coup” by the media. The AKP did not give in to this pressure, and when, in early May, a Constitutional Court ruling rendered the presidential election impossible, the government decided to dissolve the parliament.

The same month, the diary of a retired Navy commander from the period 2003–2005 was leaked to the weekly journal Nokta. It revealed that the top commanders of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie, apparently upset by the AKP government’s support to the Annan Plan for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, had plotted two coup d'etats during 2004. The plots, explained the diary, had failed because then-Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök and the majority of generals opposed them. Right after publication of the story, a military court ordered the Nokta offices to be searched, and the editor of the weekly was soon indicted for defaming the retired admiral. (He has since been acquitted by the court.) The publisher, seemingly under pressure from the military, discontinued the publication of the weekly.

Early elections held on 22 July 2007 brought AKP back to power with 47 percent of the vote, and Abdullah Gül was elected 11th President of the Republic in late August. The AKP government, at the suggestion and with the support of the oppositional National Action Party (MHP) moved in February 2008 to adopt constitutional amendments to open the way for lifting the headscarf ban for university students. The response from the military came a month later in what has been dubbed by the media a “judicial coup” — the appeal by the Chief Prosecutor to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the ruling AKP for being “the focal point of anti-secular activities”, and banning from politics for 5 years some 71 of its members, including President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan.

AKP was not the only political party to face threats of closure. The Chief Prosecutor has also filed a case with the Constitutional Court against the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which managed to become the first pro-Kurdish

---

party to be represented in the parliament, winning 20 seats in the elections of 2007. *The Economist* saw the party closure cases as a “tragedy in the making”:

Not only do Mr Erdoğan and the AKP insist vehemently that they uphold the secular state; they are also supported by a six year record of economic and political reform, more rights for minorities and women, and the start of membership talks with the EU. The AKP governments have, in short, been both more liberal and more successful than any secular predecessor.258

The closure case against the AKP not only rendered the Turkish government a “lame duck”, substantially increasing the risks of political and economic turmoil and outright military intervention, but it also threatened the future of Turkey–EU relations. The EU Commission, the European Parliament and governments of various EU member states, mainly Britain, Sweden and Germany, reacted strongly to the closure case, clearly stating their support for continued democratic reforms in Turkey. Certain other EU members, however, responded differently. France remained ominously silent about the closure case, but continued with efforts to change its constitution to make Turkish accession subject to referendum; Austria expressed complete disinterest in the future of democracy in Turkey. Austria’s foreign minister Ursula Plassnik, on a visit in Ankara in late April 2008, was content to say: “Turks will have to find a way out of this problem themselves. EU cannot become some sort of an arbiter in the AKP closure case…”, while not missing the opportunity to reiterate the offer to Turkey to consider a “privileged partnership” rather than full membership in the EU.259

Ian Lesser, an American observer of EU–Turkey relations made the following assessment of the case against the AKP: “Turks may adjust to what some observers are calling an impending ‘judicial coup’. But Turkey’s EU candidacy may be irreparably damaged, nationalist tendencies reinforced, and relations with the U.S., already troubled, could be further compromised”. According to Lesser, if AKP and DTP are closed, “A few provocations could set in motion a series of events leading to an overt military intervention… A crisis of political representation in the southeast, accompanied by PKK violence and worsening economic conditions, could heighten the risk of a more general confrontation along ethnic lines”. The indictment against the AKP, he continues, “makes numerous references to the role of the US and the EU as enablers of the AKP’s religious agenda… The sovereignty conscious, nationalistic tone is very much in line with the xenophobic mood evident in Turkish society over the last few years”. If the opponents in the EU of Turkish accession seize on the closure of AKP to suspend (or interrupt) negotiations with Turkey, he suggests:

[those] who argue for a reorientation of Ankara’s strategy toward Eurasia or the Middle East would find their case strengthened… On key issues, not least policy toward Iraq, Iran and Cyprus, the military and security establishment are likely to

---

drive Turkish decision-making... Dialogue with the Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq, essential to the containment of the PKK challenge, will be more elusive. In the Aegean, the detente with Greece is unlikely to be reversed, but movement toward resolution of core issues will be more difficult.260

Whether or not the AKP is closed, Mark Almond of Oriel College, Oxford University, does not exclude the possibility of Turkey turning its back on Europe:

Washington and Brussels both seem convinced that Turkey has nowhere else to go, so that snubs and brusque elbowings by the US or the EU will be accepted with fatalism by Turks who are always ready to be the political handmaidens of their Western partners if never their bride. But this cosy assumption in NATO and the EU overlooks a profound tectonic shift since 1991 in Turkey's geo-political position.... Erdoğan and Gül remain committed to the goal of European integration. Time is running out, however, for them to satisfy their supporters and silence their critics by achieving it.... Most Turks don't want to see their country excluded from the West, but if the EU spurns them by endlessly delaying their accession... then the real risk is that Turkey will feel strong enough as well as embittered enough to strike out on a new geo-political course.261

The reactions from the EU Commission and a number of member states may have played a role in the July 2008 decision of the Constitutional Court: lacking the qualified majority for a closure verdict, it decided not to close but to fine the AKP by halving the state subsidy to which it was entitled. Ten out of eleven justices of the Court concurred that the AKP had become “the focal point of anti-secular activities”, but by deciding not to close down the governing party, the Court avoided a grave crisis in domestic politics and in Turkey’s relations with the EU.

Conclusion

The declaration at the Helsinki summit of the European Council in December 1999 unified Turkish society on an unprecedented scale, and promoted reforms to significantly liberalise its democracy and modernise its economy. Accurately dubbed a “quiet revolution” by European observers, these reforms led to the decision of the European Council at the end of 2004 to start accession negotiations. The negotiations started at the end of 2005 but scant progress has been achieved so far.

Many blame the AKP government itself for the political crisis that was narrowly averted in 2008. It is argued that opponents of Turkey’s further democratisation and Europeanisation were encouraged to move against the AKP when it failed to continue the reform process it had energetically pursued between 2002 and 2005, and instead sought consensus with the bureaucratic establishment

261 Mark Almond, “Why Turkey may turn its back on Europe”, Europe’s World, 8 June 2008.
and status quo forces. This may be part of the truth, but does not account for the loss of enthusiasm for reform in the AKP government. The failure of European (and American) partners and allies to provide support for democratisation reforms in Turkey has surely played a role in this.

A number of EU member states changed their minds in 2005, and began offering a second-class membership (with permanent safeguards and derogations to be deployed even if accession negotiations were concluded successfully) or “privileged partnership” instead of full membership, with France declaring that Turkey had no place in Europe, despite the fact that the European Council has unanimously confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership in 1999. Greek Cypriots, who rejected the UN and EU-backed Annan plan for the reunification of the island, joined the EU in May 2004, whereas the Turkish Cypriots, who approved the plan, continued to be subject to international isolation.

These negative signals from the EU have drastically reduced if not totally extinguished the EU’s “soft power” over Turkey. Public support for EU membership declined from above 70 percent in 2004 to below 50 percent in 2008. As public support waned, the nationalist opposition to EU reforms gained in confidence. Those who wanted to get rid of the AKP government by any means began to resort to the tactics described above. The EU provided strong and credible support to the accession of Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, helping them to consolidate their democracies: it has signally failed to do the same in the case of Turkey.

Washington, by punishing Ankara in various ways for having refused to become a partner to the crime of invading Iraq, has also indirectly contributed to the current crisis in Turkey. For fear of losing ground among Turkey’s Kurds if the EU reforms were to continue to democratise the country, the PKK, based in northern Iraq, escalated its attacks in the summer of 2004. Washington failed to effectively cooperate with Ankara against the PKK, thus helping to foment the xenophobic nationalist, anti-US and anti-West sentiment in Turkey, that accuses the AKP of collaborating with foreign interests. It is perhaps the realisation of this that finally, in late 2007, convinced Washington to begin to support Ankara against the PKK.

Constitutional government in Turkey has a relatively long history with roots in the 19th century Ottoman Empire. The Republic of Turkey has, since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1950, held 15 free and fair general elections with peaceful transitions of power. It has been in the process of negotiating membership with the EU since 2005. And yet, it has still not been able to consolidate its democratic regime, as the recent crisis demonstrated. If it is to consolidate its democracy, Turkey needs a strong and credible prospect of membership in the EU. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was very much to the point when she commented: “I think we have to support the democratic institutions of Turkey... The people who could do the most are the Europeans.
Because, frankly, if Turkey is not given a fair chance to accede to the European Union, we will all pay. Europe will pay, the United States will pay.262

Reference List:

Almond, Mark. “Why Turkey May Turn its Back on Europe”, Europe’s World, 8 June 2008.


IX. Turkey’s EU Accession and the European Identity

Jaap W. de Zwaan (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ and Law School of Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Identity is not a clear and precise concept. It may be characterized by a number of common features, such as: belonging to a state or homeland, a population or a territory; a common history; a common language; a common religion; a culture (including literature, painting, music, ballet); common values, as well as a set of common rights and obligations, for example in the domain of human and fundamental rights.\(^{263}\)

As far as Europe is concerned, we have to recognize first that Europe is not a state. There is neither a common population, a European ‘demos’, nor a proper territory. Europe lacks a common language. There is no single religion; many religions are found in Europe, including Islam. Even within member states, multiple religions are often represented: the sad situation in Northern Ireland, where in the last century (extreme) Catholics were in conflict with (extreme) Protestants and vice versa, provides an obvious example. That conflict lasted for several decades and resulted in many casualties.

On the other hand, Europe clearly is a geographic entity and it has much common history. Europeans share an impressive number of common norms and values, such as freedom, liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. All European countries are members of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and States Parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Moreover, most European countries are member states of the European Union.\(^{264}\) Although there is no single European language, English is widely spoken as a second language among EU citizens; those citizens also share a number of cultural values embedded, for example, in literature, painting, theatre and music.


\(^{264}\) In the context of the present discussion it is relevant to refer to Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty, in which the principles and values of the European Union are mentioned: “The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”
In terms of religion, it was proposed during the negotiations in preparation of the so-called European Constitution\textsuperscript{265} that a paragraph be included in the preamble of the EU Treaty concerning the Judeo-Christian norms and standards of Europe. However, this suggestion was ultimately not accepted by all partners in the intergovernmental conference. Although it is true that European society was long influenced by Judeo-Christian norms and values, these days it should be seen as a multicultural and multi-ethnic society, with room for other religions such as Islam. This is partly the result of globalisation and internationalisation. That said, the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty\textsuperscript{266} states that “inspiration is drawn from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”.\textsuperscript{267} It is also worth noting that religion or belief is one of the factors on which the present text of the EC Treaty provides for the possibility of legislation to combat discrimination.\textsuperscript{268}

We might thus draw a provisional conclusion that, although a proper European identity is difficult to discern, there exists a wide variety of norms and values common to Europe and — important in the context of a discussion about the possible EU membership of Turkey — to all member states of the European Union. Society in Europe can be characterised by the concept “united in diversity” which appeared prominently as the motto of EU cooperation in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.\textsuperscript{269} In the Lisbon Treaty such a principle is lacking. On the other hand, the new Article 2(3) of the EU Treaty states that the European Union “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”\textsuperscript{270}

What Europe and Turkey Have in Common

If we ask what features and values are common to Europe and Turkey, the first thing that comes to mind is the geographic location of Turkey. Turkey is situated

\textsuperscript{267} The full text reads as follows: “Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”
\textsuperscript{268} Article 13(1) EC Treaty.
\textsuperscript{269} Article I-8(3) European Constitution (the title of the provision was: “The symbols of the Union”).
\textsuperscript{270} Furthermore, in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Article 167 (Culture), paragraph 1, reads: “The European Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.” Further, in paragraph 4, it is stated: “The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and promote the diversity of its cultures.”
partly in Europe (with the cities of Istanbul, Kırklareli, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale) and partly in Asia. Istanbul is often referred to as the bridge between Europe and Asia. Given that Turkey qualified for and was accepted as a candidate member state of the European Union, it may be implied that politicians in the EU consider Turkey to be a European State.

There are also some common historical experiences. Europeans do not always like to be reminded of the impact the former Ottoman Empire has had on developments in Europe, but this does not alter the fact that the Ottoman Empire is part of European history and part of its historical heritage. With the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the invasions, before and after that date, of the Ottoman army in the present-day countries of the Balkans, Greece, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, Hungary and Austria, culminating in the siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire was present on European territory up to the beginning of the 20th century. Even to this day there are permanent reminders of the Ottoman presence in Europe, such as works of architecture (mosques, hamams etc.), notably in the Balkans, Hungary and Bulgaria, just as there are remnants of the strong Arab-Muslim influence in the Iberian Peninsula from the 8th to the 15th century.

During the last century, and particularly since the foundation of Turkey as a Republic in 1923, Europe and Turkey have come closer to each other in many respects. Secularism is without doubt a vital element in this: since the foundation of the Turkish Republic or, more precisely, since Kemal Atatürk took power, state and religion have been separated in Turkish society. Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey is a Muslim state, the Turkish system of government is organised according to Western traditions. Other Western habits have been adopted as well, including the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the improvement of the position of women, and reforms in education as well as Western standards in music, clothing and sports. In the 21st century, Turkey can basically be considered a Western country.

---

271 In the Association Agreement of 1963 (Official Journal 217 of 29 December 1964), Article 63 offered Turkey the prospect of membership.
273 According to Article 49 EU Treaty “Any European state …may apply to become a member of the Union.”
274 In fact, Turkish secularism does not result in a complete separation of state and religion. The Presidency of Religious Affairs within the Prime Minister’s Office has a mandate to inform society about religious affairs, with a scientific approach taking into account the needs of current times. The Presidency also has the tasks of administering places of worship, and observing if there are divergences from traditional religious norms. It is supposed to give the public information about true religious knowledge from a reasonably progressive standpoint, with the aim of preventing fundamentalism. Thus the state has not completely withdrawn from the area of religion.
275 Turkey granted women the right to vote and to stand for election much earlier than many EU countries. For local elections this happened in 1930, for general elections in 1934.
Europe and Turkey also share economic principles. In 1963 Turkey concluded an Association Agreement with what was then the European Economic Community.\textsuperscript{276} Over time Turkey gradually transformed into a market economy.\textsuperscript{277} It has become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in 1995 it established a Customs Union with the EU.\textsuperscript{278} The functioning of the Turkish market economy may be far from perfect, for example because of the impact which state interventions have on competition in the country, but this does not alter the fact that Turkey in essence qualifies as a market economy.

Security is another common factor. Threats to Turkey’s security may have a negative impact on European security, and vice versa. In this context Turkey’s membership of NATO since 1952 is relevant. During the Cold War, Turkey served as a buffer between East and West. It has also supported the Western position with regard to the combat of terrorism after the tragic events in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania of 11 September 2001. The same is true with regard to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, and the invasion of Iraq by US led coalition forces in 2003. Thus, in both geographical and political terms, Turkey can be considered part and parcel of the European security infrastructure.

A further vital element concerns the respect for human rights. Turkey acceded in August 1949 to the Council of Europe and became party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Although a number of complaints for violation of the rights laid down in the Convention have been launched against Turkey, inter alia, with the European Court of Strasbourg,\textsuperscript{279} Turkey shares with Europe the same catalogue of human and fundamental rights.

The Multicultural Society in Western Europe

At the same time, certain developments have taken place in Western Europe which tend to strengthen the links between Turkey and Europe. The most important is the development of a multicultural society in many European states.

Over the centuries, migration has taken place from one continent to another. The colonial past, trade traditions and practices of several European

\textsuperscript{276} Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, already mentioned.

\textsuperscript{277} It should be stressed that Turkey has never been a completely state economy. In 1923 in the Izmir Economic Congress, it was decided that a mixed economic model should be adopted due to the poor situation of the country at that time. What the private sector was not able to achieve, had to be undertaken by the state.

\textsuperscript{278} Decision No 1/95 of the EC–Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union.

\textsuperscript{279} These have also taken the form of inter-state cases. For example, the Netherlands lodged a complaint against Turkey, jointly with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and France, after the coup d’état in Turkey in 1980. The complaint was withdrawn a couple of years later, when a friendly settlement was reached between the parties.
countries, such as the Netherlands, have contributed to these movements. Immigration occurred on a massive scale after the Second World War. In 1945 the European continent had suffered massive destruction and devastation. New economic impetus and economic growth were desperately needed. The Western European labour market was in an extremely bad shape, and the need for reconstruction was immense. Foreign workers were invited to come to Western Europe to help in this reconstruction. Although it was intended that the foreign workers should return to their countries of origin after some years, in fact many of them stayed in Western Europe permanently. Workers from countries such as Italy, Portugal and Morocco moved to Western Europe for shorter or longer visits; migration also took place from Turkey to several countries in Western Europe, including the Netherlands. As a result of this post-War wave of migrations, millions of Turks, of the first, second and third generation, now live and are integrated in the societies of virtually all Western European states.

In more recent years, globalisation and internationalisation have also had an impact, including the — sometimes massive — migration of “economic” refugees from one continent to another. Europe has also been affected by these movements. For instance, hundreds of thousands of Southern Americans have emigrated to Spain, and thousands of Africans, mostly from the Western and Northern parts of that continent, have migrated to European territories in Africa, the Canary Islands, and countries in Southern Europe. All of these movements have contributed further to the establishment of a multicultural society in Europe.

Requirements for EU Membership

According to Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty, “The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” These, then, are what we might call the minimum requirements for membership of the European Union.

In addition, the so-called Copenhagen criteria, established by the European Council in June 1993 and “strengthened” by the Madrid European Council in 1995, have to be fulfilled. According to these criteria, in order to be able to join the EU, a new member state must fulfill three criteria:

1. The political criterion of stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities.

---

280 One of the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is a new Article 1a of the EU Treaty which reads as follows: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”
2. The economic criterion of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

3. Acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

In the Treaty of Lisbon an indirect reference to these Copenhagen criteria has been included through an amendment of Article 49. In the first paragraph of this provision a new, final sentence has been included: in the process of decision making with regard to applications for membership, the conditions of eligibility as agreed upon by the European Council have to be taken into account.

In the case of Turkey, it may be argued that by deciding, in December 2004, to start accession negotiations, the European Council was of the opinion that Turkey satisfied the political criterion of the set of Copenhagen rules. It can be stated that the EU, at least politically, has confirmed that Turkey satisfies the minimum requirements for membership as mentioned in Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty.

The reference in Article 6(1) to human rights has been further elaborated in Article 6(2), which says: “The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.” 281 Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and is also party to the European Convention.

Another legal principle, mentioned in Article 6(3) of the EU Treaty and relevant in the context of the present discussion, relates to the identity of the member states as follows: “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States”. This provision further supports the claim made earlier in this paper that a genuine European identity, as distinct from identity at the national level, does not exist.

**Religion**

It follows from the foregoing that there is no specific European requirement for membership of the European Union with regard to religion. In other words,

---

281 The new version of Article 6(1) in the Lisbon Treaty refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007. Furthermore it is said in this provision that the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. In Article 6, paragraph 2 the accession of the Union to the European Convention of the Council of Europe is announced.
It may be argued that in many Western European societies, the impact of religion is diminishing in practice, as indicated by the steadily decreasing number of people attending church services on a regular basis. On the other hand, differences between countries and peoples on grounds of religion have manifested themselves — in a very negative manner, sadly — in recent European history. For example the Balkan crisis in the 1990s was essentially based on differences with regard to religion and ethnicity. The example of Northern Ireland, which pivoted on a strict religious divide, was referred to earlier.

In terms of Islam, the presence of many signs of Arab and Turkish heritage in Western Europe is important. As mentioned earlier, millions of Turks live in Europe, the majority of whom are fully integrated as citizens in the local society and a part of the multicultural society of the member states concerned. An interesting and promising phenomenon was the fact that, when the football teams of Germany and Turkey met in one of the semi-finals of the European Championships on 25 June 2008, the Turkish community in Germany flew two flags on their cars and houses, a German and a Turkish one. In other words, sports, in this case football, became a sign of successful integration in the host country.

This also implies that for the accession to the EU of a country like Turkey, whose population is almost entirely composed of Muslims, religion should not be considered a hurdle. It would only be a problem if the country concerned developed into a fundamentalist state violating basic human rights, and thus no longer fulfilling the minimum requirements of membership of the EU, as discussed.283

282 See also the 2004 report of the WRR (The Dutch ‘Scientific Council for Government Policy’) on The EU, Turkey and Islam: WWR, De Europese Unie, Turkije en de Islam (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004).

283 In a speech of 10 October 2008 at the Bosphorus Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs took a similar position when he said: “Accession should not be turned down for the wrong reasons. I believe it is entirely wrong to advance cultural or religious arguments against Turkish membership. I believe that Turkey’s supposedly ‘un-European’ character is a fiction, based on a poor understanding of both Europe and Turkey. Because the histories of Turkey and Europe have long been intertwined, Turkey still bears the marks of the Greek, Roman and Byzantine cultures which, among other influences, have profoundly shaped modern Europe. The legacies of the Enlightenment and Liberalism took root in Turkey back in the nineteenth century. Following soon after a number of Western European states, Turkey adopted its first constitution in 1876 and held elections for the first Ottoman parliament. Parts of Europe still bear witness to the influence the Ottoman Empire once exerted. So let me be clear: culture or religion is absolutely not what the discussion should be about. The discussion should be about the extent to which Turkey will be ready to join the EU.”
Recent Developments in Turkey

Legal reforms in order to bring Turkish society closer to the norms and values of the EU are ongoing in Turkey. The improved position of women, Article 301 of the Criminal Code (crimes against the identity of the Turkish State) with regard to criminal law reforms, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are all examples of this.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of Turkish society which warrant close attention. Concerns have been registered with regard to the zealous protection of secularism and the fight against presumed fundamentalist characteristics of Islam. For example, the election by the Turkish parliament of a new President of the Republic in 2007 led to serious political difficulties when Abdullah Gül, candidate of the AK Party, was claimed to be a fundamentalist. A ban on the wearing of headscarves in public spaces such as universities is another example, as is the recent prosecution, by the Turkish judiciary, of Erdohan’s (and Gül’s) AK Party. In Western Europe these developments have been followed with great concern. Fortunately the prosecution of the AK Party came to an end when the claim of the Public Prosecutor to prohibit the AK Party was dismissed.

In the context of the present discussion a final question has to be asked: do Turks consider themselves to be Europeans? This is not an easy question to answer, and it will not receive the same answer from all Turkish citizens. While many Turks will undoubtedly answer this question in the affirmative, there are nevertheless sentiments of frustration that have become visible in recent years in Turkey, in particular over the complexities and the length of the procedure of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkey has been involved in the process of accession since the beginning of the 1960s, when the first Association Agreement was concluded with the European Economic Community. These days, there is a common feeling that too much time has passed without concrete results or prospects being achieved. Prime Minister Erdohan, too, shows his unease at the situation, when he sometimes refers to “they” (the Europeans) and “we” (the Turks).

Consequences of Turkey’s EU Membership

It is also important to consider the consequences of Turkey’s membership of the EU. Once it becomes a member of the EU, Turkey’s visions and traditions will have an impact on the functioning of the EU institutions and the management of EU policies.

284 In its judgement of 10 November 2005 in the case of Leyla Sahin versus Turkey (Application no. 44774/98), the European Court in Strasbourg declared that Turkey’s ban of headscarves in public domains is not a violation of human rights because of the special situation of the country.
First and foremost, Turkey is a big country. With approximately 71 million inhabitants, Turkey will — as things currently stand — become the second largest member state of the EU, after Germany. However, the growth of the Turkish population is faster than that of Western European countries. It may therefore be that, once in the EU, Turkey would become the biggest member state, at least in terms of population.

In the present institutional system of the EU, the size of the population of member states is taken into account in issues such as the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers\textsuperscript{285} and the composition of the European Parliament.\textsuperscript{286} The admission of Turkey will therefore have an impact on the balance of power within the EU. Should the EU simply continue to apply the present rules based, in a way, on proportionality? Or should it switch to a new set of rules based, for example, on the principle of equality of states? For the moment these are only questions, but it is clear that once Turkey accedes to the EU, its status will have an impact especially for the large member states like Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

Turkey’s visions and ideas will also have an impact on European policy domains, including such sensitive areas as justice and home affairs, foreign policy and defence. The geographic location of Turkey is an especially relevant factor here. Turkey has common borders with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. After Turkey’s accession the EU would thus have common borders with the three Caucasus countries and the Middle East region. The EU would then be more or less forced to develop common policies towards these regions, all of which are — from the point of view of stability, security and safety — extremely sensitive. The position of Russia, the nuclear programme of Iran and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will also have to be taken into account, albeit less immediately. Turkish membership of the EU will also have implications for the relationship between the Union and regions such as the Balkans, because of the promise the Union has made to the Balkan countries regarding EU membership once the minimum requirements have been fulfilled.

In a wider context Turkey’s accession will also have implications for the relationship between the EU on the one hand, and the United States and organizations like NATO on the other.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

This paper has argued that there is no clear concept of European identity. However, it can be established that European society comprises a number of common norms, traditions and experiences. It may thus be argued that membership of the EU is

\textsuperscript{285} Article 205(2) EC Treaty.
\textsuperscript{286} Article 190(2) EC Treaty.
based on shared norms and values, the most important being democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights (and not on religion).

Turkey shares most of these norms and values with the EU member states. Turkish membership of the Council of Europe and its early accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights bear crucial testimony to this. The decision of the European Council, in December 2004, to open negotiations for accession with Turkey, may also be seen as an indication that the EU believes that Turkey fulfills the minimum requirements for membership.

That said, there are factors that may obstruct Turkey’s accession to the Union. One of these is the so-called enlargement fatigue that has set in among governments and peoples of a number of member states of the Union. This phenomenon, which reared its head after the most recent accessions of 2004 and 2007, may prove a serious obstacle. In order to be successful the process of European integration must be solidly based in national societies: in other words, if European cooperation is not wholeheartedly supported by ordinary citizens, it will lack legitimacy and may ultimately end in deadlock. Politicians — members of national governments and parliaments — are responsible for providing their citizens with full insight in the essentials of the process of European integration. In the case of Turkey’s application for membership of the European Union, this means that politicians are expected to explain properly and in an objective manner the relevant arguments connected to that application, as well as the consequences of a possible Turkish membership.

References


PART F

CONSEQUENCES OF ACCESSION AND NON-ACCESSION FOR THE GLOBAL POSITION OF THE EU
Predictions in Politics

A lot can change in 30 years. Inspired by the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1990 I co-organized a national essay contest for high school students in the Netherlands on the question: what will the world look like in 2020? The accompanying brochure sketched some of the dynamics of change, mainly related to the Cold War (but also to societal attitudes, like attitudes towards smoking, in the 1960s advertised with the slogan “Smoking? Begin when you are young!”, and nowadays forbidden in all public places in the Netherlands). In 1960 the Berlin Wall still had to be built; in 1990 it had already been torn down. In between, the Cold War dominated world politics. It seemed to omnipresent and permanent, just stopping short of global nuclear war. The present generation of students (aged 20, still in their diapers when the Wall came down) know Russia mainly as an unstable country, struggling for democratisation and against organised crime. They know the Bush-era USA as a paranoid superpower, spotting potential terrorists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) behind every (Muslim owned) tree. When members of that generation are in positions of power, 20–30 years from now, they may wonder about today’s old Cold War reflexes in the West, whenever Gazprom and the Kremlin team up to manage (or stir up) conflicts amongst Russia’s near neighbours. Incidentally, most of the essays about 2020 expressed serious concern about the future role of micro-organisms in world politics: pandemics hitting every corner of the globalised world.

What if one had asked the same question in 1925 — what will Europe look like in 1950? — the answers would have missed the Second World War altogether. Words like holocaust, genocide, and nuclear weapons were hard to predict in 1925. Yet in 1950 they had left a lasting imprint on social-political life. On the other hand, the ideological controversy between East and West had already begun, starting with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Red Scare in the USA during the 1920s. European elites have feared communism since the socialist revolutions of 1848. It is likely, therefore, that 1925 scenarios for 1950 would have included some Cold War features, or worse.

What are the parameters for building scenarios and predictions? Are we automatically in the world of science fiction if we want to sketch long-term scenarios? Yes and no. On the one hand political science — and social science in general — has very limited predictive power, firstly because there are simply too many variables, and secondly because most variables are social variables and
therefore subject to social learning and unforeseen policy choices. The very notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy illustrates the problem that is highlighted by social constructivist methodological insights: observers change the reality they observe by spreading or using their research results. Orwell’s 1984, for example, stirred a “big brother is watching you” awareness in the West, which even today influences debates about the balance between collective security and individual privacy. Much goes unpredicted. The policy choices by the various Gorbachev administrations (1985–1991), leading to the end of the Cold War and the peaceful implosion of the Soviet Union, was an unpredictable course of history. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush administration was another example of policy-making at odds with general insights into the national interests of (in that case) the USA. International relations (IR) theories can only make sense of them retrospectively.

Thirdly, the rules and norms conducting social life, as well as their interpretations, change constantly, but scenario writers are stuck with their own contemporary interpretations. For example, the concept of state sovereignty long implied the right to declare war on another state (ius ad bellum), but after the First World War it implied the prohibition from declaring war on another state (non-intervention). After the Cold War, the non-intervention principle began eroding again, and the “international community” is now seen as having a moral obligation to intervene in (declare war on) sovereign states where the government obstructs doctrines like the Responsibility to Protect. Analysts of science fiction generally agree that images of the future tell us more about the present than about the future. The same goes for attempted projections of social trends.

Fourthly, even if the rules are well-known and consistent, and the complexity of variables is controlled, predictions can only be very general. Compare, for instance, predictions of soccer games. Experts, like Johan Cruyff in the Netherlands, know everything about the players, the rules, the tactics, the money, the media and so forth. All variables are known before the match, all the rules are known in detail. Moreover, in stark contrast to politics, there is a beginning and an end: a true outcome, instead of the artificial outcomes constructed in historical analyses. Still the expert can only predict that it is “very likely” that one side will win or that there will be a draw. And even this is a ceteris paribus prediction: perhaps the game will be cancelled because of unexpected bad weather, or stopped because hooligans invade the pitch. In the study of war, Carl von Clausewitz rightly emphasised the crucial impact of two unknown variables: friction and genius. In the end they determine who will win or lose. When things do not go as planned, it takes ingenuity to take the right (i.e., winning) decision in the new circumstances. Thanks to recurring soccer matches, bookmakers can tell you something about the chances of either side winning, but in politics the number of similar cases involving the same actors is always low and often zero; furthermore it is never clear when the “game” begins or ends. There is only one history, which can

---

be narrated in a number of ways, and the circumstances will never be the same again.

Nonetheless, some long-term theories about international relations have established a respectable track record. Hegemonic stability theory, theories about long cycles in economic and political hegemony, theories about polarity and order, theories about international regimes and types of anarchy, help to define system level conditions that set the stage for the feasibility of specific scenarios at lower levels of analysis. Prognoses about demographical and environmental developments can help. Prognoses about technological developments, especially those affecting communication and transport, have an impact.

Scenarios and predictions will always reflect the variables that are highlighted by the theory behind them. Most of these theories put a lot of weight on overall military power and economic power. Cultural identities (ideological, religious, hegemonic discourses) and environmental issues are increasingly gaining attention as important structural variables. Most theories tend to be state-centric, even if they are built on economic determinism. This is hard to avoid: although it is widely acknowledged that overall power assessments on the basis of resource power have very low predictive value for concrete outcomes of policy processes,288 long-term views can only focus on likely developments in overall resource power balances between the actors that are deemed important by the theorist.

Global Trends

There are serious studies which work with these overall data and theories in order to look into the crystal ball. A good example is the report by the US National Intelligence Council published in November 2008, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.289 It has various things to say about Turkey and the EU in 2025.

The NIC expects the economic and political power of Turkey to increase (Ibid., vii) in combination with increased Islamisation (Ibid., 14). Together with Indonesia and Iran, Turkey is expected to become important “for establishing new patterns in the Muslim world” consisting of “a blending of Islamic and nationalist strains” (Ibid., 29, 35–6). The current youth bulge in Turkey “will diminish rapidly” (Ibid., 22) and labour migration to Turkey can be expected. Influenced by Iran’s growing nuclear capacities, the NIC expects that Turkey may start building new nuclear power facilities (Ibid., 62). Whether this includes a military nuclear capacity is not mentioned, but is implied by the direct link to Iran. Obviously, involvement in

Iraq is likely as well, although the kind of involvement is not specified. The report leaves unanswered whether Iraq will be a stable state in 2025 or torn apart by civil war (Ibid., 72–3) — or perhaps neatly divided into four or five separate sovereign entities. The Kurdish problem is not mentioned in the report at all, which is odd. Another striking omission is that nothing is said about Turkey’s relationship with the USA or its position in NATO (although the authors do predict that NATO’s position is likely to decline; Ibid., 4).

The EU is treated with the same scepticism in this report as it is by most commentators: it will become either a potentially great power or a “hobbled giant” (Ibid., 32). In the great power scenario, Ukraine and Turkey are likely to become EU member states, and the EU will spread political stability and democracy to Europe’s periphery. But the great power scenario is not really credible: NATO’s decline will be mainly due to “declining European capabilities” (Ibid., v). In economic terms Europe is still seen as a dominant world region or even a quasi-bloc, next to North America and East Asia (Ibid., xi). Still, the relevant section is entitled “Europe: Losing Clout in 2025”. It concludes that the EU will not become a major military power (Ibid., 32–3).

The ageing EU population will demand “painful reforms” (Ibid., 32), which will threaten its unity. The demographic development of the EU is even listed as one of the crucial uncertainties for the coming 25 years (Ibid., v, vii, xii, 21). EU membership for Turkey is seen as crucial to prevent radicalisation of the Western–Islamic divide (Ibid., 33). But the report also expects growing tensions between native and non-native Europeans (Ibid., 21), especially if this is linked to the expected spread of transnational organised crime coming from Eurasia (read Russia), which is seen as the main threat to Europe (Ibid., 33). There is no escape from this, because of energy dependence on the Russian Federation. By 2025 organised crime may even have created a “shadow’ international system” (Ibid., 88), while some Central and Eastern European states may become dominated by crime syndicates. As is so often the case in discussions on organised crime, Italy — bulwark of organised crime but also one of the founding fathers of the EEC — is never mentioned. Apparently, the threat comes from the east, not from within.

The NIC focuses on Muslims in Europe as a potential threat to its stability. It expects the Muslim population in Western Europe to grow from 15–18 million in 2008 to 25–30 million in 2025 (Ibid., 25). This will colour the political agendas, but the report is rather vague about the shade of that colour. If Turkey’s EU membership is conditional on bridging the Islamic–Western divide, as the report suggests, one could argue that the membership issue will determine the balance between melting-pot and voluntary apartheid characteristics in Europe.

Methodologically the NIC implicitly adopts the following approach: it sketches trends for some crucial variables (“key drivers”), and links these to a forceful message that “leadership matters” — hence, everything might go differently, depending on crucial decisions made by powerful men and women. This can be interpreted as a specific reading of the structure/agency debate, which is
one of the key debates in IR theory. In the NIC report, structural developments are de-socialised as if they were natural trends. It then becomes possible to make a forecast about human institutionalised behaviour. It is a comparative analysis of resource power and technological, demographic and environmental trends affecting the position of national states in the international system. What is unclear is how global developments relate to local dynamics. For instance, the report rightly points out that urbanization has taken on historically new proportions (with more than 50% of the world’s population now living in urbanised centres); it would have been interesting to see what this implies in terms of regional stability. Could the tension between urban and rural populations lead to state fragmentation, as Robert D. Kaplan speculates in The Coming Anarchy? China, especially, has the potential to break apart on these grounds in the coming decades — an option not considered by the NIC. Although one scenario predicts catastrophes while another predicts growing influence from non-state networks, the state system is expected to remain in place, and in its current form. Historically, in the face of decolonisation, fragmentation and integration processes, this is quite unimaginative and reveals a conservative world view.

The next implicit step in the report is to re-socialise the structures again, bringing the “human factor” back in. The report is silent about what this means. Leadership can change everything: that’s all. Von Clausewitz’s friction and genius are indeed hard to calculate. There are always choices to be made in unforeseen circumstances, and in the end the quality of those decisions determines the course of history. The emphasis throughout the NIC report on the role of leadership as the determining factor, however, is quite unsatisfactory. It turns leadership into a kind of ideologically blind quality. “Taking the right decision” must always be related to the questions “right for whom?”, and “right in terms of which norms?” What is the referent object and what are the values that need to be protected and promoted?

It is important, therefore, to analyse the basis on which the “key drivers and barriers” are selected. In the NIC report they are simply out there, apparently self-evident: “globalization, demography, the rise of new powers, the decay of international institutions, climate change, and the geopolitics of energy”. They lead to “relative certainties” and “key uncertainties”, as listed in Table 1.

290 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
293 NIC, Global Trends 2025, opening page.
Table 1: Key Factors in Global Trends 2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Certainties up to 2025</th>
<th>Key Uncertainties up to 2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Global multipolar system (USA, China, India, Brazil, Russia, EU/Europe), with the less dominant</td>
<td>1. Will global powers work with multilateral institutions to adapt their structure and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but still the most powerful.</td>
<td>performance to the transformed geopolitical landscape?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Growing power for legal and criminal NGOs.</td>
<td>2. How quickly will climate change occur and what are the locations where its impact is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>most profound?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Increased pressure on energy, food, and water resources due to continued economic growth and</td>
<td>3. Will an energy transition away from oil and gas be completed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population growth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Growing conflict potential in the Middle East due to rapid changes and the spread of lethal</td>
<td>4. Will regional fears about a nuclear armed Iran trigger an arms race and greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capabilities.</td>
<td>militarization; or will the Greater Middle East become more stable (stability in Iraq, end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Israeli–Arab conflict)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Terrorism is unlikely to disappear, but can diminish depending on economic growth in the</td>
<td>5. Will democratization occur in Russia and China?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East. Terrorism can become more destructive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Several youth-bulge states (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Yemen) remain rapid</td>
<td>6. Will Japan and Europe overcome economic and social challenges caused or compounded by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>growth trajectories, creating instability unless employment conditions change dramatically.</td>
<td>demography?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Will mercantilism stage a comeback and will global markets recede?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This list is rather unbalanced in terms of a consistent reasoning: system level variables and country specific variables are used randomly, without establishing their interrelationship. The key factors also reveal a variety of security discourses, but their apparent endurance goes unexplained. As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde have tried to show, these discourses can be structured in a clear framework,

---

often referred to as the Copenhagen School in Security Studies. Below I will use this framework to shed light on the determinants of the future relationship between Turkey and the EU.

The Copenhagen School

The building blocks of the Copenhagen School are: (1) securitization theory; (2) system theory; and (3) a sector approach.

Securitization theory focuses on the social-political functions of labelling something a security issue. It also focuses on the way security discourses become institutionalised, and come to dominate politics. Security is the absence of threat. In a security discourse, however, the word ‘security’ is used for exactly the opposite purpose: it points at the presence of a threat. Reports like Global Trends 2025 sketch the dark clouds and the windows of opportunity that are expected to lie just beyond the short-term and mid-term horizons in policy-making. These expected clouds and windows implicitly advise policy-makers where to put their priorities in the coming years, either to avert expected disasters or to finally solve long-standing threats.

If a security discourse persists it will result in community-building and institutionalisation, often involving enmity/amity patterns between dissenting or competing groups and organisations. Communities and societies are built on security discourses. I don’t expect this to change. The institutionalisation of security discourses makes these discourses the subjects of ordinary politics. Governments and societies develop rules that allocate the means necessary to master emergency situations. Hence, the NIC report cannot but reflect the threat scenarios that the NIC itself brought into existence. An analysis of long-term perspectives of Turkish–EU relations similarly has no choice but to start with the existing security concerns of the actors involved. Present perceptions of Turkish–EU relations determine the starting-point of the analysis. But where will these actors be in 2025? How strong will their position in society be? Will their concerns and their strategies still be the same? Probably not.

One way to structure security concerns is to follow the sector approach. In Buzan et al., sectors are presented as lenses: by placing specific existential values at the centre of the analysis, the world will be described in those terms. For example, if military values are made central, an issue like energy supply and demand will be analysed in terms of strategic sensitivities and vulnerabilities, and military interdependence between given actors. If energy supply and demand is analysed through an environmental lens, the focus will be on pollution and possible contributions to climate change. From an economic perspective the analysis will focus on costs and benefits for the industries that are involved and on the impact on

financial markets. Through a societal lens the effects on social conditions and identity formations will be highlighted, such as labour unions, the future of traditional mining communities or the way national identities of some OPEC countries are shaped by their oil industries.

These examples cover the five sectors that are used by the Copenhagen School. The military sector is about territorial integrity. Traditionally the state level constructs the dominant security concerns, but at the domestic level, too, territorial integrity is a concern, especially in quasi-states and failed states, as well as in the notion of gated societies, which has found its way into the West.

The political sector is about governmental and administrative integrity. Again, traditional concerns about eroding sovereignty form a big part of the story. Especially in the context of European integration, the price for ‘pooling’ sovereign rights is in constant conflict with functionalist arguments about the economic, environmental and military profit of an ever closer union. In the face of globalisation — the fruits and perils of interdependence, as the British historian Ramsay Muir labelled it in 1933 — political security discourses are about the ability to rule, not just at the state level, but also at the community level. Others have emphasized how civil wars and inner-city warfare are fuelled by transitional networks. The same goes for conducting economic policies: the success of individual governments largely depends on market structures and forces beyond the reach of any of them. In the legal realm national politics is also losing sovereign ground to international rules, contracts, treaty obligations and, in the European context, laws that take precedence over national powers.

The economic sector focuses on welfare and development, on market structures, finances and trade. In the present era “freedom from market distortions” dominates the debates, followed by concerns about energy supply and demand security. Economic security issues are felt hardest at the individual level. Job security is a constant worry for billions, and for about 1 billion people even that would be a luxury problem; they live below the poverty line and struggle with physical survival. The other level for major concern is the maintenance of the world economy. At the global level, the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO) has beaten competing (communist) structures; but will it survive the crises that are inherent to capitalism?

The societal sector is about integrity of identities and cultures. It has been popularised by Huntington’s image of a clash of civilizations — which, together with 9/11, helped to trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy. By arguing that differences between “Us” and “Them” can be crucial, they become crucial. In that quality, the security discourses about identity repeat the discourses that helped to vote fascism into power in Italy and Germany in the 1930s. The Global War on Terror fits the image; it helps to create the very enemies it tries to crush. Identity issues play out particularly at the local and the regional levels. States are often caught in between, with elites having no choice but to manage the existing pluralism in their societies and across their borders.

The environmental sector is about the integrity of living conditions. This ranges from health security to climate change. The security discourses focus mainly on the global level and the local drama. The main paradox at the basis of environmental security discourses is that in order to preserve the political-economic and social-cultural structures of local, national and world societies it is necessary to change them fundamentally, because of their unsustainability. The warning reads that either the structures are changed voluntarily and in a controlled manner, or structural change will be enforced violently and randomly by environmental crises. Much of the debate boils down to the question “who is to pay a price today to avoid that others have to pay a higher price tomorrow?”

Each of these lenses highlights specific concerns. It is also possible to work in reverse, so that texts like Global Trends 2025 can be analysed to discover the lenses that are used implicitly. However, this still does not tell the full story. It is important to trace in security discourses what or who the referent object of the concern is. Whose security are we talking about?

Part of the answer can be found by looking at the speakers in the discourse: who are the securitizing actors? In the case of Global Trends 2025, this is the NIC. The obvious referent object is the US administration, for which the report was produced in the first place. It is an analysis for foreign policy purposes, which works as a kind of filter for the key trends that are selected. The future character of the USA’s domestic society, especially, is black-boxed, except for some general demographical, economic, and military features. For the purpose of foreign policy advice, developments abroad are selected to the extent that they seem relevant for specific bilateral relations and global stability.

The third element of the Copenhagen School may help to structure this in a more neutral way, by applying system theory. World politics can be studied at different levels of analysis, ranging from the local level to the global level. System theory distinguishes between the system level and the unit level. At the system level we find a different logic than at the unit level. The system is constructed by the units, but not by a single one of them. The system can only be understood in terms

of interaction patterns, not single motives. Hence, the role of leadership is not an
independent variable. Moreover, over time systems develop dynamics of their own:
the global structure encourages some processes and discourages others. Obviously, then, how the units perceive the system is important.

In the end the global structure is human-made, but it is not designed, and it
leads a life of its own. More refined sub-systems can be detected: structures that
embrace sub-sets of units which together evolve a group dynamic distinct from the
system dynamics and partly independent from it. Within these system and sub-

system contexts, the units also live a life on their own. They have an identity and
behavioural capabilities that are shaped by their internal structures as much as by
their external interactions. Hence there is a sub-unit level that needs to be
considered. This implies (hi)stories about what the unit is, what it is composed of,
what its purpose and destiny are, and so on.

System analysis is not by definition state-centric, although it is mostly used
in that way, defining sovereign states as the units. But one can also define other
units, such as firms or international organisations or individuals, depending on the
purpose of the analysis. In political science, the state-centric reading of system
theory is dominant. In this reading each level of analysis can be characterised by its
own security discourse. The system level is covered by global security concerns:
the way that survival of the units is related to, and dependent on, the survival of the
whole. The sub-system level is covered by regional security concerns: the way that
units are concerned about their direct salient environment. This is captured well by
Barry Buzan’s security complex theory. The unit level tends to be about state
security — the way the unit relates to both its external and internal salient
environment. But it can also be about the integrity of other types of unit, such as the
EU. The sub-unit level tends to be about human security. Taken together, this
results in the following framework (see Table 2):

Global Security and Turkish–EU Relations

When it comes to future scenarios at the system level, Turkey and the EU are in
crucially different positions. The EU is an active player at this level, whereas Turkey
is not. Turkey simply does not have the resources to push world politics. The NIC,
and many others, define the EU mainly as a potential player, because it lacks the
features and symbols of traditional great powers, let alone of a superpower. At the
same time, however, all the literature on world politics deals with Europe as a global
factor. Elsewhere I have argued that this ambivalence about Europe tells us more
about the scholars analysing it than about the power of Europe. The switch in the

300 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the
301 Jaap de Wilde, “Fears into Fences: The Isolationist Pitfalls of European Federalism.” In:
Stefano Guzzini and Ditrich Jung, eds. Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen
previous sentence from EU to Europe was deliberate. One of the biggest mistakes made in political analyses of Europe is that it is equated with the EU, and subsequently the EU is treated as a kind of ‘quasi state’ — a concept developed to qualify the malfunctioning of African states, rather than those of Europe.\(^\text{302}\) (In the quasi-state literature Europe is often called “postmodern”.) Implicitly, and often explicitly, analysts are waiting for the “ultimate” outcome of integration: the United States of Europe, a federation carrying all major symbols of a nation state (flag, anthem, and army) and a central government that can and is willing to play power politics according to our 19\(^\text{th}\) century inspired reading of world history.\(^\text{303}\)

This is one scenario of where the EU/Europe may be heading, and it has the potential to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the scenario of a Fortress Europe. If this is Europe’s future, it is likely that in 25 years the EU will be involved in constant warfare, a major target for terrorism, with borders in the south and east that have copied the present practices in Ceuta and Melina (the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, which are similar to the Berlin Wall), yet are as porous to illegal trespassing as the southern border of the USA.\(^\text{304}\) The big question in this scenario is whether Turkey is inside or outside of the fortress. If it is inside, Europe will inherit all of Turkey’s geopolitical strategic advantages and disadvantages; if it is outside, EU–Turkish relations will be tense and conflictive.

Yet, the existing power of Europe is both global and real. Europe is not waiting for a global role, like Brazil or India, for instance, but is already playing one. The NIC’s image of a hobbled giant is blind to the reality of a Europe of Concentric Circles. In this scenario it is a likely that existing practices will endure: the core of Europe is formed by the EU and NATO and, within these international organisations, by France, Germany, the UK, Italy and the European Commission. Member states with strong economies and/or strong political identities play a major role. Member states with weak economies accept their position due to the dynamics of European institutions. Weaker international organisations, especially the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but also the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), play crucial roles in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, Central Asia — and in 25 years, probably also in the Middle East. In this scenario Europe has strengthened and

---


\(^\text{303}\) See Jaap H. de Wilde, “Uit de Tijd, uit de Pas? Anachronistisch denken in de politieke wetenschap.” Oratie University of Groningen, delivered 10 February 2009.

\(^\text{304}\) Cf. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., \textit{The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
cultivated its global and regional role as a soft power: a force to reckon with, yet multilateral by nature, hence also a force to negotiate with.

In this scenario, whether Turkey is an EU member state or not, is not very important. In 25 years the membership issue will have lost its political salience and its symbolic value. Like today, Turkey will be part of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea area and the Caucasus. Its geopolitical position as a doorway and barrier — a sluice — between various regional security complexes will be strengthened and exploited positively. In the Fortress Europe scenario, Turkey will be trapped by the security dynamics around its borders, and troublesome for all its neighbours. In the Concentric Circles scenario, Turkey will be central to its success.

After the Second World War, Europe’s role was mainly negative in military and political terms: in the process of decolonisation, it lost its political clout. This was overlaid by Cold War realities and helped to stir up the identity issues (societal security) that came to dominate much of world politics after the Cold War. Still, as an acknowledgement of their former global position, France and the UK got a permanent seat and veto power in the UN Security Council. This exceptional position in the UN is one of the reasons why the EU is unlikely to become a federation. France and the UK cherish their global reach and will want to hold onto it, rather than give it up to the EU (the Commission or the High Representative on CFSP), which has, in the meantime, achieved its own recognition as a global player. Moreover, Germany has found its way to the system level too; politically in fora such as the G-8 (where Italy also plays a global role), but essentially because of its economic power. Economically, the EU’s Common Market is as important as the North American and the Asian markets. The latter has, until recently, been dominated by the Japanese economy; in 25 years it is more likely to be controlled by China, India and parts of Russia, as well as international organisations building on their experiences with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and ASEAN.

Trilateralism in economics is a starting-point for all future scenarios, and, however divided, Europe is part of that. As a consequence, Europe is also a leading player in global environmental issues. At the core of global environmental dynamics are both economic and demographic aspects. As long as these are at odds with sustainability, they represent a fundamental source of global instability. Hence, centres of economic activity and economic powers are by definition at the heart of

environmental debates: without their active cooperation not much can be achieved.308

On a more positive note, Europe — again, divided as it is — is a dominant actor in pushing democratisation and human rights, and is spreading (the logic of) civil society organisations and social movements across the world. This global role is strengthened in the Concentric Circles scenario. Its track record is far from clean (think, for example, of the betrayal of Algeria in 1992, or the continued double standards on free trade versus protectionism) and there is much confusion about its direction, but having learned to accept its own internal pluralism, Europe is equipped to deal with the kind of pluralism that is unavoidable worldwide. Hence, the economic power of the EU combined with its complex internal political nature turns it into a role model for various regions to follow (the African Union, for one, is quite explicit about this). The very nature of contemporary Europe adds to its power, even if it is labelled soft power. Moreover, whether Europe lacks hard power is difficult to tell, since it has not been tested since 1945.

Relations between the EU and the Russian Federation — largely concerned with regional issues such as energy policies, levels of democracy, organised crime, spheres of influence, and multilateral cooperation in the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO — also influence the global playing field. At the present time, however, there is not much contention at the global level between the Russian Federation and the EU, France, Germany, or the UK.

This is true in general for all the major global players. If we take the USA, the Russian Federation, the EU/France/Germany/UK combination, Japan, China and the upcoming political-economic great powers India and (perhaps) Brazil, there are no major controversies between them at the global level. They all share — at this level — the norms of the LIEO, even though they all favour regional or national protectionism when it serves them. But even this is a shared and accepted characteristic. The political dimension of these economic battles is well embedded in the World Trade Organisation. Global interstate military conflicts at present only exist on the drawing tables of the military establishments. The risk of another world war, now and in the coming decades, is more likely to emerge from escalated regional warfare than from global political instability, as was the case during the Cold War. The repetition of a First World War scenario (i.e., unwilling and unforeseen entrapment in the logic of escalation) is more likely than a Second World War scenario (i.e., collective action against a global aggressor) or a Cold War scenario (a dual between ideological or cultural blocs).

Catastrophic terrorism — which so far exists only in the imagination — is a historically new idea, which potentially upsets the notion of levels of analysis altogether. Small-scale actors or networks could destroy large parts of the global infrastructure if they managed to deploy WMDs. So far their direct impact has been

308 For a good overview on this, see Hans Günther Brauch, Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks in Environmental and Human Security. Publication Series no. 1. (Bonn: UNU-EHS, 2005).
only local and regional (it was the USA rather than Al Qaeda that globalised the impact of 9/11), but should any attacks on the scale of Hiroshima/Nagasaki occur, their global impact would be obvious. Nevertheless, the power of terrorism is mainly destructive: it is very hard for terrorist organisations to use their power as a deterrent or for blackmail purposes in an attempt to protect or create a world of their liking. Moreover, the peculiar setting of Al Qaeda’s terrorism is a remnant of the Cold War: Muslim fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan was stimulated by the proxy war between the USA and the Soviet Union there. In general, terrorism is a local threat and a regional phenomenon, mostly related to social resistance against oppressive governments. As long as it lacks a well-developed diplomatic dimension, it cannot achieve much besides fear and destruction. As soon as a diplomatic dimension is developed, then in principle conflict management and political compromise become feasible, even though deadlocks and civil war can continue for generations, as the history of the PLO shows.

The most difficult aspect of global scenarios is to estimate the consequences of the dark side of the LIEO. Capitalism is built on insecurity: the constant risks of bankruptcy, job insecurity, financial crises, etc., are supposed to keep the economy and the market vibrant and healthy. World economic crises are temporary consequences; world poverty is a structural consequence. Environmental policies will be an add-on dimension, a luxury for those who can afford the extra costs. Politics are required to run the global commons; economic logic only applies to scarcities. The impacts of demographic, environmental and economic crises are hard to predict, but are expected to begin at the local level irrespective of global origins. Future scenarios treat them as ceteris paribus and hope that future generations will cope and manage.

Regional Security and Turkish–EU Relations

Talking about Europe rather than the EU raises the interesting question of whether Turkey belongs to it or not. Strategically, Turkey is a crucial ally for the USA, and within NATO Turkey is an important member state. It is strategically positioned both militarily and culturally, as emphasised by the NIC report (see above). The future definition of Europe, with or without Turkey, has global significance. But the processes which will determine where it is in 25 years moves us to the sub-system level of analysis.

As Buzan and Wæver argue in *Regions and Powers* (2003), the USA, as the only military-political superpower at present, must clearly be part of any regional analysis. In the Clinton and Bush eras, US policies towards Europe still carried a dominant imprint of the Cold War: military containment of Russia combined with institutionalised diplomatic negotiations. NATO enlargement has restricted the number of Russia’s European, non-NATO member neighbours to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Kaliningrad has become a crucial outpost for Russia. Within NATO, the special relationship with Russia has replaced the Cold War fora for arms race negotiations. The military strategic core within NATO has moved from West Germany and West Berlin to Poland and Turkey. Hence, US pressure on the EU to accept Turkey as a member state will remain strong.

The main obstacle to Turkish membership comes from the territorial and political conflicts with Greece and Cyprus. The EU failed to link the membership of Cyprus, especially, to a friendly solution of the island’s division. As a result, Turkish membership has become much more than a functional consequence of widening and deepening European integration. Prestige and other intangible issues have entered the sober negotiations about the various chapters of the Copenhagen criteria; as Mansbach and Vasquez have argued, intangible issues can be solved but they are not negotiable.\(^3\) In my view, the negotiations about EU membership will trouble rather than smooth EU–Turkish relations for long time to come.

A more successful approach is incremental and functionalist. The best way to solve the Cyprus issue is to imitate the Alsace-Lorraine approach: forget about it. The French–German controversy has been depoliticised rather than solved. Similarly, human rights controversies cannot be addressed successfully through the membership debate; they need to be addressed in the context of the CoE, the OSCE and UN institutions. Human rights issues are increasingly being (mis)used for power politics, stirring EU arrogance versus Turkish “mind your own business” attitudes. Meanwhile Europe’s security agenda is no longer dominated by military issues, but by so-called “Third Pillar” issues: effective cooperation in the fields of policing, intelligence, and criminal law, while improving transparency, checks and balances and human rights legislation. Globalisation plus Europeanisation has resulted in a pan-European arena of home affairs. Turkey is part of that arena already. Further cooperation between Turkey and the EU member states in the field of transnational security issues is in the interests of both, with or without Turkish membership.

But Turkey is also involved in the security issues of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Black Sea area. Buzan and Wæver call it an “insulator” between various regional security complexes.\(^3\) It is also, however, the meeting place of these security complexes. A regional security complex is defined as: “A set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so

---


interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. The term “insulator” is appropriate if one takes a global look at these complexes: Turkey is not at the heart of their dynamics, but at the periphery. From a national perspective, however, Turkish politics has no choice but to take all of them into account and to find a balance between them.

A Fortress Europe scenario would put Turkey in the frontline, which is not a very comfortable position (as Belgium discovered in the First World War). On which side of the frontline Turkey might find itself would probably be determined mainly by the foreign policy of the USA. If US interest remains high, Turkey is likely to end up within the EU/NATO bulwark. If US involvement diminishes, and if NATO continues to lose political significance, Turkey is likely to end up outside of the EU.

Again, if Europe continues to develop along the lines of concentric circles (either by policy choice, or because its pluralism is too strong to realize the fortress scenario) it will not matter a great deal whether Turkey achieves full EU membership or not. Its military-political position will be similar to that of non-EU member Norway. Its economic position will be mixed: the urbanised centres will function like most urban centres today in the world economy — Istanbul and Ankara are cosmopolitan centres like Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kiev. The countryside, however, will at best resemble Western Europe in the early 1950s. It is questionable whether EU membership will make much difference in trying to solve this urban–rural cleavage. The test of this for the coming decades will be what happens in some of the new EU member states, notably Romania and Bulgaria.

When it comes to societal security — controversies in terms of competing identities — Huntington, Kaplan, the NIC and Buzan and Wæver all put a lot of emphasis on Turkey’s role. Far from being an insulator, Turkish domestic politics can set the standard for ways to bridge or escalate tensions between religious and secular politics. The ability to depoliticise identity issues goes way beyond the power of governments. Governments can at best freeze or suppress the tensions, and then facilitate dialogue and cooperation, as the USA, UN and EU have done in former Yugoslavia. To free societies from these tensions generally takes generations.

State Security and Turkish–EU Relations

In system analysis the unit level occupies a strange position. It is constructed by a combination of system and sub-system dynamics, and sub-unit dynamics. In traditional political analysis, the unit level is the state level, and its identity is shaped by domestic and foreign pressures. The distinction between these pressures is not pre-ordained, but is itself a social construct. Historically, state formation occurs in a setting of the conflictive and cooperative interactions among groups of people who

develop actor status and social identities in the process. The logic of internal and external affairs, as well as the logic of “Us” versus “Them”, both emerge out this process. Over time this becomes institutionalised in governmental structures and “national” myths about identities. The resulting sovereign states tend to be treated as given and constant in most political analyses, or as independent variables. But in an analysis of EU–Turkish relations the future of governmental structures is at the heart of the debate. How will the grown complexity of multilevel governance within the EU develop, and in what way will the Turkish governmental structures get involved? Fully integrated, sharing the discourse on ‘pooled’ sovereignty? Or fully separated, developing into a discourse on bilateral diplomacy?

A government, once shaped, also develops its own dynamics. Governments have to deal with their external and internal circumstances, as well as their means to execute policies successfully. This is where the NIC report hides behind ‘leadership’ in writing about future scenarios: it keeps the state level essentially black-boxed. Will we see reincarnations of Ataturk and Delors? Obviously, leadership (or the lack of it) plays an important role, but the patterns of conflict and cooperation that can be expected to have an effect on policy choices are even more important. National security policies will be set in the context of these dynamics. Their analysis will reveal the most likely policy options that are available.

One obstacle in assessing unit level dynamics is the very nature of multilevel governance within Europe. The unit level consists of competing and overlapping units. The EU is an actor at the unit level and a forum for action at the sub-system level at the same time. This in fact explains its success and what makes it attractive for candidate countries: it is the first power in history with a periphery that wants to be absorbed. Still, the EU has not yet been able to develop a “state security” discourse about its own survival. The Second Pillar developments that promise a common foreign and security policy and a European army are still basically intergovernmental. It offers at best a sub-system level umbrella for collective security — but it is doubtful whether any soldier in Europe is willing to die for EU interests formulated as such. NATO, also at the sub-system level, is far more successful in the realm of collective military security. The EU’s success is enormous, but primarily in terms of economic security (creating and protecting the Common Market), and political security (replacing the struggle for power discourse by the integration discourse). Turkey’s contribution to collective military security is optimal already due to its NATO membership. Turkey’s potential contribution to the Common Market is still quite limited. Many analysts see its membership as an economic and societal burden rather than an opportunity.315

As a candidate country Turkey is already part of the integration discourse. The inherent problem of that discourse, however, is that it rests on the assumption

---

that integration will progress. The notion of integration can be seen as synonymous with the notion of growth in economics. Without growth, the economy is in crisis; stagnation is bad news. Similarly, without further integration the EU is in crisis. Discussing the conditions of EU membership only makes sense if there is a belief that membership will be achieved some day. If EU membership for Turkey is not a feasible option, discussing it loses meaning. But as long as it is discussed, Turkey is successfully embedded in the integration discourse.

The main conflict area between the EU and Turkey is at the societal level, focussing on human rights and minority policies. As argued above, the CoE offers a much better forum for these issues than the EU does. For Turkey’s state security, moreover, Kurdish separatism forms a classic threat. The logic of peaceful disintegration into separate, smaller sovereign states has only a very short track record: the implosion of the Soviet Union, and divorce of Czechoslovakia. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, particularly, show the paradox of contemporary sovereignty: after formalizing their borders, they agreed to get rid of them again by joining the EU. This scenario may well help with the Turkish-Kurdish problem, and with the problem of Cyprus. But institutionalised reflexes dictate that the state coerce first and talk later. It is likely that developments in Iraq and Chechnya will have a bigger impact on the Kurdish issue than the EU/UK combination or the wisdom of the Turkish governments, whatever the leadership.

Human Security and Turkish–EU Relations

At the domestic level, both the EU members and Turkey are faced with societal insecurity. Even when the causes of conflicts are essentially economic or environmental, they will surface as societal crises, strengthening cultural and class differences. Armed societies, quite common in other parts of the world (sometimes even on a constitutional basis as in the USA, Brazil and South Africa), are likely to grow throughout Europe. Gated communities and voluntary apartheid are likely to increase too. The distinction between military, police and intelligence work is becoming blurred because of the growing awareness of the transnational proportions of local security issues. States, the EU members in particular, compensate for their open borders by changing the balance between collective security and the security of privacy to the advantage of the former. This process has been given a huge boost by the Global War on Terror.

Within societies, too, more and more self-help initiatives emerge. This is increasingly defended or legitimized in terms of human security initiatives “from

The shift from state security to human security is mainly developed to protect societies against their governments. Failed states, quasi-states and autocracies are unable or unwilling to serve their subjects in the way that we expect of modern governments. There is a “Responsibility to Protect”, and governments who fail to do so run the risk of (violent) intervention. This can be called “top-down human security”. It is a very slippery concept, which can be easily misused. The same is true for human security from below: how to distinguish a proper human security self-help network from a criminal self-help network is not that easy. Nevertheless, the human security literature draws attention to new societal practices in which citizens are not passively waiting for the formal authorities to take care of their needs. In case of basic needs there will be little debate about this. But in more sophisticated circumstances, competing centres of public authority can claim to be the true agents of human security. The PKK is an example of such a competing authority.

On the positive side, Europe and Turkey can profit from their transnational intertwinement. The strong and well-established Turkish populations in Germany and the Netherlands can play an important part in bridging societal differences. The NIC report makes the point that these communities can play a crucial role in depoliticising cultural differences.

Conclusion

In conclusion it can be argued that the future of Turkish–EU relations first of all depends on global security in all sectors. Preventing global catastrophes is beyond their reach, although the EU/France/Germany/UK combination has some influence at this level.

Regional security dynamics are also largely determined by the EU and its main member states, but Turkey’s position and policies are crucial for Europe’s relationship with other regions, especially the Middle East. A Fortress Europe scenario will probably leave Turkey out, unless US pressure is too strong for the EU and Turkey to resist. But whether it is on the inside or the outside, a fortress Europe would put Turkey at the frontline of classical military conflict scenarios and thus in a difficult position. If Europe actively opts for, or passively continues to pursue, a Concentric Circles scenario, Turkey would be far better off. It can negotiate its position on European policies on an issue-specific basis, either as a member, a candidate or a good neighbour. This will help Turkey to keep its present role as an insulator between the security dynamics of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the

317 Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde, eds., The Viability of Human Security (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008).
Caucasus, the Black Sea area, and Europe. This would clearly be in the interests of the EU.

State security dynamics are dominated by Turkey. EU member states (except perhaps Cyprus and Greece) are not faced with traditional interstate threats. Domestically some are instable (e.g., Belgium, Spain and Italy), but this has been the case for decades and full-blown civil wars as in former Yugoslavia are not likely. The EU itself is still far from having a state-like discourse about its security. Such discourses focus on sovereignty versus internal and external threats to the carrier of sovereignty — the official government, which is something the EU does not have. Turkey has the most difficult agenda to manage here, ranging from deep and potentially violent domestic cleavages within its society to facing violent separatism, and potential conflicts with most of its neighbours, including some of its EU neighbours. Good relationships with the EU and the USA are and will remain crucial, but can also stir up or exacerbate domestic cleavages.

Human security initiatives from below are likely to increase during the coming decades. What their impact will be is hard to tell: they may stimulate the fragmentation of existing sovereign states into smaller entities, which can potentially be a peaceful process. However, they have a tendency to split societies into competitive self-help groups which, in the end, will destabilize the larger societies they belong to. Former Czechoslovakia and former Yugoslavia highlight the kind of extremes that lie on Turkey’s horizon.

All in all, 25 years is too long a period to make reliable predictions. The best that such scenarios can do is to follow specific lines of reasoning based on readings of present dominant security discourses, recent experiences, and political theory. The Copenhagen School offers a consistent approach to structure these discourses in a less *ad hoc* manner than, for example, the US National Intelligence Council does in *Global Trends*. Assuming that both Turkey and the EU still exist in 25 years, it is not leadership that will keep the two together but a proper reading of their interdependence at the regional level.

References


Den Boer, Monica and Jaap de Wilde, eds. The Viability of Human Security. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008.


De Wilde, Jaap H. “Uit de Tijd, uit de Pas? Anachronistisch denken in de politieke wetenschap.” Oratie University of Groningen, delivered 10 February 2009.


HARMONIE PAPERS


4. Štefan Sarvaš, One Past, Two Futures?: The NATO Enlargement Debate in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, January 1999, €7 (incl. postage).


7. Otto Doornbos, Educating Slovakia’s Senior Officers, June 1999, €7 (incl. postage).


**Special Issues**

Ivanka Nedeva and Joost Herman (eds), *Minorities and Foreign Policy*, November 1998, €14 (incl. postage).

Herman W. Hoen, and others, Governance Structures in Central and Eastern Europe, September 2000, €14 (incl. postage).